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ABSTRACT
 This thesis examines how military members and veterans with Operational Stress 
Injuries are treated by Canadian justice systems. It suggests a correlation between mental 
injuries sustained on operations by military personnel and propensities for military and 
societal misconduct. By comparing civilian and military processes with American justice 
counterparts, a plan to improve the existing Canadian legal landscape is proposed. Using 
an analysis of the underlying philosophy and purpose of military justice, a problem 
solving diversionary court is recommended, along with legislative and policy 
amendments. The use of a consent-based “Treatment Standing Court Martial” would 
place military justice officials parallel to civilian justice alternative measures programs, 
and in a better position to break the cycle of recidivism among veterans by addressing 
root causes. Education to reduce stigma along with military-civilian partnerships are also 
advocated to enhance the detection of mental illness and to foster early treatment for 
military personnel and veterans. The overall goals of the work include: reducing 
recidivism, improving operational efficiency and taking care of military members, 
veterans and their families.   
ix
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
After ten years of combat in Afghanistan, with troops still remaining in that war 
zone to train the Afghan security forces,1 Canadian military officials are now dealing 
with healing the combat wounds of thousands of veterans. These wounds are not always 
visible. In fact, many have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
operational stress injuries (OSI) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI). Unfortunately, these 
“hidden wounds of war” often manifest as disciplinary or criminal activity, attracting the 
scrutiny of the military justice system or the civilian justice system. Research has shown 
that punishing and incarcerating veterans with these hidden wounds, without proper 
comprehensive treatment, results in higher than necessary rates of recidivism.2 Due to the 
nature of their specialized training to inflict violence and their related experiences, the 
1 See e.g. “Operation ATTENTION”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp>: “Operation 
ATTENTION is Canada’s participation in the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan 
(NTM-A), which delivers training and professional development support to the national 
security forces of Afghanistan: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan Air Force 
(AAF), and the Afghan National Police (ANP) [.…] In 2012, now a mature mission, 
NTM-A is working to sustain its momentum while initiating preparations for the transfer 
of the lead security responsibility to Afghan control in 2014. This is a conditions-based 
process that will take place when: the Afghan national security forces are ready to 
shoulder responsibility for security with steadily decreasing assistance from ISAF 
[(International Security Assistance Force)….]” 
2 Major Evan R. Seamone, “Reclaiming The Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The 
Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and 
TBI and Reduce Recedivism” (2001) 208 Mil L Rev 1 at 38: “Studies reveal that drug 
courts reduce recidivism and save more costs than traditional probation or prison. […] As 
applied to the treatment of mental illness […] there are strong indicators that the basic 
drug court principles work equally well.” 
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treatment of combat veterans with PTSD and TBIs has been recognized as a matter of 
public safety.3
The civilian justice system has adapted in recent years by pursuing more 
rehabilitative approaches when dealing with offenders with mental disorders. “Problem-
solving”4 courts (PSC) have exploded in North America. Numerous Canadian 
jurisdictions now have mental health courts (MHC)5 and/or drug treatment courts 
(DTC).6 Twenty-six American jurisdictions have created 88 veteran treatment courts 
(VTC), which are a combination of MHCs, DTCs and other PSCs for their veteran 
offenders.7 At present, Canadian veterans who are released (or serving members who 
commit offences over which the military does not choose to exercise jurisdiction) may 
3 Ibid., at 3: “In contrast to problem-solving courts, which target the illness underlying 
criminal conduct, courts-martial function as problem-generating courts when they result 
in punitive discharges that preclude mentally ill offenders from obtaining Veterans 
Affairs (VA) treatment. Such practices create a class of individuals whose untreated 
conditions endanger public safety and the veteran as they grow worse over time.” 
4 John H. Kramer, “Problem Solving Courts: New Approaches to Criminal Justice”, 
(2010) 39 Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 466: “Problem solving courts 
(PSC) have exploded onto the criminal justice scene in the last twenty years.” 
5 Donalee Moulton, “Mental health courts gain popularity across Canada” The Lawyer’s 
Weekly (1 June 2007), online: LexisNexis Canada Inc. 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=484>: “A few 
provinces, such as Ontario and New Brunswick, have mental health courts already up and 
running. Some provinces, like Newfoundland and Labrador, have ongoing pilot programs 
in place. Now they are being joined by other jurisdictions looking for ways to decrease 
the criminalization of the mentally ill while at the same time decreasing the growing 
number of individuals cramming provincial and federal jails”.  
6“Drug Treatment Court Funding Program”, online: Department of Justice Canada 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/pb-dgp/prog/dtc-ttt/index.html>: “There are 6 federally-
funded DTC pilot sites operating in Canada: Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, 
Ottawa and Regina.” 
7 Tori DeAngelis, “Help for struggling veterans -  Psychologists are involved in a new 
type of court that helps veterans on the wrong side of the law get the help they need to 
restart their lives”, online: (2012) 43:3 Monitor on Psychology 34 
<http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/03/veterans.aspx>. Note: More VTCs have been 
created since this count of 88 and continue to develop across the country. 
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have access to civilian rehabilitative alternative measures. Conversely, the military justice 
system currently has no similar mechanism in order to divert mentally ill veterans into 
these rehabilitative justice-led programs. Similarly, the civilian models do not yet fully 
incorporate the unique nature of military service into their PSC multi-disciplinary teams 
when dealing with veterans.
This thesis will argue that everyone suffering from a mental disability ought to 
have equal access to a justice system which is sensitive to their concerns. I will show that 
many Canadian civilians have access to problem solving courts, which are sensitive to 
their concerns; however, military personnel do not uniformly have access to mental 
health courts or other diversionary treatment courts. As a result, traumatized military 
personnel do not have equal access to a justice system sensitive to their concerns, and 
there is no military reason to deprive them of this access. Further, there is an urgent need 
to address this issue now. This thesis proposes that a problem solving court be created 
within military justice processes and that existing civilian processes be improved to meet 
the unique needs and concerns of released veterans. 
In order to substantiate this position, Chapter One will review the history of 
mental health in combat and modern understandings of the injuries, including the concept 
of comorbidity. It will articulate the difficulty in detecting the illness, particularly for 
justice officials, and explain how insufficient treatment exacerbates the problem. Further, 
it will compare existing processes for dealing with mentally injured veterans in the 
civilian and military justice systems.  
Chapter Two will develop why this issue is relevant now by describing the scope 
of the problem for the Canadian Forces and the current challenges in detection and 
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prevention of activities attracting military penal consequences. In addition, it will show 
that there are significant numbers of veterans anticipated to be suffering from OSIs and 
the correlative disciplinary or criminal behavior. It will also provide some relevant 
recommendations on improving the current justice processes for veterans, reducing OSI 
stigma and fostering related treatment.  
 Chapter Three will provide a comparative analysis of prosecuting veterans within 
the Canadian and the current American systems of justice. In so doing, it will compare 
four main areas, namely: the magnitude of the problem, the military justice process, the 
civilian justice process and veterans treatment courts. The comparison will assist in 
formulating the proposed Canadian approach. It will also provide some relevant 
recommendations on improving the current justice processes for veterans, reducing OSI 
stigma and fostering related treatment. 
Building upon existing civilian and foreign models and ideas, Chapter 4 will 
propose a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process. This process will 
include a court martial structure that allows diversion for treatment where appropriate. It 
will justify its use by referring to the underlying philosophies of the military justice 
system, statements of key officials, and the stated purpose of military justice: namely, 
discipline, morale and efficiency. It will express the hope that innovative justice methods 
will better balance rehabilitation, public safety and the public interest by treating veterans 
with the respect and care that they deserve. In addition, Chapter Four will also advocate 
for building partnerships with civilian justice officials by using a “whole of governments” 
approach to deal with veterans who have or will reintegrate into civil society. It will 
provide a blueprint or “campaign plan” upon which the Canadian Forces and others can 
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build. It will suggest three main areas of action, namely: legislative reform, policy 
reform, and an educational initiative for justice issues impacting veterans and military 
members with OSIs.   
Using primarily doctrinal, comparative, interdisciplinary and policy scholarship 
methodologies, this thesis will conclude that while all players truly have the best interests 
of Canadian Forces veterans at heart, they must consider new “tactics” to improve 
conditions and existing justice processes for our nation’s veterans. 
As a legal officer in the Canadian forces with more than a decade of experience in 
military prosecutions and advising front-line units on summary trials, I will periodically 
provide observations within this work, which is based on my personal experience.   
In addition, it should be made clear at the outset that while the arguments 
contained within this thesis place significant value on veterans and military personnel and 
their related treatment, the intent is not to devalue or prioritize veterans over any other 
profession, group or persons suffering from mental illness. Ideally, the 
reccommendations in this thesis should be tailored to all Canadians suffering from mental 
disabilities; however this work focuses only on the welfare of military members, veterans 
and their families. The purpose is not to fetishize militarism. Rather, the hope is to draw 
attention to veteran issues and their correlation to operating an effective fighting force - a 
tool in governance and diplomacy.   
1.1  MENTAL HEALTH IN COMBAT
1.1.1  A Historical Review 
As it is often said, in order to understand where we are going, we have to
5
understand where we have been. Using a doctrinal approach to understand mental health 
injuries among military personnel, a brief review of how militaries have dealt with these 
injuries in the past is necessary to ground the argument being made here. Well-known 
World War II American military general George S. Patton, Jr. is attributed with having 
said “I am convinced that much more emphasis should be placed on history. The purpose 
of history is to learn how human beings react when exposed to the danger of wounds or 
death [.…]”8  Further, military history and “lessons learned” are currently used by the 
Canadian Forces in determining future military doctrine and theory.9
The concept of suffering a mental health injury in combat is not new. As early as 
1900 BC, there were reports by Egyptian physicians of what would now be described as 
PTSD symptoms related to combat.10 These symptoms and related reporting crossed all 
cultures throughout the history of military combat.11
8 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers: 1940-1945 (United States of America: Da Capo 
Press, 1974) at 750. 
9 See e.g. “Chapter 1 – Canadian Military Doctrine”, online: National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces <http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=10772>: 
“Canadian Military Doctrine provides the military strategic guidance essential for the 
development and the employment of the full range of CF capabilities across the spectrum 
of operations in response to government direction. […] By building on lessons learned
with an understanding of the future, military doctrine provides the rationale behind the 
organization and the employment of military forces and assists in the determination of 
appropriate roles and missions.” [Emphasis mine]
10 Abdalla Bowirrat et al., “Neuro-psychopharmacogenetics and Neurological 
Antecedents of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Unlocking the Mysteries of Resilience and 
Vulnerability” online: (2010) 8:4 Curr Neuropharmacol 335 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3080591/>. 
11 See e.g. Steve Bentley, “A Short History of PTSD: From Thermopylae to Hue Soldiers 
Have Always Had A Disturbing Reaction To War” The VVA Veteran (March/April 2005) 
online: Vietnam Veterans of America 
<http://www.archive.vva.org/TheVeteran/2005_03/feature_HistoryPTSD.htm>. 
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The first term used to describe PTSD was “nostalgia” in 1678, though its name 
has changed over time.12 In 18th century, it was referred to as “homesickness,” while 
during the American Civil War it was called “soldier’s heart”.13 During World War I, it 
was known as “shell shock” and “war neurosis,” whereas World War II literature refers 
to it as “battle fatigue” and “combat exhaustion”.14 It should be noted that up until this 
point, most of the terminology used seemed to infer a non-medical condition that would 
pass. This is consistent with the historical stigma component of the problem we currently 
have today.
During the Gulf War in the early 1990s the symptomology was called “combat 
stress reaction”.15 More recently, since the commencement of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts, it has been referred to as PTSD and OSIs by most western nations. Some high-
ranking military officials and academics have argued that using modern medical 
terminologies for combat related trauma impedes treatment. This recently resulted in calls 
to change the name of the military ailment.16 The Americans ultimately rejected this 




15 Todd C. Helmus & Russell W. Glenn, “Steeling the Mind Combat Stress Reactions and 
Their Implications for Urban Warfare” RAND Arroyo Center (2005), online: RAND 
Corporation <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG191.pdf>. 
16 See e.g. Daniel Sagalyn, “Key Psychiatric Doctor Rejects Name Change for PTSD”
PBS Newshour (10 May 2012), online: MacNeil/Lehrer Productions 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/05/key-psychiatric-doctor-rejects-name-
change-for-ptsd.html>: “A key leader in the psychiatric community has rejected the idea 
of altering the name of a traumatic condition affecting an estimated tens of thousands of 
U.S. combat veterans -- a move that effectively blocks growing efforts by a small group 
of psychiatrists and military brass concerned about reducing patient stigma.” 
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approach in May 2012, suggesting that a multi-pronged approach, including combatting 
stigma using Canadian initiatives, is preferable.17
The historical evolution of combat mental injuries helps in understanding existing 
problems and the modern definitions for our veterans’ “hidden wounds”. 
1.1.2 Defining the Combat Injury Today
PTSD became a formal diagnosis in 1980, despite its likely existence since 
combat began.18 Today, it is commonly understood as an “anxiety disorder that develops 
after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or 
was threatened.”19 It has been recognized that military combat is a traumatic event that 
may trigger PTSD. Common symptoms include “flashback episodes, memories, 
nightmares, or frightening thoughts, especially when they are exposed to events or 
objects reminiscent of the trauma.”20 Other symptoms include emotional numbness, sleep 
disturbances, depression, anxiety, irritability, outbursts of anger, and feelings of intense 
guilt. Physical symptoms that may develop include “headaches, gastrointestinal distress, 
immune system problems, dizziness, chest pain, or discomfort in other parts of the 
body.”21 The fear of experiencing the symptoms generally leads to “avoidance” of things 
that remind sufferers of events that have caused the PTSD. Further, veterans often 
17 See e.g. ibid: “By contrast, Friedman said, the Canadian approach is ‘brilliant’ and is 
‘proof that stigma can be addressed successfully without changing the name of the 
diagnostic label. So we can have it both ways. Keep the PTSD diagnostic term and have 
it regarded as an injury.’"
18 Roxanne Dryden-Edwards, “Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)” MedecineNet.com,






experience “hyperarousal” causing them to be extremely sensitive or anxious about 
normal life experiences, such as driving a car. “Complex posttraumatic stress disorder (C-
PTSD) usually results from prolonged exposure to a traumatic event or series thereof and 
is characterized by long-lasting problems with many aspects of emotional and social 
functioning.”22 Prolonged exposure is consistent with deployments into combat in excess 
of twelve months during a three year period.23 In fact, the United Kingdom has taken 
steps to reduce deployment periods in order to minimize the risk of its soldiers 
developing PTSD.24
Along with the emotional and mental injuries that may occur in combat there are 
also physical injuries. Some physical injuries, such as TBIs, are difficult to detect because 
they cannot be seen and present more like a mental disorder. In addition to PTSD and 
OSIs, TBIs are now also commonly associated with combat veteran mental injuries. 
TBI’s more recent affiliation with injured veterans has been due to advancements in 
22 Ibid.
23 Brian P. Marx et al, “Association of Time Since Deployment, Combat Intensity, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms With Neuropsychological Outcomes Following Iraq War 
Deployment”, online: (2009) 66:9 Arch Gen Psychiatry 996 at 1002 <http://archpsyc. 
ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/66/9/996.pdf>: “Such a Pattern would be consistent with a stress 
sensitization model of PTSD, 26-28 which purports that stress exposure leads to changes 
in neurotransmitter and neurohormonal response that, in some cases, generate or 
exacerbate PTSD symptoms. The PTSD symptoms, in turn, further promote increased 
overreactivity of the nervous system.” [Emphasis mine] 
24 Mark Phillips, “Britain Limits Deployment to Reduce P.T.S.D.” The New York Times
(20 March 2012), online: nytimes.com 
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/20/would-a-draft-reduce-the-number-
of-post-traumatic-stress-cases/britain-limits-deployment-to-reduce-ptsd>: “One study 
found that personnel who deployed for 13 months or more in three years were more 
likely to fulfill the criteria for P.T.S.D. Research has focused on the clear relationship 
between the duration of deployment and poor well-being [….]” 
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radiology to allow for detection and diagnosis.25 A TBI is defined as “nondegenerative, 
noncongenital insult to the brain from an external mechanical force, possibly leading to 
permanent or temporary impairment of cognitive, physical, and psychosocial functions, 
with an associated diminished or altered state of consciousness.”26 [Emphasis mine] The 
mechanisms of injury of TBIs are consistent with combat related experiences including: 
motor vehicle accidents, falls and gunshot wounds.27 They are also linked to the use of 
alcohol, a common secondary illness to PTSD.28
Similarly, OSIs are “[i]njuries caused by operational stress and trauma.”29 The 
Canadian Forces refers to any persistent psychosocial problem that occurs as a result of a 
military operation as an OSI.30 This term seems to capture PTSD, C-PTSD and TBI, 
along with any secondary injuries or illnesses associated with combat, such as depression 
or addictions. This phrase was coined by the Department of National Defence in the 
25 Segun T Dawodu, “Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) - Definition, Epidemiology, 
Pathophysiology” Medscape Reference: Drugs, Diseases & Procedures (10 November 
2011), online: WebMD LLC <http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/326510-
overview#showall>: “Differences in diagnostic tools and admission criteria also may 
affect the above-defined severity classifications. In the past, the use of roentgenograms to 
help diagnose skull fractures after head injury did not show much of any concurrent 
intracranial lesions. These lesions were difficult to diagnose until the advent of CT 
scanning, which is now the diagnostic imaging of choice in TBI cases.” 
26Ibid.
27 Ibid: “Work-related TBIs constitute an estimated 45-50% of all TBIs. Incidence varies 
from 37 cases per 100,000 people for military employees (57% are related to 
transportation) to 15 cases per 100,000 people for civilians (50% are because of falls).”
28 Ibid: “Alcohol is a major factor in many TBIs and often is associated with the leading 
causes of TBI.” 
29 “What Are Operational Stress Injuries?” The invisible wounds (2006), online: 
Operational Stress Injury Social Support 
<http://www.osiss.ca/engraph/what_e.asp?sidecat=1>.
30 “Cumulative Incidence of PTSD and Other Mental Disorders: Executive Summary”, 
online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces <http://forces.gc.ca/health-
sante/ps/mh-sm/osi-bso/sum-som-eng.asp>. 
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creation of Operational Stress Injury Clinics. Secondary illnesses caused by PTSD or 
TBIs can be equally problematic, if left untreated. 
1.1.3 Secondary Illness    
The number of combat veterans who are diagnosed with secondary problems or 
illnesses caused as a direct result of PTSD is significant. This psychological phenomenon 
is often referred to as comorbidity. Among returning Iraq and Afghanistan veterans with 
mental health problems, the majority had a comorbid diagnosis. More specifically, “29% 
had 2 and one third had 3 or more different mental health diagnosis.”31
Combat PTSD or OSIs are commonly associated with other mental health 
disorders such as: depression, insomnia, substance abuse, anxiety, panic disorder, anger 
management and suicidal tendencies – to name a few.32 Often, a veteran experiencing 
flashbacks from combat can become depressed because they are having these issues. 
They may have nightmares and develop insomnia. They may turn to alcohol or drugs to 
dull the pain of the memories and develop addictions or substance abuse problems. The 
reduced sleep, the addictions and depression can lead to or exacerbate anger management 
issues. Some of these secondary issues can also lead to conditions that cause criminal or 
disciplinary behavioural problems.33 The secondary illnesses are relevant because they 
31 Karen H. Seal et al, “Trends and Risk Factors for Mental Health Diagnoses Among 
Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Using Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care, 2002-
2008” (2009) 99: 9 Am J of Pub Health 1651 at 1652. 
32 “Definition of Post-traumatic stress disorder” MedicineNet.com, online: MedicineNet, 
Inc. <http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=18779>: “Depression, 
alcohol or other substance abuse, or other anxiety disorders frequently co-occur with 
PTSD.”
33 See e.g. Terence T. Gorski & John M. Kelley, Counselor's Manual for Relapse 
Prevention with Chemically Dependent Criminal Offenders, (Rockville, Maryland: U.S. 
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can be displayed without a formal diagnosis of an OSI and mask more serious injuries 
related to combat. The resulting behaviours can also be mistaken for strictly disciplinary 
or criminal conduct, seemingly unrelated to underlying illness, and thereby solely 
engaging the military or civilian justice systems and related punitive or correctional 
philosophies. Without treatment, the likelihood of veteran recidivism increases, thereby 
creating a vicious cycle of increased punishment for misconduct without addressing the 
root problem: the OSI. The correlation between OSI and justice involvement is now well 
documented. 
1.1.4 The Correlation with Justice 
PTSD affects between a quarter and a third of combat troops. “Studies reveal that 
[a PTSD] diagnosis is related to perpetrating more types of violence.”34 For example, 
Clark et al. suggest that “a significant proportion of Service members returning from 
current wars either as a result of mental health problems or as a result of their military 
training are at high risk for contact with the criminal justice system.”35 Further, 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1996) at 5: “Chemical dependency can cause 
a person to commit crimes. People who are chemically dependant commit crimes related 
to their use of alcohol or drugs (drunk driving, public drunkenness, assault, etc.), the 
support of their addiction (selling drugs, committing crimes to get drugs or money for 
drugs, etc.), and secondary consequences of drug or alcohol use (not paying child support 
or court fines, failing to follow through with probation requirements, etc.).”
34 Supra, note 2.
35 Sean Clark et al, “Development of Veterans Treatment Courts: Local and Legislative 
Initiatives” (2010) 7 Drug Ct Rev 171 at 174: “In summary, significant numbers of 
America’s veterans are involved in the nation’s justice system or are at risk for such 
involvement. Justice-involved veterans have been shown to have high rates of substance 
abuse, mental illness, homelessness, and other chronic and infectious medical diseases.” 
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“involvement in the criminal justice system is a strong predictor of future arrests and 
incarceration for people with a psychiatric disability.”36
The assertions by academics that there is a correlation between OSI and justice 
are not merely theoretical. In a recent American study involving more than ninety 
thousand Marines who served from 2001 to 2007 revealed that soldiers with operational 
deployment who had been diagnosed with PTSD “were over 11 times more likely to 
engage in the most serious forms of misconduct than were combat deployed Marines 
without a psychiatric diagnosis.”37 [Emphasis mine] This quantitative study corroborates 
previous military research “linking mental disorders with antisocial behavior and legal 
problems […and] civilian literature indicating a strong overlap between psychiatric 
problems and misconduct.”38 According to Seamone, the 2009 Supreme Court of the 
United States decision in Porter v. McCollum39 suggests a recognized propensity of 
criminality and disciplinary problems for veterans by stating that there has been a “long 
36 David Loveland & Michael Boyle, “Inclusive Case Management as a Jail Diversion 
Program for People with a Serious Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature” (2007) 51 
Int’l L J Offender Therapy & Comp Criminology 130 at 132. 
37 Robyn M. Highfill-McRoy et al, “Psychiatric Diagnoses and Punishments for 
Misconduct: The Effects of PTSD in Combat-Deployed Marines”, online: (2010) 10:88 
BMC Psychiatry 1 at 6 <http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-244X-10-
88.pdf>.
38 See also Stephanie Booth-Kewley et al, “Psychosocial Predictors of Military 
Misconduct”, online: (2010) 198 J Nerv Ment Dis 91 at 97 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515104>. See also Claudia Baker & Cessie Alfonso, “PTSD 
and Criminal Behavior” Traumatic Stress Treatment Center, online: 
<http://www.traumatic-stress-treatment.com/artptsdandcriminalbehavior.html>: 
“[S]ymptoms of PTSD can incidentally lead to criminal behaviour [.…] Some combat 
veterans also may seek to recreate the adrenaline rush experienced during combat. 
Feeling the need to be always "on guard" can cause veterans to misinterpret benign 
situations as threatening and cause them to respond with self-protective behavior. 
Increased baseline physiological arousal results in violent behavior that is out of 
proportion to the perceived threat.”
39 130 S Ct 447 (2009).
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tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for 
those who fought on the front lines.”40
 American agencies have publicly recognized the increased public safety problems 
associated with having untreated mentally ill veterans in the community. The United 
States Department of Homeland Security recently cited national security concerns 
associated with terrorist groups trying to recruit veterans who have developed 
psychological problems from combat.41
 The increased risk of criminality or disciplinary issues among mentally ill 
veterans often results in interaction with the criminal justice system. Depending on 
whether the member is still serving, whether they are part way through their release 
process, or when, where and how an offence is committed, they may find themselves in 
either the military justice system or a civilian justice system. There are deficits for 
military members in either system. In particular, military processes lack alternative 
measures schemes found in the civilian justice system which may place veterans at a 
disadvantage when compared to civilian counterparts. Similarly, civilian processes lack 
the knowledge and military expertise to understand the offender’ values and to fully 
exploit existing treatment, support and social programs in determining sentences or 
40 Supra, note 2.
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
“Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in 
Radicalization and Recruitment” (7 April 2009) at 7, online: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf>: “DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing 
extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to exploit their 
skills and knowledge derived from military training and combat. These skills and 
knowledge have the potential to boost the capabilities of extremists—including lone 
wolves or small terrorist cells—to carry out violence. The willingness of a small 
percentage of military personnel to join extremist groups during the 1990s because they 
were disgruntled, disillusioned, or suffering from the psychological effects of war is 
being replicated today”. [Emphasis mine] 
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alternative measures for military members.  Currently, the approaches taken in these 
concurrent Canadian justice systems have stark differences for military members and 
veterans afflicted with OSIs.
1.2  THE CANADIAN JUSTICE PROCESSES
1.2.1 The Current Military Justice Process
 In the Canadian military justice system, there are two forms of service tribunals: 
the summary trial and the court martial.42 Service tribunals have jurisdiction over regular 
force43 members almost completely. Military tribunals also have jurisdiction over 
reservists44 and civilians in limited circumstances, including for offences committed 
while on defence establishments, in Canadian Forces vehicles, aircraft or vessels and 
(regarding reservists) when in uniform.45
1.2.1.1 The Summary Trial System
 The summary trial system is administered by the unit or formation of the military 
Member, and is normally presided over by a Commanding Officer46 or their delegated 
officer.47 A legal advisor is often required to provide pre-charge advice to the charge 
42 National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 2 [NDA]: “service tribunal” means a court 
martial or a person presiding at a summary trial.”
43 Ibid, s 15(1): “There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the regular 
force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for 
continuing, full-time military service.” 
44 Ibid, s 15(3): “There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve 
force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for 
other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.”
45 Ibid, s 60.
46 Ibid, s 163(1-1.1). See also, Queens Regulations and Orders 108.06. [QR&O]
47 Ibid, s 163(4). See also, ibid. 108.10.
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layer.48 The accused is provided with a Record of Disciplinary Proceedings (RDP) which 
includes some basic disclosure.49 The accused may or may not be provided with an 
opportunity to elect court martial.50 Such an election would automatically entitle the 
member to free legal counsel regardless of their rank or income.51 Offences which do not 
provide an election are often referred to as the “Baby Five”52 and are considered minor 
due to their maximum sentence of a fine in the amount of 25% of their monthly basic 
pay.53 Some of these offences include: Insubordinate Behavior54, Quarrels and 
Disturbances55, and Drunkenness.56 Not coincidentally, these offences are often 
associated with veterans who have mental health disorders, particularly PTSD.57 As 
48 Ibid, 107.03 & 107.11.
49 Ibid, 107.09(1)(b) & 108.15.
50 Ibid, 108.17.
51 Ibid, 101.22: “Every accused who is to be tried by court martial is entitled to: (a) be 
represented by legal counsel who is a barrister or advocate with standing at the bar of a 
province; and (b) have an adviser to assist the accused, both before and during the trial, in 
respect of any technical or specialized aspect of the case.” See also ibid, 109.04.
52 This terminology comes from my personal experience as a legal officer.  
53 Supra, note 46, 108.17(1).
54 Supra, note 42, s 85. See also ibid, 103.18: “Every person who uses threatening or 
insulting language to, or behaves with contempt toward, a superior officer is guilty of an 
offence [….]”
55 Ibid, s 86. See also ibid, 103.19: “Every person who (a) quarrels or fights with any 
other person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, or (b) uses provoking 
speeches or gestures toward a person so subject that tend to cause a quarrel or 
disturbance, is guilty of an offence [….]”
56 Ibid, s 97. See also ibid, 103.30: “[…T]he offence of drunkenness is committed where 
a person, owing to the influence of alcohol or a drug (a) is unfit to be entrusted with any 
duty that the person is or may be required to perform; or (b) behaves in a disorderly 
manner or in a manner that is likely to bring discredit on Her Majesty’s service”.
57 Supra, note 37 at 6: “[T]he experience of combat has also been shown to be related to 
both distinct PTSD symptom profiles and increased aggressive behaviour, both of which 
could explain the increased behavioral problems in the war-deployed cohort.” See also 
supra, note 34 at 91: “[Studies] observed a significant association between exposure to 
atrocities during the Vietnam war and interpersonal violence. […] PTSD may play a role 
in associations between combat and misconduct [….] In a sample of Vietnam veterans, 
[i]nternalizers had high rates of depression and panic, whereas externalizers had high 
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previously indicated, combat PTSD or OSIs are often associated with substance abuse, 
aggression, interpersonal violence and anger management problems.58
Once the file proceeds to summary trial, often the accused is “paraded out” in 
front of his unit and peers to face the Presiding Officer. This can be extremely difficult 
for a veteran with combat related PTSD or OSIs. According to various academics, 
“sometimes a PTSD reaction is so severe and pervasive that the client may have trouble 
attending court or participating in the legal case.”59 During the summary trial, evidence 
will be called by the unit to make out the elements of the offence(s) and the accused will 
have an opportunity to make representations.60 They may call upon their appointed 
assisting officer, who is not legally trained, in order to help them.61 The accused may 
request that a lawyer paid by her be allowed to ask questions; however, the Presiding 
Officer may refuse this request.62 The Presiding Officer, the Delegated Officer and the 
rates of antisocial personality traits and alcohol-related problems. There were similar 
results in a mixed sample of veterans from Vietnam and other conflicts.” See also 
“Topics in Brief: Substance Abuse among the Military, Veterans, and their Families” 
NIDA: National Institute on Drug Abuse (April 2011), online: U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 
<http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/topics-in-brief/substance-abuse-among-
military-veterans-their-families>: “Alcohol abuse is the most prevalent problem and one 
which poses a significant health risk. A study of Army soldiers screened 3 to 4 months 
after returning from deployment to Iraq showed that 27 percent met criteria for alcohol 
abuse and were at increased risk for related harmful behaviors (e.g., drinking and driving, 
using illicit drugs).”
58 Supra, note 32.
59 Lyn Cobin Gullette & William R. Gullette, Difficult Clients: Dedicated Attorney: 
Practical Psychology For Effective In-The-Trenches Representation (Denver, Colorado: 
Bradford Publishing Company, 2005) at 122.
60 Supra, note 46, 108.20.
61 Ibid, 108.14.
62 See note B to ibid, 108.14: “An accused person does not have the right to be 
represented by legal counsel at a summary trial. However, if an accused requests such 
representation, the officer having summary trial jurisdiction has the discretion to: (i) 
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Assisting Officer will have been provided with a 2-3 day course or an on-line 
recertification in order to perform their important disciplinary functions.63 There is 
currently little or no legal training related to mental health screening or detection.
Still, by virtue of their military training, every CF member is trained to look for 
signs of combat acute stress during first aid training, which is recertified on a regular 
basis. The ineffectiveness of this training as a means to allow unit leadership to identify 
and appropriately treat all PTSD and mental health cases is highlighted in allegations of 
underreporting64 and the dramatic increase in suicides by service members.65 In fairness, 
PTSD, other mental health disorders associated with combat and TBIs are often referred 
permit representation by legal counsel; (ii) proceed without representation by legal 
counsel; or (iii) apply for disposal of the charges against the accused by court martial.”
63 Ibid, 101.09. See also Judge Advocate General, JAG Annual Report 2009-10 (Ottawa, 
National Defence, 2012) at 13, online: National Defence 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/office-cabinet/annrep-rappann-09-10-
eng.pdf>: “3.2 Service Tribunals - Summary Trial and Court Martial”: “Military 
commanders who preside at summary trials must be trained and certified by the JAG as 
being competent in their duties as presiding officers, and must maintain that currency by 
re-certifying every four years [….] Note also that every four years, qualified presiding 
officers require re-certification, which is done online through Presiding Officer Re-
certification Test (PORT).”
64Becky Rynor, “Veterans stepping forward for treatment of operational stress injuries”, 
online: (2010) 182:7 CMAJ E281 
<http://www.cmaj.ca/content/182/7/E281.full.pdf+html>: “Boivin adds that it is likely 
posttraumatic stress disorder is underreported as a consequence of barriers and attitudes 
within both the military and general populations.[…] But many others struggle to cope 
with operational stress injuries on their own or refuse to admit they need help, he adds, 
noting that PTSD sufferers are six times more likely to have thoughts of suicide.”
65 David Pugliese, “As soldier suicides rise, National Defence slashes suicide prevention 
staff” canada.com (2 May 2012), online: Postmedia Network Inc. 
<http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=6556357>: “Statistics 
released Monday by DND show that the number of suicides among Canadian Forces 
personnel increased last year. Twenty soldiers died of suicide in 2011 - 19 men and one 
woman, the department reported. Just 12 soldiers took their lives in 2010, all of them 
male.”
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to as hidden wounds of war66 which are often overlooked, misdiagnosed or not well 
understood even by front-line family physicians.67
If an election is provided, and the member chooses to be tried by summary trial, 
the accused could be sentenced to thirty days detention in the Canadian Forces Service 
Prison and Detention Barracks (CFSPDB) depending on their rank.68 There is no ability 
66See e.g. Stan Alcorn, “PTSD and the Hidden Wounds of War” Dart Center for 
Journalism & Trauma (9 December 2010), online: Trustees of Columbia University in 
the City of New York <http://dartcenter.org/content/ptsd-and-hidden-wounds-war>:
“Everyone has heard of PTSD, but veterans, clinicians and scientists say most people 
misunderstand not only the disorder, but the other ways that war affects individuals and 
families”. [Emphasis mine] See also Angela Mulholland, “Many military suicides likely 
getting missed” CanadaAM (4 October 2011), online: BellMedia 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CanadaAM/20111004/suicide-military-canada-am-series-
111004/>: “We've long known of the physical toll the battlefield can exact. But in recent 
years, the invisible mental wounds of war have finally been getting more attention [….] 
The Canadian Forces say the programs are working, and emerging mental health 
woes are being nipped in the bud early. But there are still many who slip through the 
cracks [….]” 
67 See e.g. Angela Mulholland, “Brain injuries among soldiers often overlooked” CTV.ca
News (5 July 2011), online: BellMedia 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Afghanistan/20110630/afghanistan-kandahar-brain-
injuires-ptsd-110705/>: “Dr. Donna Ouchterlony, the head of the brain injury clinic at St. 
Michael's worries that PTSD is being overdiagnosed in soldiers who actually have brain 
injuries from explosions. The problem is that many of these soldiers may not realize they 
have a head injury, particularly if they never experienced a blow to the head, and so 
they're being sent for the wrong kind of treatment.” [Emphasis mine]. See also “Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder: Out of Sight, Not out of Mind” Mood Disorders Society of 
Canada (March 2012), online: 
<http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Advocacy/PTSD_Report_EN.pdf>:
“Canada has approximately 76,000 family physicians. 85% of Canadians dealing with 
mental health problems approach their family physician first. Unfortunately, many 
healthcare providers, including physicians, have stigmatizing attitudes towards patients 
presenting with possible mental health problems including PTSD. Furthermore, 
physicians have not received appropriate training and education about mental health or 
mental illnesses.” [Emphasis mine] 
68 Supra, note 46, 108.24. 
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to impose treatment as part of a sentence, nor is there a probation system in the Canadian 
Forces.69
The summary trial structure accounts for approximately 97% of all military 
tribunals.70 These tribunals are not equipped to deal with complex legal arguments or 
matters. In fact, a Presiding Officer would be advised to refer a complex legal matter, 
such as the requirement for expert medical testimony, to a court martial.71
The summary trial system proper currently has insufficient systematic safeguards 
to ensure military members with combat mental disorders are adequately screened or 
diverted to treatment.72 Further, the accused has no legal representation, which ordinarily 
may canvass possible defences or mitigation associated with combat stress or related 
disorders. The result of a conviction at summary trial can be a criminal record,73 a 
69 Supra, note 42, s 139.
70 Supra, note 63 at 95.
71 See note C to supra, note 46, 108.14: “In the exercise of the discretion [regarding the 
right to be represented by legal counsel at a summary trial], the officer having summary 
trial jurisdiction should consider at least the following: […] (ii) the complexity of the 
offence [….]” 
72 Ibid, 108.06: “A commanding officer may try an accused person by summary trial if all 
of the following conditions are satisfied: […] the commanding officer does not have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused person is unfit to stand trial or was 
suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.” It 
should be noted that provision presumes that there are adequate systematic methods to 
screen or detect the mental disorder. 
73 See e.g. Criminal Records Act, RSC, 1985, c C-47, ss 2(1): “service offence” has the 
same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the National Defence Act [….] See also supra,
note 42 ss 2(1): “‘service offence’ means an offence under this Act, the Criminal Code or 
any other Act of Parliament, committed by a person while subject to the Code of Service 
Discipline” [….] It is noteworthy that the term “Criminal Record” is not defined within 
either Act. Still, if one requires a record suspension, one must logically have a “record” to 
begin with. See also Criminal Records Act, RSC, 1985, c C-47, ss 4(1): “A person is 
ineligible to apply for a record suspension until the following period has elapsed after the 
expiration according to law of any sentence, including a sentence of imprisonment, a 
period of probation and the payment of any fine, imposed for an offence: (a) 10 years, in 
the case of an offence that is prosecuted by indictment or is a service offence for which 
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permanent entry on a conduct sheet and negative career implications, including delayed 
promotions, postings and related benefits. If the misconduct giving rise to the summary 
trial was the result of a mental injury from combat, this may not be fair. As will be 
argued, added systematic or procedural protections may reduce the likelihood of potential 
unfairness for offenders with hidden war wounds. The court martial system does 
currently provide some additional protections.
1.2.1.2 The Courts Martial System 
 The court martial system is an ad hoc system74 in which the military service 
tribunal is convened by the court martial administrator following preferral by the Director 
of Military Prosecutions (DMP).75 This is normally prompted by the Commanding 
Officer referring the matter to her referral authority due to, among other things: the 
offence(s) charged76, the rank of the accused77 or the gravity of the offence and likely 
sentence.78 The referral authority then asks the DMP to proceed to court martial where 
appropriate.79 Once in the hands of the DMP, a prosecutor will request full disclosure 
from all relevant parties, including the police, unit, referral authority, legal advisor, etc. 
the offender was punished by a fine of more than five thousand dollars, detention for 
more than six months, dismissal from Her Majesty’s service, imprisonment for more than 
six months or a punishment that is greater than imprisonment for less than two years in 
the scale of punishments set out in subsection 139(1) of the National Defence Act; or 
(b) five years, in the case of an offence that is punishable on summary conviction or is a 
service offence other than a service offence referred to in paragraph (a). [Emphasis mine] 
74 As opposed to a permanent court structure. See e.g. Jason Samson & Mike Madden, 
"Entrench the Bench! Canada's Pressing Need for a Permanent Military Court" (2009) 55 
Crim LQ 215. 
75 Supra, note 42, s 165.191-165.193.
76 Supra, note 46, 108.07.
77 Supra, note 42, s 163(1)(a). See also ibid 108.06.
78 Ibid, s 163(1)(b). See also ibid.
79 Ibid, 109.05(1).
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Once received, she will complete a post charge review to ensure that all elements of the 
offences charged are founded in evidence. She will also examine any relevant defences 
and Charter applications that could impact the reasonable prospect of conviction 
standard.80 This would include any issues related to fitness81 and/or a defence of mental 
disorder.82
 Simultaneously, the accused will be assigned a military defence legal officer from 
the Directorate of Defence Counsel Services (DDCS). This officer will request full 
disclosure from the prosecutor and begin to build her defence. The defence counsel will 
ordinarily have access to psychiatric assessments, social work evaluations and other 
relevant evidence in order to determine whether a defence of mental disorder83, a fitness 
hearing84, or a partial mental health defence to mitigate sentence is warranted. There is 
no formal pre-sentencing report prepared85; however the defence may call evidence th
would be akin to this information. Because the prosecution would not have access to the 
accused’s medical file, the defence counsel is in the best position to ensure that relevant 
medical information is brought to the court’s attention. Still, this requires the consent of 
the accused, which may not be forthcoming due to stigma and career implications.
at
86
80 “Director of Military Prosecutions Policy Directive 003/00: Post-Charge Review” (18 
March 2009), online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/cmps-scpm/policy-politiques-003-eng.pdf>. 
81 Supra, note 42, s 198. 
82 Ibid, s 202.13.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, s 198.
85 Notwithstanding the absence of a formal pre-sentencing report, the Prosecutor shall 
provide the court with sentencing information. See supra, note 46, 112.51 and 111.17. 
86 See e.g. Greg Passey, “Mental health, a mounting priority in the Canadian Forces”, 
online: (2009) 5:1 Canadian Psychiatry Aujourd’hui <http://publications.cpa-
apc.org/browse/documents/448>: “The fear of discrimination, career implications, and 
lack of insight resulted in significant numbers of military personnel never coming 
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In addition to counsel, the military judge will also assess whether the accused is 
fit to stand trial during their interactions in court.87 The court may also ask questions with 
respect to matters that touch on the accused’s mental health, whether this would be 
related to fitness, responsibility or mitigation.  
 Once an accused is sentenced or acquitted, the military tribunal ceases to exist. It 
currently does not assume a supervisory function, like a civilian PSC.88 Often, offenders 
with PTSD are sent to the CFSPDB. 
1.2.1.3 Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks 
If an offender is incarcerated, they may serve part or all within the CFSPDB or a 
civilian prison.89 Both prison systems offer psychological counselling; however the 
CFSPDB staff arguably should have more expertise in dealing with veterans suffering 
from combat related mental disorders.90 Ordinarily, the CFSPDB uses military 
psychiatrists from CFB Edmonton to treat its inmates.  
forward for assessment or treatment. Attempts to screen for Operational Stress Injuries (a 
military term for all mental health diagnoses related to military duty, but mainly point to 
PTSD and depression) were not as successful as possible because personnel would often 
not answer truthfully for obvious reasons.”
87 Supra, note 42, s 198(2).
88 Office of Justice Programs, “Specialized Courts” National Institute of Justice (2 May 
2012), online: <http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/specialized-courts.htm>: “The scope of 
criminal court research and evaluation has grown with the advent of specialized or 
problem-solving courts. Examples of specialized courts include drug courts, mental 
health courts, domestic violence courts and reentry courts. Specialized courts differ from 
traditional courts in that they focus on one type of offense or offender. Usually the judge 
plays an intensive supervisory role. Other criminal justice components (e.g., probation) 
and social services agencies (e.g., drug treatment) are involved and collaborate closely in 
case processing.” [Emphasis mine]
89 Supra, note 42, s 220. See also supra, note 46, ch 114.
90 The Canadian Press, “Victim's family wants soldier jailed, dismissed” CTV News (28
September 2009), online: BellMedia  
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Unfortunately, if the offender is undergoing treatment for OSIs, incarceration will 
result in an interruption in the continuity of care, unless the member is with an 
Edmonton-based unit. There is significant debate on the propriety of changing healthcare 
providers during OSI management and its impact on treatment progress.91
Further, the CFSPDB regime is much stricter than civilian prisons and induces 
stress harsher than basic training.92 Basic training is geared towards inducing stress to 
prepare for combat. For those suffering from combat induced PTSD or an OSI, 
incarceration at CFSPDB may be problematic and further complicate the medical 
condition.93 Corrections studies have shown that boot camps and control or punishment 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CTVNewsAt11/20090928/wilcox_sentence_090928/>: " 
‘All inmates at the Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks are provided 
with professional and timely medical and mental health care,’ the spokesman said in an 
email. […] ‘In addition to these services, all inmates also receive regular visits, twice 
weekly, by the base chaplain to provide for the inmates' spiritual counselling needs.’" 
91 See e.g. John P. Wilson, Matthew J. Friedman, & Jacob D. Lindy, eds, Treating
Psychological Trauma and PTSD, (New York: The Guilford Press, 2001) at 270: “It is 
important that psychiatrists or therapists taking the history provide an ongoing 
relationship. There is no place for separation of evaluation and treatment. There is no 
safety in telling a difficult story to one provider only to be switched to another. The 
therapist must be consistent throughout the treatment.” [Emphasis mine]
92 Mary Ellen Lamb, “Prison rehabilitates soldiers gone astray” Canadian Army (7
August 2006), online: National Defence <http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-
nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=1190>: “The Canadian Forces Service Prison and 
Detention Barracks are not like regular prisons. Prisoners do not have an easy lifestyle; 
they are busy performing drills, training and receiving counseling from dawn to dusk. 
When they first arrive, they are allowed basic rights such as eating and sleeping, but no 
extra privileges such as talking, interacting with fellow prisoners, smoking, watching 
television, reading, or making phone calls are allowed. […] It's a very controlled military 
atmosphere [….] The worst behaviour usually seen is a prisoner refusing to do the work. 
If this happens, the prisoner is sent to solitary confinement.”
93 Supra, note 38: “[B]eing in prison requires a person to be constantly vigilant regarding 
the threat of violence, an individual with PTSD who is in prison can be profoundly 
retraumatized and his or her PTSD symptoms may be exacerbated to the point where he 
or she will act out with violence. […] In fact, because prison life may retraumatize a 
person, a lengthy incarceration will likely seriously exacerbate PTSD symptoms and 
cause the person's level of functioning to deteriorate.”
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oriented programs do not work for the general population in reducing recidivism or 
criminogenic factors.94
 There are currently no diversion, alternative measures or PSC available within the 
military justice system that would create treatment options as opposed to incarceration. 
The judicial supervision required of a PSC may be difficult in an ad hoc court martial 
system that requires the convening authority to convene courts under a strict regulatory
process. Still, this issue could be resolved by moving to a permanent court system.95
Regardless, the problem is not insurmountable and a solution should be canvassed to 
ensure both serving and released veterans are treated fairly and equally. Currently, a 
veteran before the civilian justice system may have additional options, including 
treatment focused judicial monitoring. 
1.2.2 The Released Members’ Experience 
 A mentally ill member who is released from the Canadian Forces will no longer 
be subject to the Code of Service Discipline.96 However, their OSI-fuelled behaviour will 
be still subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian courts of the province or territory in 
which they find themselves. Further, the legislative regime governing their conduct 
differs from the NDA.
94 See e.g. “IPP - Criminogenic Needs” Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction (16 March 2006), online: ohio.gov, 
<http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/ipp_criminogenic.htm>.
95 See e.g. supra, note 74.
96 Supra, note 42, s 60.
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1.2.2.1 Legislation Governing Civilian Courts 
There is currently no specific civilian legislation related to defences or alternative 
measures for OSIs. There are general provisions provided for mental illness which cover 
the spectrum of no responsibility to mitigation. There are also provisions for alternative 
measures. A brief discussion on the options in civilian legislation is helpful to understand 
how veterans with OSIs are treated by civilian courts. 
The law and procedures available to an accused person who has experienced a 
mental disorder at the time of the alleged offence are legislated in the Criminal Code.97
For the most part, these provisions relate to fitness and criminal responsibility and mirror 
similar provisions in the NDA.98 The legislation is premised on a common law rule from 
the famous M'Naghten's case99 which has been part of our legal culture for almost 170 
years.
In particular, the term mental disorder is defined in the Criminal Code as “a 
disease of the mind [and] imports the terminology used to define insanity under previous 
provisions of s. 16”.100 Subsection 16(1) of the Criminal Code expressly states that “No 
person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while 
suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the 
nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong”.101 [Emphasis 
mine]   
97 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 s 16, 672.1-672.95.
98 See e.g. supra note 42, s 2, 198, 200, 202.13, and 202.14. 
99 (1843) 10 C & F 200, 8 ER 718.
100 Supra, note 97, s 2.
101 Ibid, s 16(1). 
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 The Criminal Code also sets out in detail the administrative procedure in dealing 
with offenders who committed the act, but are not to be held criminally responsible or 
those who are not fit to stand trial. These legislative provisions may be relevant to 
veterans with PTSD or OSIs who are tried in the civilian system by civilian judges. 
The leading civilian case on combat induced PTSD in Canada comes from a 
unanimous decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Borsch.102 This was a case 
where a soldier who had served in Bosnia between 1991 and 1994 was diagnosed with 
PTSD. He reported having witnessed the rape of a young girl and having killed the 
aggressor during combat. He was plagued with nightmares associated with this 
experience and others associated with his tour of duty. He was exposed to “ethnic 
cleansing”, and was under constant threat of death from snipers and artillery fire. He had 
been divorced twice since returning from deployment and had a comorbid diagnosis 
which included addictions. On July 27th, 2004, he broke into a house in his 
neighbourhood and sexually assaulted a 13 year old girl at knife point. During the attack, 
he threatened to kill her. At trial, numerous experts were called, with varying positions as 
to whether or not the accused was in a dissociative state at the time of the offence. 
Ultimately, the trial judge found that he was not criminally responsible because he was in 
a dissociative state related to his combat induced PTSD. On appeal, the decision was 
overturned and a new trial was ordered because the trial judge failed to provide adequate 
reasons.
1022007 MBCA 111. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed: [2007] 
SCCA 580 (QL).
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The Manitoba Court of Appeal found that PTSD is a mental disorder as defined in 
s. 2 of the Criminal Code.103 Further, they found that PTSD can cause a dissociative 
state. They wrote that “a person committing a wrongful act while truly in a dissociative 
state caused by PTSD, […] would generally not appreciate the nature and quality of the
act being committed or know it was wrong”.  of 104 The Court clarified that the majority
persons suffering from PTSD would likely never enter into dissociative states; thereby 
suggesting it was rare – but possible.105
 Leave to appeal was sought to Canada’s top court; however, this was denied.106
The legacy of the Borsch decision seems to be formal recognition that an NCR defence 
for combat related PTSD is possible when an accused is found to be in a dissociative 
state. Arguably, fitness could equally be impacted by combat induced PTSD.107 The 
103 Ibid, para 75. See also supra note 97, s 2: “In this Act, […] “mental disorder” means a 
disease of the mind”.
104 Ibid, para 75.
105 Ibid, para 95. See also R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun 2011 SCC 58, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 575: 
“Thus, criminal responsibility will not be imposed if the accused gives an excuse for his 
or her act that is accepted in our society, in which there is a ‘fundamental conviction that 
criminal responsibility is appropriate only where the actor is a discerning moral agent, 
capable of making choices between right and wrong’ […] In Ruzic the Court recognized 
the existence of a principle of fundamental justice that ‘only voluntary conduct – 
behavior that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external 
constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability [….]” While 
Bouchard-Lebrun did not mention PTSD and was more pre-occupied with self-induced 
psychosis, some comments on the issue of criminal responsibility have application for 
veterans with OSIs.
106 “Supreme Court of Canada: Bulletin of Proceedings” Office of the Registrar of the 
Supreme Court of Canada (4 April 2008) 517 at 522, online: 
<http://scc.lexum.org/en/bulletin/2008/08-04-04.bul/08-04-04.bul.pdf>. See also R. v. 
Borsch, 2007 SCCA 580 (QL). 
107 See e.g. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Press Release, 
CC/PIO/096-E “Erdemovic case: pre-sentencing hearing postponed” (4 July 1996), 
online: UN ICTY <http://www.icty.org/sid/7330>: “The [accused] has been found 
insufficiently able to stand trial at this moment because of a post-traumatic stress 
disorder”.
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military and civilian processes with respect to fitness and NCR are almost identical. 
Where the gaps between the two begin, as will be seen, is in treatment based approaches 
to mental illness.   
 The Borsch case highlights how inadequately-treated veterans with OSI can 
become caught up in civilian justice processes and how the system may deal with it. 
Using NCR and fitness legislation to acquit is one mechanism that may be used by 
Canadian justice officials. Unfortunately, this does little to address the root cause. 
 In addition, the Criminal Code provides for alternative measures in dealing with 
offenders who have mental disorders or some secondary disorders related to combat. 
Alternative measures are defined as “measures other than judicial proceedings under this 
Act used to deal with a person who is eighteen years of age or over and alleged to have 
committed an offence”.108 There is no such provision in the NDA. In fact, neither the 
words “diversion”, nor “alternative measure” exist in the Code of Service Discipline. This 
gap or omission in the justice process creates a significant disparity in how a released and 
serving veteran suffering from PTSD, OSI and/or TBI is dealt with. The most significant 
civilian alternative measures available to a mentally and emotionally injured veteran 
include diversion to a MHC or DTC.
108 Supra, note 97, s 716-717. Note that the provisions cited are general provisions for 
alternative measures and do not specify mental disorders or veterans. Still, these 
provisions have been the basis for the creation of civilian mental health courts or other 
PSCs, which have processed veteran offenders suffering from mental disorders and OSIs.
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1.2.2.2 Mental Health and Drug Treatment Courts 
Civilian MHCs and DTCs are based on therapeutic principles.109  The aim is to 
break the cycle of crime and reduce recidivism by addressing the root problem of the 
criminal behaviour.110 Reducing recidivism and instilling discipline is a primary purpose 
of military justice.111
The first Canadian DTC was established in Toronto, Ontario on 1 December 
1998.112 “There are [now] 6 federally-funded DTC pilot sites operating in Canada: 
Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa and Regina”.113
Similarly, MHCs have also been established in various jurisdictions throughout 
Canada.114 While they have varying degrees of criteria for eligibility, the focus is the 
109 Natasha Bakht, “Problem Solving Courts as Agents of Change” International
Association of Drug Treatment Courts at 2, online: IADTC
<http://www.iadtc.law.ecu.edu.au/pdfs/Problem%20Solving%20Courts%20Paper%20fin
al%20ppr.pdf>: “The dispute resolution model of problem-solving courts is founded upon 
the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence [….]” 
110 Ibid, at 24: “These courts exemplify the underlying principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and restorative healing in that they are intent upon dealing with the root 
causes of the criminal activity, offering treatment and counseling where needed in the 
case of both victims and accused persons.” [Emphasis mine] 
111The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol 5 (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 1997), online: 
<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol5/v5c40be.htm>: [T]he military justice system is also 
designed to promote strict discipline [….]”
112 Paul Bentley, “Canada’s First Drug Treatment Court” (2000) 31 CR (5th) 257 at 260.
113 Supra, note 6. 
114 See e.g. “Nova Scotia Department of Justice: Nova Scotia Mental Health Court 
Project” Nova Scotia Canada (20 March 2012), online: Province of Nova Scotia 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/mental_health_court.asp>: “A specialized Mental Health 
Court, the first of its kind in Nova Scotia, will hold its first seating on November 5, 
2009.” See also, “About Mental Health Court” Mental Health Court Canada, online: 
2003 Mental Health Court Canada <http://www.mentalhealthcourt-sj.com/home.html>: 
“Mental Health Court is the name used to identify an innovative process of the Provincial 
Court of New Brunswick currently operating in the City of Saint John.” See also, The 
Canadian Press, “Manitoba creates mental health court” CBC News (7 June 2011), online: 
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same: treatment rather than proliferating cycles of incarceration.115 In 2010, the Standing 
Committee on Public Safety and National Security was concerned about “what appears to 
be an insufficient use of mental health courts and its impact on the provincial and federal 
correctional systems”. 116 The Committee suggests that offenders with mental health 
problems serve more time because of the difficulty of adapting to the prison environment 
and are at increased risk to exhibit inappropriate or violent behaviours.117 The report 
recommends “that the federal government support the creation and funding of more […] 
mental health courts to divert those with mental health needs to appropriate services”.118
Both DTCs and MHCs use a collaborative approach in dealing with offenders. 
The multi-disciplinary team consists of the judge, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer(s), 
social workers, mental health nurses, probation officers, psychiatrists, physicians, and 
other treatment providers all working together with a coordinated strategy in order to 
ensure the offender complies with the treatment plan, while ensuring public safety. 
Counsel do not act in an adversarial fashion, but rather act collaboratively in the interests 
cbc.ca <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/06/07/mb-mental-health-
court-manitoba.html>. 
115 “Mental Health Diversion and Court Support” Canadian Mental Health Association 
Ontario, online: CMHA Ontario <http://www.ontario.cmha.ca/justice.asp?cID=5445>: 
“The objective is to secure appropriate mental health services without invoking the usual 
criminal justice control of trial and/or incarceration.”
116 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 
Mental Health and Drug and Alcohol Addiction in the Federal Correctional System 






of treatment, the goal being to address the root cause of criminality. The judge moves 
from a detached impartial role to one of an empathetic counsellor.119
The requirements for participation in and administration of alternative measures 
are set out in the Criminal Code.120 Most importantly, there must be informed consent by 
an accused. This ordinarily requires ongoing consent for court officials to access offender 
medical information until they “graduate” from the program. Referral to an MHC or DTC 
can be made by a judge, prosecutor, probation services, police, community services 
official or at the request of the defence. Ordinarily, the Prosecution must consent to 
transfer to these courts. This allows for the Crown to weigh the public interest and safety 
in a given case.
Eligibility for these courts varies by jurisdiction. In Nova Scotia, for example, the 
Nova Scotia MHC is a voluntary based program for adults. In order to access this court, 
the offender must have a mental disorder and there must be a significant connection 
between the disorder and the offence. Further, the offender must voluntarily undergo a 
clinical psychiatric assessment and accept responsibility for the offence. Further, the 
Crown Prosecutor must consent to the offender’s access to this program.121   
There are various phases that an offender must go through before being accepted 
and graduating the PSC programs. For example, a Nova Scotia released veteran (or 
anyone) who is referred to the MHC will go through four phases: the appearance, the 
screening, the assessment, and the program. The appearance occurs when the originating 
119 Supra, note 109 at 9.
120 Supra, note 97, s 717.
121 “Mental Health Court Program Overview” Nova Scotia’s Mental Health Court 
Program, online: Nova Scotia Justice 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/global_docs/MHC_Overview-EN.pdf>.
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judge is advised of potential eligibility and decides to refer to the MHC. At that point, the 
information notes the referral and the matter is adjourned for a couple of weeks while the 
accused consults with counsel. If the accused agrees, she will endorse consent and release 
documents in order for the MHC team to review their personal information.122 It should 
be noted that often the forms are only endorsed after a first appearance before the MHC. 
At this point, the collaborative team will screen the candidate for eligibility and informed 
consent. Further, at this stage, the prosecution can veto an eligible consenting 
candidate.123 Should the accused be ineligible or choose not to participate, she may 
choose to be sentenced by the Provincial Court judge in order to expedite the process or 
she may choose to be referred back to the originating court. The legislated jurisdiction of 
the civilian judge124 allows her to maximize efficiencies by flexibly moving from 
alternative measures to sentencing when appropriate, without the convening orders and 
related bureaucratic processes required in the military justice system.   
Should an accused be eligible and provide the requisite consents, they will be 
assessed by MHC treatment professionals on the multi-disciplinary team in order to 
determine their needs. Following the assessment, an individualized treatment program is 
developed and implemented under the close supervision of the MHC. The frequency of 
appearances is tailored to the participants. The supervision of the court allows the 
sanctioning of participants who do not follow the treatment plan. Sanctions can include 
increased supervision, conditions, detention or expulsion from the program.  Successful 
completion of the treatment intensive program would usually mean that the accused 
122 Ibid.
123 It is noteworthy that there is currently no Nova Scotia Public Prosecution policy on 
how this discretion is exercised.
124 Provincial Court Act, RSNS 1989, c 238, s 7. 
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would have outstanding charges withdrawn.125  This would allow the individual before 
the court to avoid having a criminal record, which could have otherwise further limited 
employment opportunities and successful reintegration into civilian society.
Studies of both the Canadian and American experience suggest that the benefits of 
participating in a MHC or DTC include: increased access to mental health and addictions 
services;126 improved ability to function independently; reduced substance abuse,127
decreased use of crisis intervention services128 and improved quality of life.129 Overall, 
studies suggest that there is a lower rate of recidivism.130 These lower rates appear to be 
125 Supra, note 121.
126 See e.g. Roger A. Boothroyd et al, “The Broward Mental Health Court: process, 
outcomes, and service utilization”, online: (2003) 26 Int’l J L & Psychiatry 55 at 70 
<http://www.floridatac.org/files/document/MHC_Jan03_Boothroyd.pdf>: “Our findings 
suggest that […] at least in comparison to a traditional misdemeanor court, the Broward 
County MHC enhances treatment access and involvement for a substantial number of 
defendants appearing before it.” [Emphasis mine] 
127 Council of State Governments Justice, “Mental Health Courts: A Primer for 
Policymakers and Practitioners” Bureau of Justice Assistance at 14, online: U.S. 
Department of Justice <https://www.bja.gov/publications/mhc_primer.pdf>: “Mental 
health court participants improved their independent functioning and decreased their 
substance use compared with individuals who received treatment through the traditional 
court process.” See also M. Cosden et al, “Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment 
Court with Assertive Community Treatment,” (2003) 21 Behav Sc & L 415. 
128 Ibid. See also Mary Ann Campbell, Crystal Grass & Jeff Karabanow, “Prospective 
Evaluation of the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court Program: Phase I Research Proposal” 
(13 April 2012) [unpublished].
129 Ibid.
130 Dale E. McNiel & Renée L. Binder, “Effectiveness of a Mental Health Court in 
Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence”, online: (2007) 164 Am J Psychiatry 1395 
<http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=98922>: “These results support the 
effectiveness of a mental health court in reducing the involvement of persons with mental 
disorders in the criminal justice system. […M]ental health court participants showed a 
longer time without any new charges or new charges for violent crimes compared with 
similar individuals who did not participate in the program. […] Additional analyses 
showed that persons who graduated from the mental health court program maintained 
reduced recidivism after they were no longer under supervision of the court, in contrast to 
comparable persons who received treatment as usual. 
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even better for veteran offenders provided with specific combat related PTSD, OSI and 
TBI treatment and programs.131
In summary, a civilian, a released member or a serving member who is engaged 
by the civilian justice system may reap the benefits of the diversion to a mental health or 
drug treatment court. A similar diversionary process is not currently available in the 
military justice system. These courts provide substantial benefits to civilian and released 
veteran offenders, including treatment, rehabilitation and strategies to avoid criminal 
behavior and a criminal record. The benefits are further maximized when veteran-specific 
treatment is used. In addition, the civilian justice system also has other relevant 
alternative measures for civilians and released veterans suffering from PTSD, OSIs and 
TBIs.
131 See e.g. Robin Kemker, “Treatment Courts Help Veterans Help Themselves” The
Epoch Times (31 March 2012), online: <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-
states/treatment-courts-help-veterans-help-themselves-213274.html>: “The Buffalo 
Veterans Court program reported an initial two-year zero recidivism rate, while the 
national general prison three-year recidivism rates are about 65 percent. [Emphasis mine] 
See also, Elizabeth Evans, “Veterans treatment court saves taxpayer money, is right thing 
to do, officials say” National Drug Court Resource Center, online: 
<http://www.ndcrc.org/content/veterans-treatment-court-saves-taxpayers-money>: “So 
far, the recidivism rate in the state's 10 veterans treatment courts is 1 percent.” Compare 
John Roman, Wendy Townsend & Avinash Singh Bhati, “Recidivism Rates for Drug 
Court Graduates: Nationally Based Estimates, Final Report” U.S. Department of Justice
at 2, online: Caliber Associates and the Urban Institute 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/201229.pdf>: “The study estimates that within one year 
after graduation, 16.4 percent of drug court graduates had been arrested and charged with 
a serious offense. Within two years, the percentage rises to 27.5 percent. These estimates 
represent the expected outcomes for those who succeed in drug court.” Compare Deborah 
Becker, “‘Mental Health Courts’ Strive To Provide Treatment Instead Of Jail Time” 90.9
wbur Boston’s News Station (23 April 2012), online: wbur.org 
<http://www.wbur.org/2012/04/23/mental-health-courts>: “Most studies suggest a 
recidivism rate of between 17 and 20 percent — which is less than half of traditional 
court [….]”A quantitative analysis and detailed comparison of recidivism rates in the 
military, civilian courts and PSCs are beyond the scope of this paper. Still, the authorities 
suggest that VTCs and treatment based approaches reduce recidivism rates among 
veteran offenders. 
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1.2.2.3 Other Alternative Measures 
Other PSC or alternative measures that may be available to civilians or released 
veterans in the civilian justice system include: domestic violence courts (DVC)132and
adult alternative measures agreements.133
 DVCs are PSCs that try to treat the root problem of domestic or family violence, 
as opposed to incarcerating offenders. “The victim wants the violence to stop but might 
want everything else to continue and a specialized court model can address those 
issues.”134 There are currently DVCs in Manitoba, Ontario, Alberta, Yukon, 
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia. 
“Different jurisdictions have chosen different models of specialized courts. […S]ome 
models allow early intervention for low-risk offenders, some use a therapeutic court 
option, and most prosecute severe and repeat offenders vigorously”.135
 Studies suggest that veterans diagnosed with PTSD, OSIs or TBIs are more at risk 
to commit domestic violence.136 The Canadian military justice system will ordinarily 
132 See e.g. “Alternative Measures Program”, online: Government of Saskatchewan 
<http://www.cpsp.gov.sk.ca/Default.aspx?DN=c1005a11-0baa-430c-a01c-
09446b7abcb5>.
133 See e.g. “Adult Alternative Measures Program”, online: Government of Alberta, 
<http://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/criminal_pros/crown_prosecutor/Pages/Adult
AlternativeMeasuresProgram.aspx>.  
134 Mary-Ellen MacIntyre, “Domestic violence court aims to stop abuse” Herald News 
(12 March 2012), online: The Chronicle Herald.ca
<http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/72633-domestic-violence-court-aims-stop-
abuse>.
135 “Domestic Violence Courts in Canada” (March 2009), online: Public Health Agency 
of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ncfv-cnivf/EB/eb-Mar-2009-eng.php#article>.
136 Jessica Martin, “A growing problem for veterans – domestic violence:  Treatments for 
PTSD and domestic violence are very different; effective collaboration needed” 
Newsroom (6 November 2008), online: Washington University in St. Louis 
<http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/12902.aspx>: “The increasing number of veterans 
with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) raises the risk of domestic violence and its 
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refer cases of domestic violence to civilian courts, when possible, because it does not 
have sufficient victims’ services to deal adequately with this issue. Regardless, it is 
important to point out that some released members who are at higher risk of committing 
domestic violence due to their injuries may have access to DVCs, which could 
specifically treat the injured offenders as opposed to incarcerate them. As previously 
mentioned, incarcerating these injured veterans may simply aggravate symptoms. 
Further, there are calls by veteran advocates to incorporate DVCs into the “Veterans 
Treatment Courts” (VTC) now in numerous jurisdictions within the United States.137
Unfortunately, the civilian Canadian DVCs also currently lack the context of military 
service and related veterans’ programs that may be beneficial in designing treatment 
plans for offenders and their families. Specific programs related to combat veteran 
treatment have demonstrated results in lower recidivism rates regardless the offence.138
 Similarly, Adult Alternative Agreements or Programs are also a diversion process 
available to members or veterans that find themselves before Canadian civilian justice. 
These are designed to “promote reparation and reconciliation. […It] provides the 
opportunity for young persons/adult offenders to acknowledge what they have done and 
consequences on families and children [….] Community responses to domestic violence 
must be adapted to respond to the increasing number of veterans with PTSD.”
137 Samantha A. Torrence,  “Military wife becomes champion for Veterans with PTSD” 
Digital Journal Reports (24 March 2012), online: digitaljournal.com 
<http://digitaljournal.com/article/321735>: “Shawn wants established Veteran's Courts to 
include cases of Domestic Violence due to PTSD to help give caretakers a tool to keep 
themselves safe without forcing them to betray or harm their veterans. The Veteran's 
Courts would have the option of giving the veteran an ultimatum to seek treatment for 
PTSD or choose to go to jail. The option of seeking treatment can empower a spouse to 
help their veterans. Shawn said if Veteran's Courts had been established for Domestic 
Violence cases Justin may have received treatment years earlier and saved much 
heartache for her family.”  
138 Supra, note 131. 
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to work at making amends, thereby avoiding a criminal record.”139 There is no such 
opportunity for serving veterans in the military justice system. Ordinarily, matters such as 
remorse, restitution or other forms of reparation are only taken into account post-
conviction at sentencing.
 In the first Canadian Mental Health strategy,140 one recommendation for action 
was increasing “the availability of programs to divert people living with mental health 
problems and illnesses from the corrections system, including mental health courts and 
other services and supports for youth and adults.”141 Without these programs of 
diversion, many mentally ill veterans will be convicted and sentenced, whether by the 
military or civilian justice system. 
1.2.2.4 Sentencing
 The sentencing regime in the civilian system is currently much more flexible in 
dealing with mentally ill offenders. The existing justice infrastructure provides judges the 
ability to impose probation to ensure appropriate conditions, monitoring and supervision. 
Probation allows the court to impose conditions on an offender while she is in the 
community.142 This permits reasonable controls over the offender in the interests of 
139 “Alternative Measures Program (Adult): Extra Judicial Sanctions Program (Youth)”, 
online: Government of New Brunswick 
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/dam/gnb/Departments/ps-
sp/pdf/Publications/AM_&_ES_Program-e.pdf>. 
140 Mary Bartram et al, “Changing Directions Changing Lives: The Mental Health 
Strategy for Canada” Mental Health Commission of Canada (2012), online: 
<http://strategy.mentalhealthcommission.ca/pdf/strategy-text-en.pdf>.
141 Ibid, at 38. 
142 See e.g. “Correctional Services: Community Corrections: Probation” Ontario Ministry 
of Community Safety & Correctional Services (27 March 2009), online: Queens Printer 
for Ontario 
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public safety and/or rehabilitation. In addition, there is a further civilian court ability to 
impose an absolute discharge for some deserving offenders. Neither of these options is 
currently open to serving members in the military justice system. It should be noted that 
there is currently legislation before Parliament to provide for absolute discharges and 
restitution.143 The restitution component is part of a sentence post-conviction and the 
absolute discharge legislation provides no authority to the military judge to order or 
monitor treatment.  
 It should also be pointed out that in order for civilian probation to be effective, 
there must be adequate treatment options for veterans with PTSD, OSI and/or TBI. These 
offenders often suffer from a comorbid diagnosis which includes addictions. According 
to the BC Court of Appeal, “[w]ithout treatment to back up the admonitions, such orders 
will often do the opposite to what is intended -- create a simple path to reoffending 
[….]”144 The same is true for absolute or conditional discharges.  
 Veterans require access to mental health services tailored to their specific needs. 
There are currently support groups and other related services available through Veterans 
<http://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/corr_serv/comm_corr/probation/probation.htm
>: “Probation is a court disposition that authorizes the offender to remain at large in the 
community subject to conditions prescribed in a probation order.” 
143 Bill C-15, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011, cl 62 (first reading 7 October 2011), 
online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5166437&file=4>.
144 “Addicts, mentally ill need help, not jail time: The B.C. Court of Appeal issued a plea 
to Victoria on Friday to improve treatment resources for mentally ill and addicted 
recidivists who are clotting up the criminal legal system” The Vancouver Sun (26




Affairs.145 Civilian justice officials need to know about the treatment and community 
based programs available in order to craft appropriate probation orders optimally tailored 
to veterans. Further, civilian justice officials would benefit from knowledge of programs 
and interface with military and/or Veterans Affairs officials in preparing pre-sentencing 
reports.
Sentencing before a military tribunal is strictly governed by statute and 
regulations. At summary trial, the available punishments are listed in the regulations and 
vary depending on the Presiding Officer and other factors, including monthly pay.146 At 
courts martial, the range of punishments is listed in the NDA.147 Possible punishments 
range from dismissal with disgrace, dismissal, incarceration, reduction in rank, forfeiture 
of seniority, severe reprimand, reprimand, fines, or minor punishments. Minor 
punishments include things such as extra work and drill or confinement to barracks or 
ship and stoppage of leave.148 The available punishments under the Code of Service 
Discipline seem to work from the premise or assumption that no offender will need to be 
followed with treatment or community services – something probation might assist 
with.149 The “able-bodied assumption” is consistent with the stigma attached to disability 
in the military – particularly mental disability.150 Despite the best efforts by military 
145 See e.g. “Network of Operational Stress Injury Clinics”, online: Veterans Affairs 
Canada <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/mental-health/support/osi-clinics-
support#clinics-list>.
146 See e.g. supra, note 46, 108.24-108.26. 
147 Supra, note 42, s 139. See also, ibid, 104.02.
148 Ibid, 104.13.
149 See e.g. supra, note 140: “Provide appropriate mental health services, treatments and 
supports in the youth and adult criminal justice system, and ensure that everyone has a 
comprehensive discharge plan upon release into the community”. [Emphasis mine]
150 See e.g. Dianne Pothier& Richard Devlin, “Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Dis-Citizenship” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory: 
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judges to use their sentencing toolbox to craft appropriate sentences for a growing 
number of OSI stricken offenders, the differences for individual veterans before civilian 
or military courts can be significant.     
Bill C-15 is currently before the legislature. If passed, it would clearly articulate 
the objectives of sentencing in the military justice system. This would include 
rehabilitating offenders and assisting them to reintegrate into military service.151 Still, 
there are no provisions that tangibly ensure treatment for mentally ill offenders in order to 
address the root cause of misconduct. According to Seamone, the absence of a 
diversionary treatment based process within the military justice regime “undermines the 
stated sentencing philosophy of rehabilitation of the offender”. By contrast, the civilian 
justice system has taken more tangible steps to put the stated philosophies into action. 
1.2.3 Comparing the Differences and its Impact 
 While the differences between the military justice system and the civilian system 
may appear minor on the surface, there remain some stark contrasts for many mentally ill 
offenders. As highlighted above, the most significant variance includes the absence of 
alternative measures within the military justice system that would allow a veteran to 
focus on treatment as opposed to possible incarceration.  
Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 1 at 13:
“[I]t is the pervasive impact of ableist assumptions, institutions, and structures that 
disadvantage persons with disabilities.” See also “Military launches mental health 
awareness campaign” CBC News (25 June 2009), online: cbc.ca 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/06/25/military-campaign025.html>: 
“Canada's chief of defence kicked off an awareness campaign Thursday to try to lessen 
the stigma attached to mental illness in the military and encourage troubled soldiers to 
come forward.”
151 Supra, note 143. 
41
Veterans have made numerous sacrifices for the Canadian Forces, but some were 
seriously injured in the process. Their injuries have caused some to have behavioural 
problems, which are known secondary effects of the injuries.152 These behavioural 
problems have attracted disciplinary or criminal attention. Despite being promised that 
they would be taken care of if injured from recruiting through to departure,153 they are 
now being prosecuted in front of their peers, demoted, reprimanded, fined and facing 
incarceration. The impact on trust and morale for the individual affected and close 
colleagues can be devastating.
More importantly, when soldiers see other veterans not being looked after as 
promised, this can have a negative impact on morale, efficiency, discipline and ultimately 
operations. As a result, the objective of swift military justice to maintain discipline, 
morale and efficiency can actually do the exact opposite if disabled veterans are 
perceived to be treated unfairly by military tribunals as opposed to their civilian 
counterparts. Even the perception of unfair treatment can be devastating. If a military 
purpose exists to justify excluding diversion and treatment based sentences, then it needs 
to be clearly articulated and understood, so as to avoid impact to morale. 
In order to better understand the stark differences in how veteran offenders are 
dealt with by the military justice system and the civilian justice system and the 
152 See e.g. supra, note 37. 
153 See e.g. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, 41st Parl, 1st 
Sess, No 8 (25 October 2011) (Rear-Admiral Andrew Smith), online: Parliament of 
Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5194465&Language
=E&Mode=1>: “When Canadian Forces members are injured or become ill, they must 
have confidence that they will receive the treatment and rehabilitation services necessary 
to restore them to health and that the needs of their families will be met. If they cannot 
resume military service, they must know that the Government of Canada will support 
them as they make new lives for themselves.” 
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subsequent impact on the individuals, a few hypothetical examples are helpful to provide 
context to the differences highlighted above.154
Corporal (Cpl) A and B live and serve in Nova Scotia. Both have been deployed 
to Afghanistan and were diagnosed with PTSD. Both have secondary problems and are 
reporting blackouts, alcohol and drug addiction, anger management issues, flashbacks to 
combat, insomnia and depression. Prior to their deployment, they had no criminal or 
disciplinary record or mental issues. Post deployment, they became increasingly agitated. 
They were sent on anger management courses and addictions counselling. Both began 
having difficulties with their relationships and became administrative burdens within the 
unit. Leadership began to take administrative action against the two, as required under the 
regulations. Cpl A was posted to the Joint Personnel Support Unit/ Integrated Personnel 
Support Centres (JPSU/IPSC) because he could no longer work. Cpl B was allowed to 
continue working because her trade was in high demand.  
Cpl A began to live with his mother. He could not manage his finances due to his 
addictions. His wife left him and he now pays child support. Within two months he was 
arrested for public intoxication. While being arrested on the second occasion, he kicked 
out the window of the police car and was charged with wilfully damaging property. As 
the blackouts progressed, so did his drinking. He attempted suicide on several occasions. 
On one evening, while at a friend’s house, he was playing a computer game and “blacked 
out”. He was not drinking at the time. When he woke up, he was in a police cruiser. He 
was advised that he began yelling and screaming while brandishing a weapon. When the 
police came, he threatened to kill them and himself. He was charged with multiple 
154 These two illustrations, while fictional, contain elements of typical real life examples.  
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offences, including uttering death threats to a police officer. He was remanded into 
civilian custody and referred for a forensic psychiatric examination. He was found fit to 
stand trial and was released on bail with conditions. His lawyer had the matter transferred 
to the MHC.
Once referred to the MHC, an intake assessment was completed by a mental 
health nurse. He also met with a probation officer and a social worker. All worked with a 
prosecutor and defence lawyer in order to devise an appropriate treatment plan in order to 
allow Cpl A to reintegrate into society, while keeping the public and himself safe. He was 
compelled to appear before the mental health court judge once every two weeks for six 
months and monthly thereafter for an additional year. On each occasion the judge would 
ensure treatment was followed, behaviour was acceptable and the risk to reoffend was 
acceptable. Cpl A attended psychological counselling, Alcoholics Anonymous, a PTSD 
peer support group and maintained constant contact with members of the multi-
disciplinary team. He received employment retraining and housing assistance in 
conjunction with Veterans Affairs and the Department of Community Services. After 18 
months, he graduated the MHC. He is currently employed in another profession and has 
no criminal record as a result of the incident. He has not reoffended.
 Cpl B also became separated from her spouse.  Her finances were also in a mess 
due to her addiction to cocaine. She began living on the base in single quarters. One day, 
during a routine checkpoint stop, she was arrested by the Military Police for possession 
of cocaine. Administrative measures were immediately started and release was being 
threatened. As a result of her addictions and nightmares, she was not sleeping properly. 
She continuously would show up 5-50 minutes late for work over a six month period. She 
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was tried summarily for Absence Without Leave on five separate occasions within four 
months. On the last occasion, she was sentenced to 2 days detention. On release from 
detention, she disappeared for one month and was reportedly living on the street. Cpl B 
was eventually picked up by the Military Police on a Commanding Officer’s Warrant.155
She assaulted the arresting officers and brandished a knife saying that she wanted them to 
shoot her. She was held in cells pending her court martial. During the trial, the accused 
admitted most particulars, but ran an NCR defence.156 She was convicted and sentenced 
to imprisonment for ninety days and dismissed from the Canadian Forces. She now has a 
criminal record for multiple offences and has been released into the community with very 
little treatment. Her condition has reportedly worsened since incarceration, during which 
she underwent minor punishments for non-compliance within the CFSPDB. Upon 
release, she returned to the street, where she continues to reoffend. She was subsequently 
charged with assault with a weapon and is in a provincial holding facility facing a long 
period of incarceration. Her victim is in critical condition.  
 These two examples highlight the stark outcomes that can occur between civilian 
and military justice systems. Having a military justice PSC would help to bridge the gap 
between the two approaches and ensure that veterans are treated where appropriate as 
opposed to being punished for problems stemming from their combat injuries. The 
existing systematic punishment or corrections approach in military justice fosters 
recidivism for traumatized veterans. While the rates of recidivism may be statistically 
low within the military system due to rapid administrative release measures, the veterans 
155 Supra, note 42, s 157. 
156 Ibid, s 202.13.
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who are left untreated become the burden of the civilian justice system – ultimately 
placing public safety at risk.157
Further, the civilian justice system lacks the expertise and knowledge required to 
deal with the unique circumstances that veterans may find themselves in. As mentioned 
above, existing civilian PSC multi-disciplinary teams have little knowledge of military 
programs that are available through the military, Veterans Affairs, or other veteran non-
profit organizations. It is imperative that key civilian justice players are provided with 
that information along with their key contacts so that they can properly tailor treatment 
programs, sentences or decisions for veterans - with an adequate understanding of their 
problems, backgrounds and the assistance available to them. This action needs to be 
taken now as there are currently more and more Canadian veterans who are struggling 
with the mental scars of war.   
157 Supra, note 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
This chapter will develop why this issue is relevant now by describing the scope 
of the problem for the Canadian Forces and the current challenges in detection and 
prevention of activities attracting military penal consequences. In addition, it will show 
that there are significant numbers of veterans anticipated to be suffering from OSIs and 
the correlative disciplinary or criminal behavior. It will also provide some relevant 
recommendations on improving the current justice systems for veterans.  
In particular, the first section will examine the scope of the problem for the 
Canadian Forces by examining the current available numbers. This section will make two 
main arguments: conditions common to mental disorders are more likely to be found 
among those who have served in the military than in the general population, and those 
conditions are even more common among released veterans than among serving 
members. The section will also examine military culture. This is relevant because the 
existing culture in the Canadian Forces is impeding treatment and disclosure of mental 
illness among veterans; thereby exacerbating the problem. Finally, the last part of the first 
section will discuss military detection issues. The lack of effective systematic processes 
to detect mental illness among traumatized veterans adds to the problem.  
The second section of this chapter will examine the impact of inadequately treated 
veterans on civil society. In particular, it will discuss the problem as it relates to public 
safety. Further, it will examine increased social problems that are associated with 
untreated traumatized veterans. In addition, this section will examine the impact of 
untreated veterans on civilian courts and prisons. Also, this section will try to quantify the 
actual cost of traumatized veterans on Canadian society.
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Finally, a brief summary of relevant recommendations that have been generated 
by examining the scope of the problem will be provided at the conclusion of Chapter 2.  
These recommendations include: better data collection, tracking and analysis for 
veterans; more stringent policies that address mental health discrimination within the 
Canadian Forces; more extensive earlier training on OSIs for all military members; more 
specific training for military justice participants; the provision of elections to court 
martial regardless of the charge for mentally injured members; specific policy direction 
from key military justice officials on how subordinates are to deal with circumstances 
where mental illness is suspected, alleged or proven; the quantification of the actual costs 
of mentally injured veterans; and better focused treatment options within Canadian jails 
and prisons tailored to veterans who need to be incarcerated. These recommendations are 
collateral to the primary argument for a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures 
Process as detailed in Chapter 4.    
2.1  THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE CF
Traumatized veterans have existed since the beginning of conflict, but the current 
scope of the problem is significant for the Canadian Forces. Following more than a 
decade of combat and support operations in Afghanistan there are more and more soldiers 
complaining of PTSD, OSIs or TBIs. Further, the Canadian Forces has been actively 
engaged in other dangerous deployments during that timeframe.158 This section will 
detail the contemporary problem, in order to argue that immediate action is needed.
158 See e.g. “Canadian Forces operations”, online: National Defence and the Canadian 
Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/index-eng.asp>.
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This problem (deemed a “crisis” by some)159 was in play early in the Afghanistan 
campaign. Military officials were acutely aware of the issue, having dealt with 
traumatized veterans following Rwanda, Bosnia and Korea – to name but a few. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, many soldiers diagnosed with PTSD were redeployed 
multiple times in order to fill the significant demand for their limited expertise in a war 
zone.160 Unfortunately, this often exacerbates previous wounds and can create a more 
significant illness.161 In fairness, during an ongoing conflict there are only limited 
resources. When a large portion of a trained fighting force becomes wounded, the armed 
forces cannot keep up the operational tempo demanded of the government without more 
personnel. Personnel cannot simply be hired off the street in order to go into battle.162
159 See e.g. Chris Cobb, “NDP Questions Why Afghan Army Getting $110 Million A 
Year From Government While Canadian Afghan War Veterans Lack Adequate Mental 
Health Care” Ottawa Citizen (23 May 2012), online: 
<http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/05/23/ndp-questions-why-afghan-army-getting-
110-million-a-year-from-government-while-canadian-afghan-war-veterans-lack-
adequate-mental-health-care/>: “The federal Opposition is calling for the creation of a 
task force to find ways of dealing with the growing ‘crisis’ among Canadian veterans 
suffering from war-related mental illness. ‘There is a reluctance to treat this as a crisis,’ 
said NDP defence critic Jack Harris Wednesday, ‘but that’s what it is. We are trying to 
deal with it in a patchwork fashion and we need to find a better way.’ [Emphasis mine]
160 “Canadian military redeploying soldiers with PTSD” cbcnews (14 June 2011), online: 
cbc Radio-Canada <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/06/14/ptsd-soldiers-
redeploy.html>. 
161 Ibid: “Ottawa psychologist Ken Welburn, who counts current and former soldiers 
among his clients, used to help soldiers redeploy after suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder, but now believes that was a mistake. ‘I think that soldiers with PTSD 
should not be re-deployed into a war zone,’ said Welburn, director of the Ottawa Anxiety 
and Trauma Clinic. ‘If you go back on another deployment it's like going into the sun 
after a bad sunburn. You are going to pay for it.” 
162 See e.g. Lee Berthiaume, “Canadian army’s ‘long-term health’ at risk due to shortage 
in mid-level leadership” National Post (28 November 2011), online: 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/11/28/canadian-armys-long-term-health-at-risk-due-
to-shortage-in-mid-level-leadership/>: “Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk 
recently highlighted the importance of trained NCOs and mid-level officers. ‘I cannot go 
onto the street and hire a sergeant, hire a major, hire a colonel,” he told the Commons’ 
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Without the extensive training required of normal forces, casualties will increase. Further, 
actual combat experience is invaluable. The Canadian Forces was merely trying to make 
do with what they had. Unfortunately, this required putting people in harm’s way and 
some soldiers getting traumatized. 
Most soldiers jump at the opportunity to help Canada despite serious personal 
risk. Part of the reason for their willingness to do so is the belief that Canada will take 
care of them, and their injuries, when they return.163 Unfortunately, statistics suggest that 
despite the best efforts of the government, there is a perception that a number of veterans 
are falling through the cracks.164 The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) agrees that more 
needs to be done.165 Examining the current numbers may assist in deciphering the actual 
scope of the problem. 
   
defence committee on Nov. 3. “If you want a sergeant with 10 years of experience, it 
takes 10 years.’”
163 See e.g. House of Commons, Report of the Standing Committee on 
National Defence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, “Doing Well and Doing Better: Health Services 
Provided to Canadian Forces Personnel With An Emphasis on Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder” (June 2009), online: cbc.ca < http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/2009-
2010/broken_heroes/documents/scnd_report_june_2009.pdf >: “Within the military, 
effective casualty treatment and handling is a significant morale enhancer. If Canadians 
expect our troops to do what we ask of them, it is only fair that those troops be confident 
they will be taken care of, should they be injured in the course of doing their duty. 
Moreover, should they be killed, or injured, physically or psychologically, they must 
know that their family will be cared for too.” [Emphasis mine] 
164 “Vet-centred care: Take new tack” Herald Opinions (1 May 2012), online: The 
Chronicle Herald <http://thechronicleherald.ca/editorials/91796-vet-centred-care-take-
new-tack>: “Falling through the cracks remains far too easy for members of the Armed 
Forces suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, as The Chronicle Herald’s Michael 
Gorman illustrated last week in presenting us personal testimonies from a pair of troubled 
veterans.”
165 See e.g. Meagan Fitzpatrick, “Mental health services 'not perfect,' military says: Top 




2.1.1 The Current Numbers
This section will make two main arguments: conditions common to mental 
disorders are more likely to be found among those who have served in the military than in 
the general population, and those conditions are even more common among released 
veterans than among serving members. The distinction between the two is important in 
determining solutions, as both are subject to different justice processes. 
While examining recent statistics will be helpful in understanding the impact of 
veteran mental illness in the justice systems, “[t]he biggest challenge is not here and 
today. It's in five years and 10 years.”166 Notwithstanding this reality, it is important to 
determine how serious this problem is now, after more than a decade of recent conflict. 
Further, the existing numbers still substantiate the above arguments.   
According to the Department of National Defence, more than 2,000 soldiers were 
injured during the 10-year Afghanistan combat mission. This figure does not incorporate 
“the thousands of Canadian soldiers who are suffering from [PTSD] and other 
psychological damage. A recent Defence study predicted as many as 13.2 per cent of the 
40,000 Canadians who served in Afghanistan could be suffering from Afghanistan-
related mental injuries.”167 Using their own figures, this suggests that approximately 
5,280 servicemen and women could be dealing with combat related mental injuries. “A 
recent parliamentary study estimated that almost 3,000 of the soldiers who served there 
can be expected to suffer from a severe form of post-traumatic stress disorder and 6,500 
166 Allan Woods, “Bracing for war's hidden fallout” TheStar.com (13 July 2009), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/665007>.
167 Lee Berthiaume, “Afghan war injury toll tops 2,000; 10-year mission by Canadian 
troops brings 158 deaths” Edmonton Journal online (2 February 2012), online: Postmedia 
News <list.plcom.on.ca/pipermail/defenceweekday/.../attachment-0001.doc>.
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will suffer from mental health issues”.168 [Emphasis mine] It is noteworthy that when 
compared with physical injuries, the most common combat injury is mental in nature.  
Another study by the Department of National Defence indicated that 
approximately 30% of Canadian Forces members have received specialty mental health 
services. Approximately 8% were diagnosed with Afghanistan-related PTSD. 5.2% of 
soldiers were diagnosed with “other Afghanistan-related OSI's, such as depression 
(2.2%), adjustment disorders (2.0%), or anxiety disorders other than PTSD (1.9%)”.169
Rates of OSIs among soldiers were highest for those who deployed to Kandahar 
(17.1%) and to Kabul (14.5%). This is significantly higher than rates for those deployed 
to the Arabian Gulf (6.5%), Camp Mirage or elsewhere in Southwest Asia (3.3%).170
This is consistent with a recent Canadian study suggesting a correlation between 
exposure to actual combat or risk and OSI prevalence. In particular, recent data suggests 
higher rates of PTSD among “front-line” soldiers. According to Major Paul Sedge
military psychiatrist, “based on 792 soldiers from CFB Gagetown who experienced high 
levels of combat during their deployments in 2007 […] nearly a quarter of the soldiers —
23.1% — suffered with some form of mental problem. Further, PTSD was reported in 
more than 20% of the cases”.
, a 
171  This is more than double the normal rates for the 
168 The Canadian Press, “Number of suicides in military rises as troops return home from 
Afghanistan”, The Winnipeg Free Press (30 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/number-of-suicides-in-military-rises-as-
troops-return-home-from-afghanistan-149582255.html>. 
169 Supra, note 30.
170 Ibid.
171 Bradley Bouzane, “8% of Canadian soldiers who served between 2001 and 2008 have 




Canadian Forces population segment and significantly higher than the 13.2% suggested 
by the Department of National Defence.  
Despite these figures, it is important not to correlate mental injury severity with 
the location of a deployment or the nature of the mission. There are too many variables 
that must be considered. In fact, PTSD “represents a common, if not the most prevalent, 
mental health problem in community studies in post-conflict areas”.172 In Rwanda, for 
example, in 1994 there were crimes of genocide where approximately 800,000 people 
were killed. Of the approximately 7.7 million people in that country, 4 million were 
displaced.173 The survivors witnessed violence, corpses and other terrors associated with 
war. Studies of the Rwanda survivors suggest that approximately 1 in 4, “(24.8%) met 
symptom criteria for PTSD”.174 Senator Romeo Dallaire, who led the United Nations’ 
mission in Rwanda, stated in a “Fifth Estate” interview that out of the dozen people that 
reinforced him during that mission, approximately 70% have had varying levels of PTSD. 
One was diagnosed 12 years after the incidents and one committed suicide 14 years after 
the incident. Senator Dallaire indicated that he remains vulnerable to suicidal tendencies 
and is currently undergoing therapy.175
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the site of a major Canadian Forces 
deployment in the 1990s, there are reports that as many 1.75 million citizens may be 
172 Michael Odenwald et al, “Screening for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder among Somali 
ex-combatants: A validation study”, online: (2007) 1:10 Conflict and Health 1 at 2 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1752-1505-1-10.pdf>.  
173 Phuong N. Pham, Harvey M. Weinstein & Timothy Longman, “Trauma and PTSD 
Symptoms in Rwanda Implications for Attitudes Toward Justice and Reconciliation” 
(2004) 292:5 JAMA 602.
174 Ibid.
175 Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire,“Broken Heroes” The Fifth Estate
(Interview, 2 October 2009), online: cbc.ca < http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/2009-
2010/broken_heroes/dallaire.html>.
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suffering symptoms of PTSD. According to data, studies suggest that 30% of war 
veterans in Serbia and 40 % in Bosnia are afflicted with the mental disorder.176 This is 
consistent with Canadian figures which suggest that “at least 30% of soldiers involved in 
combat operations risk suffering from PTSD or major depression during their 
lifetime”.177 Similarly, in a Doctors Without Borders study on the general population of 
Freetown, Sierra Leone following years of civil war, “high levels of traumatic stress 
[were] evident, […25% were suffering] from severe traumatic stress or even PTSD”.178
The same study also demonstrated that “[d]eliberately or not, witnessing at least once 
event such as torture (54%), execution (41%), (attempted) amputations (32%), people 
being burnt in their houses (28%) and public rape (14%) often results in traumatic stress 
or even PTSD”.179 Canadian Forces soldiers have seen many of these types of atrocities 
in the course of their service in many parts of the world – whether in actual combat, on 
peace-keeping missions or other missions.  
The average PTSD rate expected of the general population is approximately 
8%.180 “The estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD among American veterans […] is 
176 “Study: PTSD Haunts Bosnian War Survivors” Balkan Insight (3 February 2010), 
online: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/study-ptsd-haunts-bosnian-war-
survivors>.
177 Jean-Rodrigue Paré, “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and the Mental Health of 
Military Personnel and Veterans” Parliament of Canada (14 October 2011), online: 
Library of Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-
97-e.htm>. 
178 Kaz de Jong, Maureen Mulham & Saskia van der Kam, “Special Report: Report 
Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone” Medecins Sans Frontieres Doctors Without Borders
(11 January 2000), online: 
<http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1459>. 
179 Ibid.
180 “Post-traumatic stress disorder” Encyclopedia of Mental Disorders, online: 
<http://www.minddisorders.com/Ob-Ps/Post-traumatic-stress-disorder.html>: “The 
National Comorbidity Survey, a major epidemiological study conducted between 1990 
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30.9% for men and 26.9% for women”.181 Whether there are any cultural considerations 
to be incorporated and how to do so in diagnosis remains inconclusive.182 Still, statistics 
do indicate that “women are twice as likely as men to develop PTSD”.183
In addition to the consequence of suicide and homelessness, the risk of 
criminogenic behavior increases with OSIs. Recent reports suggest that there has been a 
steady increase in inmates at the CFSPDB since 2001. In fact, statistics show that rates 
have doubled during the Afghanistan campaign. According to University of Alberta 
professor Andy Knight, "there's a link to Afghanistan, (but) I don't think you'll ever get 
the military to say this […] adding the number of soldiers sent to prison could indicate 
difficulty adjusting to life after war”.184 Similarly, University of British Columbia 
political science professor Michael Byers “believes the […] mission in Afghanistan may 
have taken a psychological toll on some soldiers. […] Deployment increases the 
opportunities and, essentially, the circumstances within which criminal activity takes 
place".185
and 1992, estimates that the lifetime prevalence among adult Americans is 7.8%, with 
women (10.4%) twice as likely as men (5%) to be diagnosed with PTSD at some point in 
their lives. These figures represent only a small proportion of adults who have 
experienced at least one traumatic event—60.7% of men and 51.2% of women 
respectively”.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid. See also James Phillips, “The Cultural Dimension in DSM-5: PTSD” Psychiatric
Times (15 August 2010), online: <http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/blog/dsm-
5/content/article/10168/1635720>: “Either way, in the area of trauma and PTSD, the 
DSM-5 on the horizon remains, for understandable reasons, a long way from cross-
cultural adequacy”.
183 Supra, note 18.
184“Rise in soldiers in prison not tied to Afghanistan: army” canada.com (1 April 2008), 





An examination of reported Canadian courts martial decisions for the year 
2010186 reveals that of the 65 decisions, 57 of the cases were resolved by guilty plea. 
Eight courts martial involved operational offences and 15 reported mental health iss
with an additional 8 not being clear. Conditions and symptoms reported included
management in 3 cases; schizophrenia in 1; addictions in 4; post-traumatic stress in 4; 
depression in 1; and suicidal thoughts in 2. Of the 15 issues, 3 were found directly related 
to combat while 7 were unclear. Based on this data, and making the unlikely assumption 
that there was no under-reporting of symptoms, 
ues
: anger 
at least 15 of 65 or 23% of military 
offenders tried by court martial are dealing with a mental health issue. Further, at least 4 
of 65 or 6% of offenders tried and convicted had PTSD and a little less than 5% had an 
OSI directly related to combat.  
These numbers do suggest, at a minimum, the need for better data collection, 
tracking and analysis on this important issue. Arguably, this information should be 
provided and reviewed in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) annual report as it relates to 
military justice. The Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance from Attorney 
Generals, should analyze the information related to civilian justice. 
The above statistics demonstrate that conditions similar to mental disorders are 
more likely to be found among those who have served in the military than in the general 
population. I now turn to the second argument that those conditions are even more 
common among veterans than among serving members. 
186 “2010 Decisions”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/dec/2010-eng.asp>.
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Academic studies have determined that there is a link between the OSIs and the 
number of suicides among Canadian Forces members.187 “According to statistics 
provided by the military, 187 soldiers have committed suicide since 1996”.188 It is 
noteworthy that this number is more than the total casualties from the Afghanistan 
combat mission proper.189 It has been recognized that “[s]uicide is among the most 
common causes of death in the military [….and] the third leading cause of death in 
Canadian forces members over the past 25 years”.190 While studies suggest that soldier 
suicide rates are lower than in the civilian population, “[r]esearch suggests that […] 
veterans are 1.4–4 times as likely to die by suicide compared with nonveteran 
civilians”.191[Emphasis mine] The 1.4 starting point related to a study of Norwegian 
peacekeepers192 and seemed inconclusive on OSI correlation to suicide. More specific 
studies of combat troops included a study of Vietnam era vets which showed that “PTSD 
veterans were more likely than the non-PTSD veterans to die from suicide (relative risk = 
3.97, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.20-7.03)”.193  More recently, a broader population 
study looking at a twelve year period found that “[v]eterans were twice as likely (adjusted 
187 See e.g. supra, note 167, “The study said the risk of suicide is a major concern with 
stress-related injuries”. 
188 Ibid.
189 “In the line of duty: Canada's casualties” CBC News (31 October 2011), online: cbc.ca 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html>: “Since 2002, 158 
members of the Canadian Forces have been killed serving in the Afghanistan mission.” 
190 Shay-Lee Belik et al, “Are Canadian Soldiers More Likely to Have Suicidal Ideation 
and Suicide Attempts Than Canadian Civilians?”, online: (2010) 172:11 Am J Epidemiol
1250 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3025631/#bib3>. 
191 Ibid.
192 S. Thoresen, L. Mehlum & B. Moller, “Suicide in peacekeepers—a cohort study of 
mortality from suicide in 22,275 Norwegian veterans from international peacekeeping 
operations”, (2003) 38:11 Soc Psychiatry Epidemiol 605.
193 T.A. Bullman & H.K. Kang, “Posttraumatic stress disorder and the risk of traumatic 
deaths among Vietnam veterans” (1994) 182:11 J Nerv Ment Dis 604. 
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hazard ratio 2.13, 95% CI 1.14 to 3.99) [corrected] to die of suicide compared with non-
veterans in the general population.”194 Notwithstanding these studies, it is acknowledged 
that “there remains significant controversy as to whether soldiers are at increased risk for 
suicide compared with civilians”.195
It is important to differentiate the statistical data between soldiers and veterans.196
“[B]ecause the military environment and services provided by the CF differ from the 
civilian life of veterans and the services provided by VAC, the findings of studies for one 
of these groups do not lend themselves to extrapolation to the other”.197 Still, in 
comparing both groups, “the prevalence of mental health disorders appears to be much 
higher among veterans than among serving members”.198 This is likely exacerbated by 
numerous military factors, including untreated mental disorders due to perceived stigma 
and adverse career implications, which is discussed below. 
An examination of those receiving veterans’ benefits approved after 2006 
suggests that known diagnosed OSI prevalence is approximately 60%. This figure is 
substantially higher than previous prevalence rates for pension beneficiaries.199 Further, 
this does not capture those veterans who have not applied for benefits despite 
eligibility.200
194 M.S. Kaplan et al., “Suicide among male veterans: a prospective population-based 
study”(2007) 61:7 J Epidemiol Community Health 619. 
195Supra, note 190.




200 Ibid: “Once they become veterans, only those who decide to request VAC assistance 
will be able to benefit from the services to which they are entitled. […] As isolation and 
reluctance to seek assistance are common among those suffering from operational stress 
injuries, it is possible that many veterans who need specialized services do not receive 
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The aforementioned numbers suggest that once soldiers are released with medical 
pensions into the community, they are more likely to be suffering from OSIs than serving 
members, who some suggest already have elevated prevalence rates when compared to 
the civilian population. Unfortunately, it is difficult to monitor veterans with existing 
processes and infrastructure. “Existing databases […] do not allow for the systematic 
monitoring of the state of health and occupational progress being made by those veterans 
who do not request VAC services”.201 Many of these ill veterans are at increased risk of 
“absenteeism, unemployment, interpersonal and family problems, alcoholism and drug 
addiction, trouble with the law, homelessness and suicide”.202 Better systematic processes 
to track, monitor and assist released veterans may help ensure a safer transition to civil 
society.
The statistics and numbers highlighted demonstrate the current scope of the 
problem. Still, much of the problem is fueled by the existing military culture which 
contributes to stigma and untreated mental disorders. 
2.1.2 Military Culture
 Military culture has been described as the “bedrock of military effectiveness  
them. This increases health risks for them, because early intervention is the most 
important factor in healing. Moreover, the symptoms of operational stress injury may 
appear only several years after the event that gave rise to the trauma, which is often many 




[…and] the essence of the Canadian, or any other, military”.203 Discipline and morale are 
equally intrinsically linked to military culture. In fact, discipline, cohesion and esprit de 
corps are essential components of military culture.204 Both cohesion and esprit de corps
are major factors in the development of high morale.205
 Unfortunately, the military culture’s attitude towards mental illness and PTSD has 
been one in which any injury is a weakness.206 Weakness is not acceptable in the 
military. In particular, mental illness was perceived not to be a real injury and therefore
anyone purporting to have such an injury was a faker, liar, malingering or had som
negative persona.
e other 
207 According to the former Ombudsman for the Canadian Forces, 
“[t]he symptoms (of stress injuries) are bad enough but the culture of shame and 
suspicion is worse [….] It is considered a badge of dishonour for soldiers to get 
203 Randy Wakelam, “Book Review, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian 
Perspective by Allan D. English”, online: (2006) 6:4 CMJ 115 at 115
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/book-livre-04-eng.asp>. 
204 M.D. Capstick, “Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century”, 
online: (2003) 4:1 CMJ 47 at 49 <http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo4/no1/doc/v4n1-p47-53-
eng.pdf>: “James Burk, a prominent academic observer of the American military, has 
developed a model of military culture that includes four essential elements: discipline, 
professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps.” 
205 Ibid.
206Max J. Rosenthal, “Military Families Hit Pentagon On Response To PTSD And 
Suicide” Politics Canada (9 May 2012), online: The Huffington Post 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/military-families-pentagon-ptsd-
suicide_n_1503746.html>: “[D]espite efforts to encourage service members to seek 
treatment, military culture still views PTSD as a sign of weakness that could derail 
promising careers for soldiers.” 
207 “Healing the Invisible Wounds of War” News in Review (December 2011), online: 
cbclearning <newsinreview.cbclearning.ca/wp-content/uploads/.../dec11ptsd.rtf>.
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psychological treatment”.208  Either way, to admit they are suffering would result in them 
being cast aside professionally and socially. 
This culture and negative attitude towards mental illness created stigma. Stigma is 
a barrier to effective diagnosis and treatment, which can lead to the exacerbation of a 
mental health condition.  The stigma within the military follows veterans on release. 
“Many [civilian] employers are hesitant to hire veterans with a combat background 
because of perceived mental health issues [.…] 46 percent of employers considered 
PTSD a significant obstacle to hiring employees with military experience”. 209 This 
stigma has real results, with American statistics demonstrating a substantial increased rate 
of unemployment among male veterans ages 18 to 24 as compared to civilian 
counterparts.210
 In fairness, the Canadian military is not alone in struggling with stigma related to 
mental health. Notwithstanding strong levels of societal awareness, there continues to be 
stigma associated with mental illness among the overall Canadian population, particularly 
regarding serious cases,211 which inhibits complete acceptance.  
According to the Canadian Medical Association, only half of Canadians would 
tell friends or co-workers that they have been diagnosed with a mental illness, which is 
208 Canadian Press, “Soldiers face stigma dealing with stress: Marin”, CTV News (18
December 2002), online: BellMedia 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Specials/20021218/marin_andre021217/>. 
209 Jeff Ousley, “Soldiers Continue to Struggle with Public Perception of PTSD” 
Veterans United Network, online: <http://www.veteransunited.com/network/soldiers-
continue-to-struggle-with-public-perception-of-ptsd/>.
210 Ibid.
211 “Mental Health Literacy in Canada: Phase One Report Mental Health Literacy 
Project” CAMIMH (May 2007), online: Canadian Alliance on Mental Illness and Mental 
Health <http://www.camimh.ca/files/literacy/MHL_REPORT_Phase_One.pdf>: “Stigma 
and discrimination toward persons with mental disorders remain somewhat problematic 
in Canada, although more so for serious mental illness”.
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far below rates for other serious illness such as cancer or diabetes. Further, one in five 
Canadians indicated they did not seek treatment despite experiencing symptoms of 
mental illness in the last year.212 Also, 27% of Canadians would be fearful if they had to 
be around someone with a mental illness. In addition, almost two in five Canadians are 
uncertain if they would socialize with someone who had a mental illness. Further, more 
than half suggested that they would be unlikely to enter into a spousal relationship with 
someone who has a mental disorder. In addition, the majority of Canadians would be 
unlikely to hire a person suffering from a mental illness, including a lawyer, a doctor, a 
financial advisor or a health care worker. More importantly, nearly half of Canadians 
believe that people use the term mental health as an excuse for bad behavior.213
  The Canadian Alliance for Mental Illness and Mental Health has suggested that 
addressing mental health stigma and discrimination is one of the most pressing priorities 
for Canadian mental health officials. They call for an education strategy to increase 
acceptance and improve understanding. They also call for more stringent policies that 
address mental health discrimination to assist in expediting change.214 I agree. 
 In the recent National Mental Health Strategy there are calls to “[f]ight stigma by 
including opportunities in promotion, prevention and early intervention initiatives to meet 
212 Compare supra, note 209: “Yet, it’s estimated that less than half of soldiers with 
PTSD seek treatment.” 
213 “8th Annual National Report Card on Health Care” Canadian Medical Association
(August 2008) at 4, online: 
<http://www.cma.ca/multimedia/CMA/Content_Images/Inside_cma/Annual_Meeting/20
08/GC_Bulletin/National_Report_Card_EN.pdf>.
214 “A Report on Mental Illnesses in Canada” (5 January 2012) at 17, online: Public 
Health Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/miic-mmac/chap_1-
eng.php>.
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and talk with people living with mental health problems and illnesses”.215 Part of the 
proposed action includes a 10 year program called “Opening Minds” targeting contact-
based education to change behaviors.216
 The Canadian military has equally taken steps to eliminate stigma associated with 
OSIs. In 2009, the Canadian Forces launched a “Be the Difference” awareness program 
that was designed to help members “meet and overcome any mental health challenges 
that they may encounter – in the course of their military career, and after”.217 This effort 
was also referred to as the "all right to hurt" campaign.218
  PSCs within the military and post-release that are tailored to veterans would assist 
in reducing stigma through institutional acceptance that treatment, as opposed to 
punishment, is required. By publicly punishing those who offend due to PTSD or OSIs, 
through incarceration or other significant modes, a public perception is perpetuated that 
there is increased fault and blameworthiness associated with the mental disorder and 
related symptoms. Conversely, a rehabilitative message to injured veterans would create 
a perception of less personal responsibility. This may assist in changing the military 
culture as the CDS hopes.  
A treatment based approach to justice proceedings does not allow an accused to 
evade accountability. As explored in Chapter 1, the practice in PSCs is to ensure 
215 Supra, note 140. 




217 “Be the Difference: The Canadian Forces Mental Health Awareness Campaign” (25 
June 2009), online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
 Mobile Version <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3015>. 
218 Supra, note 150. 
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accountability through the admission of the underlying particulars of the offences 
charged. Further, the explanation of clemency or treatment-based approaches in the 
decisions of learned judges when transferring offenders to PSCs fosters education of 
mental illness in the public domain. Any increased awareness should assist in reducing 
stigma.      
While significant effort has been put into defeating stigma related to OSIs and 
PTSD, more is required. In my view, military policy statements require “teeth” to be 
effective. Some improvements may include: better safeguards on employment through 
accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI harassment and increased privacy 
safeguards.219 Military justice can also do its part.  
Obviously, stigma related to mental illness will not disappear from the military 
overnight. Still, it can be eliminated if there is a real willingness from the top. The 
military has adapted to once highly controversial cultural views related to the inclusion of 
women in combat220 and issues related to sexual orientation.221 While there is more to be 
done, it is clear that much ground has been covered. According to Commodore Jung, the 
previous Surgeon General for the Canadian Forces, "[t]he stigma will never go away 
219 The specifics of the development of these possible improvements are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
220 See. e.g. “Women” forces.ca, online: Canadian Forces 
<http://www.forces.ca/en/page/women-92>: “The Canadian Forces has taken great 
strides in safeguarding the equality of women. By adopting a ‘no exclusion policy,’ it has 
become one of the only militaries in the world to remove all barriers to full and equal 
service for its women members. This means that women members have the opportunity 
to work any job in the Canadian Forces.” 
221 See e.g. Bruce Poulin, "The official integration of homosexuals in the CF" Esprit de 
Corps (June 2004), online: CBS Interactive 
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6972/is_7_11/ai_n28209334/pg_2/?tag=content;col
1>: “Now, some 12 years after this significant ruling, few people can contest that our 
Canadian Forces servicemen and women, regardless of their sexual orientation, are 
serving their country without restriction and with honour”.
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without changing views and values about mental health and that means 'cultural change,' 
which takes years. It has taken us 10 years to get here, and I'd say the major progress will 
be in the 10 years ahead. It is so ingrained in the culture".222 While it is clear that there is 
movement on the issue, all facets of military culture, including military law, must adapt 
with the cultural evolution and the Commander’s intent. That intent is clear. The CDS has 
stated “I expect leaders at all levels to create a command climate that allows those who 
need help to get it. I also expect all CF personnel to foster a social climate of 
understanding, acceptance and support [….L]et’s make sure we take action.”223
If the military does not “foster a social climate of understanding, acceptance and 
support”224 for offenders with OSIs before service tribunals, how can anyone expect civil 
society to do so on behalf of their veterans? The military must lead on this issue and the 
JAG, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM), the Surgeon General of the 
Canadian Forces and other military leaders must be on the front lines.225 Chapter 4, 
below, will offer specific proposals.
One of the by-products of stigma associated with the existing military culture is  




223 General Walt Natynczyk, “Mental Health Awareness Campaign”, online: National 
Defence and the Canadian Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/feature-
vedette/2009/06/25-eng.asp>.
224 Ibid.
225 Supra, note 42, s 9.1-9.2: “The Judge Advocate General acts as legal adviser to the 
Governor General, the Minister, the Department and the Canadian Forces in matters 
relating to military law. […] The Judge Advocate General has the superintendence of the 
administration of military justice in the Canadian Forces. 
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inhibited detection.226 The existing military culture compounds an already daunting task 
of detection in the Canadian Forces, made difficult by “hidden wounds”227 that are 
difficult to identify. 
2.1.3 Detection Issues
 Academics and practioners agree that early detection is essential in the treatment 
of PTSD, OSIs and TBIs.228 Many western militaries have continually sought to develop 
screening or detection mechanisms in order to assess if military personnel returning from 
deployment are psychologically injured.229 The Canadian Forces is not alone in being 
unable to develop a totally effective screening mechanism that ensures early detection for 
members. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are also grappling with PTSD and OSI 
detection and treatment.230
226 Barbara Everett, “Stigma: The Hidden Killer” Mood Disorders Society of Canada at 
4, online 
<http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Publications/Stigma%20the%20hidden
%20killer.pdf>: “Stigma is […] a factor that limits early detection [….]” 
227 See e.g. J. Don Richardson et al, “Horror comes home: Veterans with posttraumatic 
stress disorder” Canadian Family Physician, online: The College of Family Physicians of 
Canada <http://www.cfp.ca/content/56/5/430.full>. 
228 See e.g. Edna B. Foa et al, eds, Effective Treatments for PTSD (New York: Guilford 
Press, 2009) at 6: “PTSD has a better prognosis if clinical intervention is implemented 
early.” 
229 See e.g. Paul D. Bliese et al, “Psychological Screening Validation with Solders 
Returning from Combat” in M.J. Roy, ed, Novel Approaches to the Diagnosis and 
Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 
2006).
230 See. e.g. Elliot Ferguson, “RCMP has 'head in the sand' on PTSD” The Kingston 
Whig-Standard (15 May 2012), online: <http://www.thewhig.com/2012/05/14/rcmp-has-
head-in-the-sand-on-ptsd>: “Passey said the RCMP needs to educate its officers from the 
beginning of their training to recognize OSIs and know how to intervene when a 
colleague, subordinate or superior officer needs help.” 
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The solution to increased detection includes more extensive training on OSIs from 
the moment of recruitment. It also includes attacking the stigma and culture of repressing 
mental health problems during basic training. This education process must be directed at 
all rank levels. 231  While it may take a generation to eliminate the cultural bias and 
discrimination, it will eventually reduce stigma, provide better coping strategies and 
foster earlier detection.
Without detection, mentally injured veterans can become ticking time-bombs. 
They may engage in criminogenic behaviors attracting the attention of the military justice 
system.232 As a result, the justice systems often become tripwires for undiagnosed and 
inadequately treated veterans with mental illness. It is essential that military justice 
participants are trained to detect mental illness and identify when there is a relevant 
correlation to the offences charged. In a December 2010 Report of the Standing 
Committee on Public Safety and National Security, it was suggested that justice officials 
needed more training on the symptoms of mental illness, mental health problems and 
addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and referral.233 I agree.
231 “Special Reports: Systemic treatment of CF members with PTSD Complainant: 
Christian McEachern”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces Ombudsman 
<http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/rep-rap/sr-rs/pts-ssp/rep-rap-03-eng.asp>: 
“Education is the single most important catalyst to change attitudes about PTSD in the 
CF. Without co-ordinated education and training programs designed to ensure all 
members understand what PTSD is, it will be impossible to change entrenched attitudes. 
Orders from above, exclusive reliance on CANFORGENs or application of the Code of 
Service Discipline cannot in themselves change attitudes, although I am of the view that 
any proven case of harassment or discrimination against those with PTSD should be dealt 
with harshly.” [Emphasis mine]
232 See e.g. supra, note 38.
233 Supra, note 116: “The Committee also notes that Lord Bradley’s report stresses the
need to implement and use diversion measures, and notes that strong partnerships are 
another key to success in creating pathways to treatment. […] The Committee agrees 
with Lord Bradley and many witnesses that diversion is a key component of a system that 
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Notwithstanding this report, the military justice system currently has no diversion 
process and many civilian PSCs are in their infancy. How can military justice participants 
be trained on detection for diversion, when no diversion processes exist? The problem is 
not exclusive to the Canadian Forces. The United States is substantially ahead of its 
Canadian counterparts in civilian PSCs for veterans; however, its military justice system 
is under fire for lagging behind in diversion options.234 "When PTSD is acquired through 
service, and combat caused PTSD increases aggression, drug abuse, and violence, […] 
the most basic concepts of justice require the military to effectively treat PTSD rather 
than punish it".235
Similarly, there is a need for justice processes that will facilitate self-identifying a 
mental illness in order to commence treatment. Detection through self-identification is 
inhibited not only by a perceived punishment or correction-based ethos, but also the 
stigma and administrative consequences of being mentally ill in the military. This 
military justice climate causes courts martial to become what Seamone calls a “problem-
respects the right of individuals to receive the healthcare services they need. In order to 
detect mental disorders and addiction issues and intervene as early as possible, the 
Committee believes it is essential to train police officers, Crown prosecutors and other 
participants in the criminal justice system to recognize symptoms of mental health and 
addiction problems and refer individuals to the appropriate community and healthcare 
resources. […] Assessments of mental disorders, including addictions, followed by 
treatment, would also help to address the revolving-door syndrome we heard much 
about.” [Emphasis mine]
234 See e.g. Allen G. Breed, “Officer: Military could learn from civilian courts”
chron.com (14 May 2012), online: Hearst Communications Inc. 
<http://www.chron.com/news/article/Officer-Military-could-learn-from-civilian-courts-
3553713.php>: “Civilian courts across the country have acknowledged the fact that, after 
a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, some veterans' crimes can be traced back to 
battle-zone trauma _ and that they shouldn't go to jail or prison for them. The same 
consideration should be given by the military legal system when damaged warriors come 
before it, say some military law authorities [….]” 
235 Ibid.
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generating court”.236 Conversely, access to diversion options like civilian PSCs facilitates 
treatment and detection. 
In addition to education and training on detection, policy direction from key 
military justice officials would help reinforce the CDS’s higher intent of creating a 
“command climate that allows those who need help to get it […and fostering] a social 
climate of understanding, acceptance and support”237 for mentally ill veterans. This 
would include specific policy direction from military justice leaders on how subordinates 
are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected, alleged or proven.
Currently, there is no readily available specific policy on how to deal with 
suspected mentally ill offenders from the CFPM238, DMP239 and DDCS.240 A specific 
policy would enhance consistency in veteran treatment by justice officials, increase 
awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection. More importantly, it would ensure the 
Commander’s intent is communicated appropriately to front-line police officers and 
counsel dealing with veterans afflicted with mental illness.  
Within the unique summary trial process, specific training on detection needs to 
be incorporated into accreditation processes for presiding and assisting officers. Specific 
regulations to ensure consistency of treatment may assist in improving detection by the 
military justice actors. Further, providing elections to court martial regardless of the 
236 Supra, note 2, at 3: “In contrast to problem-solving courts, which target the illness 
underlying criminal conduct, courts-martial function as problem-generating courts [….]”
237 Supra, note 223.
238“Policy and Publications”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/pp-pub/index-eng.asp>. 
239 “Publications – Prosecutions”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/pros-pour-eng.asp>. 
240 “Publications - Directorate of Defence Counsel Services”, online: National Defence 
and the Canadian Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/ddcs-dsad-eng.asp>.
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charge for psychologically injured members may assist in ensuring that no mentally ill 
veteran falls through the cracks. Failing to treat veterans while they serve only creates a 
bigger problem for the civilian system when they are released.241
2.2  THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
This section of this chapter will examine the impact of inadequately treated 
veterans on civil society. In particular, it will discuss the problem as it relates to public 
safety. Further it will examine increased social problems that are associated with 
untreated traumatized veterans. In addition, this section will examine the impact of 
untreated veterans on civilian courts and prisons. Also, this section will try to quantify the 
actual cost of traumatized veterans on Canadian society.
2.2.1 Public Safety
It may seem obvious to anyone that having an untreated mentally ill person with 
elevated risks of criminogenic behavior in the community is a serious issue that requires 
the attention of civilian authorities. Clearly, having these individuals untreated in the 
community creates risk for public safety.242 The risk logically becomes even more 
substantial when the mentally ill offender has received advanced military training and has 
experience in how to kill and injure other human beings.  
Often military personnel at the very basic training levels will be taught basic 
weapon handling and desensitization to violence. They will learn how to endure personal 
241 Supra, note 2, at 3: “Such practices create a class of individuals whose untreated 
conditions endanger public safety and the veteran as they grow worse over time.”
242 Ibid.
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sacrifice and hardship in order to accomplish missions at great personal risk and 
suffering. Canadian Forces members will learn escape and evasion techniques as well as 
camouflaging tactics. All learn how to kill the enemy efficiently while preserving their 
own life. At more advanced levels of training, many learn offensive and defensive tactics, 
advanced weapons training and increased efficient ways to inflict violence on the enemy.  
Further, over the course of a career, a service member will likely have multiple 
deployments to conflict areas. Many will have orchestrated, assisted in, been ordered to 
and personally committed acts of extreme violence on fellow human beings. They will 
have experience in the management and infliction of violence on the enemy. When all of 
this experience and training is combined with an untreated mental illness, the risk to 
public safety is exponentially increased.243
The operational tempo in recent operations has seen the increased use of reservists 
in front line operations.244 This essentially involves having a militarily trained civilian 
joining the military effort for a deployment, and then immediately returning back into 
civilian life. Unfortunately, there is little systematic monitoring to follow the soldier, 
sailor or air crew reservist post-deployment. Further, reservists are often from locations 
of great distance from major bases where specialized mental health support is 
provided.245 Both Canada and its allies report higher rates of reservist mental injury post 
243 Ibid, at 29: “While failure to treat mentally ill offenders may very well amount to a 
crisis in public health, the failure to treat mentally ill combat veteran offenders amounts 
to far more; by virtue of military training and experience that depends on the sustained 
direction and outlet of rage and emotion, it constitutes a threat to public safety.”
244 See e.g. “Military to send more reservists to Afghanistan” CTV News (28 February 
2007), online: Bell Media 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20070228/Afghanistan_reservists_070228/>. 
245 Doug Schmidt, “Away from the big bases, Afghan war vets struggle to find support” 
canada.com (27 February 2012), online: 
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deployment due to reported ill-preparedness and reduced access to specialized 
treatment.246
The danger of not treating veterans with PTSD or OSIs is their propensity to 
commit violence. In a study of inpatient Vietnam veterans with PTSD which examined a 
propensity for violence as compared to non-veteran inpatient patients, it was found that 
PTSD inpatients engaged in more types of violent acts such as “property destruction, 
threats without a weapon, physical fighting, and threats with a weapon”.247 The study 
showed a correlation of increased violence with symptom severity and substance 
abuse.248 Similarly, studies have shown PTSD can cause veterans to become more 
aggressive in their interpersonal relationships. Contrary to urban legend, exposure to war 
zones does not (in and of itself) cause increased aggressive behaviors. “Rather, the 
primary determinant of whether one is at heightened risk for […] violence following 
deployment appears to be the development of trauma-related psychopathology”.249
Having untreated trained military personnel with propensities toward aggression 
and violence in the community places the public at risk. Further, if these members are 
still serving, they often have access to weapons and ammunition. This increases the 
<http://www.canada.com/news/Away+from+bases+Afghan+vets+struggle+find+support/
6191605/story.html>: “While the regular forces have support networks around bases and 
urban centres, the offerings are leaner elsewhere, especially for reservists or those who 
have left the military.”
246 “More medical aid for reservists” BBC News (16 May 2006), online: BBC 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4772231.stm>: “It comes after a report revealed 25% 
of reservists who had fought in Iraq experienced a mental health disorder, compared with 
19% of regular soldiers.” 
247 Miles McFall et al, “Analysis of violent behavior in Vietnam combat veteran 
psychiatric inpatients with posttraumatic stress disorder” (1999) 12:3 Journal of 
Traumatic Stress 501.
248 Ibid.
249 Shelley M. Macdermid Wadsworth & David Riggs, eds, Risk and Resilience in U.S. 
Military Families (New York: Springer, 2011) at 196. 
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potential dangers.  In addition to public safety, veteran OSIs can lead to serious social 
problems, including public health complications. 
2.2.2 Social Problems
 Military families are most in jeopardy to increased social problems as they have 
to deal directly and regularly with the traumatized veterans. It is not only spouses who are 
in peril, but children as well. OSI sufferers often experience flashbacks or re-experience 
traumatic events at seemingly random moments which cause a significant negative 
emotional response. Children begin to worry about their parents and may feel insecure 
about their parent’s capacity to care for them. Other symptoms of PTSD include 
avoidance and emotional numbing. If veterans withdraw from their children, are irritable 
or show little or no emotion towards them, children can interpret this as not loving them.  
“Researchers have observed a direct relationship between each of the parent's PTSD 
symptoms and the children's responses. […These include] secondary traumatization, […] 
depression and anxiety, and relational problems later in life”.250 In addition, studies of 
Vietnam veterans demonstrated that “children of veterans with PTSD are at higher risk 
for behavioral, academic, and interpersonal problems […and] are at higher risk for being 
depressed and anxious than non-combat Vietnam era veteran's children”.251 Despite 
limited data collection on Canadian military family violence, there appear to have been 
increases within the Canadian Forces in the aftermath of multiple combat deployments to 
250Jennifer L. Price, “Children of Veterans and Adults with PTSD” American Academy of 
Experts in Traumatic Stress (2006), online: <http://www.aaets.org/article188.htm>.
251 Ibid.
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Afghanistan.252 Family violence is a serious social problem253 that needs to be addressed 
by the Government of Canada. Military families suffer enough during deployments when 
they worry about whether their loved ones will return at all.254 If the management of 
mentally injured veteran offenders who commit family violence requires incarceration, 
the family is further adversely affected.255 Military families will continue to make 
sacrifices alone, long after the actual fighting has ceased. Medical treatment through 
diversion would assist in reducing the social problems for veteran families associated 
with veteran OSIs. 
252Kerry Sudom, “Family Violence in the Canadian Forces” National Defence, online: 
<http://www.cfpsa.com/en/psp/DMFS/docs/DGPRAM/Family%20Violence/Family_Viol
ence_CF.pdf>: “A recent MP report, which provided an overview of the domestic 
violence cases across the country investigated by the MP from 2005 to 2008, indicated 
that there was a notable increase in domestic violence incidents in 2007 and 2008 [….] 
However, MP reports are limited in that they contain only chargeable cases, and therefore 
underestimate the extent of actual physical and emotional abuse in the military 
population.” See also, The Canadian Press, “Kids in military families under stress, 
depressed: study” CTV News (24 March 2011), online: Bell Media 
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Health/20110324/military-kids-stress-110324/>: “A new 
study says the children of parents in the military are suffering stress, isolation and 
depression linked to the deployment of their parents in Afghanistan.”
253 “Family Violence: Department of Justice Canada Overview Paper” (May 2009) at 9, 
online: Department of Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fv-vf/facts-
info/fv-vf/fv-vf.pdf>: “The results of national surveys and research have made it clear 
that family violence is not just an individual, private or family matter; it is a pervasive 
and complex societal problem in Canada.” 
254 Eric M. Flake et al, “The Psychosocial Effects of Deployment on Military Children”, 
(2009) 30:4 Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics 271. 
255 See e.g. Joyce A. Arditti, Parental Incarceration and the Family: Psychological and 
Social Effects of Imprisonment on Children, Parents and Caregivers, (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012) at 101: “The available research has indicated the largely 
negative effects of incarceration on offender parents, children, and spouses or intimate 
partners such that family health declines, child adjustment is compromised, poverty 
intensifies, and family relationships deteriorate or cease altogether [….] Parental 
imprisonment was connected to poor mental health in children and a trend toward 
antisocial behavioral outcomes for children after parental imprisonment [….]” [Emphasis 
mine] 
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The potential impact of secondary traumatization on children creates a ripple 
effect which can echo for a generation. This can include increased public health costs due 
to the psychological scarring of children and income inequality – a known social 
determinant of health.256 Further, there may be future social and economic impact via 
child underachievement that might not occur with timely, adequate family unit 
interventions. 
 The social consequences of not treating PTSD extend beyond the realm of the 
family unit. Aside from public risk related to violence, there is a serious public health 
issue. In particular, the comorbid nature of PTSD increases the risk that veterans will 
develop addictions. In fact, “[t]he co-morbidity rates of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and substance use disorders are know[n] to be substantial.”257 A review of the 
literature suggests rates of co-morbidity between PTSD and substance use disorders to 
range anywhere from 20% to 75%.258 Further, the impact and intensity of the addiction 
can intensify if the underlying medical condition goes untreated.259 Addictions are widely 
256 “The Social Determinants of Health: Income Inequality as a Determinant of Health”, 
online: Public Health Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ph-sp/oi-
ar/02_income-eng.php>: “The relationship between socioeconomic status and health 
outcomes is one of the most persistent themes in the epidemiological literature. The 
strong and growing evidence that higher social and economic status, and small gaps in 
income equality are associated with better health has led most researchers to conclude 
that these factors are fundamental determinants of health.” 
257 Wendi L. Woo & Harry R. Vedelago, “PTSD among Individuals Seeking Residential 
Treatment in a Canadian Treatment Centre for a Substance Use Disorder” online: (2012) 
3:1 Canadian J Addiction Medicine 4 at 4, <http://www.csam.org/files/CJAM-Vol3No1-
FINAL.pdf>. 
258 Ibid.
259 Deborah J. Brief et al, “Web-Based Intervention for Returning Veterans with 
Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Risky Alcohol Use”, (2011) 41:4 J
Contemporary Psychotherapy 237: “If left untreated, PTSD symptoms and alcohol 
problems can become chronic and have a significant, negative impact on the lives of 
veterans, their families and communities.” 
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accepted as a significant social problem. According to the United Nations, drug abuse can 
perpetuate crime, destroy families, impair community health, and adversely impact 
economic growth through reduced productivity.260 Some suggest that untreated PSTD 
and OSIs among veterans may be a “crisis in public health”.261 Not only can OSIs create 
social problems, but social problems can exacerbate OSIs, causing a vicious cycle of 
misery for veterans and their families.  
 In addition, social problems, such as substance abuse, unemployment or poor 
employment skills, family dysfunction, homelessness, anti-social attitudes and related 
behaviors are known criminogenic factors.262 If crime is committed and incarceration is 
imposed, further social problems often occur for the veteran family unit. If the member is 
released or if military jurisdiction is not exercised, civilian courts will be required to deal 
with veteran offenders and the related social consequences.
2.2.3 Civilian Courts 
 Throughout history, civilian Canadian courts have had to deal with offenders 
suffering from combat related PTSD, TBIs and OSIs. Some cases have put OSIs forward 
260 See e.g. “The Social Impact of Drug Abuse” United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme (1 March 1995), online: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1995-03-01_1.pdf>.
261 Supra, note 2 at 29: “While failure to treat mentally ill offenders may very well 
amount to a crisis in public health [….]”. [Emphasis mine] See also Charlene Rubush, 
“Changes Underway at the VA May Mean Better Treatment for Thousands of Veterans 
with PTSD” Win Over PTSD (17 April 2010), online: 
<http://winoverptsd.com/wp/changes-underway-at-the-va-may-mean-better-treatment-
for-thousands-of-veterans-with-ptsd/#more-361>: “The Department of Veterans Affairs 
has struggled to address this mental health crisis, and thousands of veterans have suffered 
as a result.” [Emphasis mine] 
262 Supra, note 94.
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as a defence.263 Currently, serving veterans found driving impaired in Canada are 
generally dealt with by civilian courts – even when charged by the military police. 
Similarly, despite having concurrent jurisdiction, the Canadian Forces does not generally 
prosecute cases of domestic violence due to the absence of specialized victims’ services 
that civilian counterparts can offer. Both addictions and domestic violence for veterans 
can be indicators of an OSI.264 If civilian justice officials are not trained in OSI detection 
and appropriate veteran diversion, then veterans will simply be punished as opposed to 
receiving treatment. This can exacerbate the illness and create a revolving door for 
veterans within traditional civilian courts.265 This does little to facilitate the necessary 
safe transition of the veteran from the battlefield to garrison or back into civilian society.
 In addition to R. v. Borsch266, other veterans suffering from PTSD have been 
brought before courts across the country to face criminal charges for behaviour consistent 
with OSI symptomology. Judicial treatment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
While most veterans’ cases before civilian courts are unreported, an examination of some 
recent examples of these cases shows that civilian courts are often called upon to deal 
with the aftermath of traumatized service members, despite having little training on 
263 See e.g. supra, note 102. 
264 See e.g. “Domestic violence up in Canadian military families: Rates spike after 
Afghanistan missions” cbcnews (31 March 2011), online: cbc.ca 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/story/2011/03/30/canadian-forces-
military-domestic-violence-post-traumatic-stress-disorder.html>: “Psychology experts 
believe the rise in domestic violence is directly linked to physical and emotional trauma 
suffered by soldiers in Afghanistan, especially post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.” 
265 Melissa Pratt, “New Courts on the Block: Specialized Criminal Courts for Veterans in 
the United States”, online: (2010) 15:39 Appeal 39 
<journals.uvic.ca/index.php/appeal/article/download/5400/2314>: “While traditional 
courts focus on processing the cases that come before them, resulting in a revolving door 
syndrome, problem-solving courts focus on achieving positive outcomes for victims, 
defendants, and communities.”
266 Supra, note 102.
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military culture, life, experiences and OSIs. The sample cases below involve actual 
situations of veterans who fought for their country and were psychologically injured. 
They demonstrate the current scope of the problem for civilian courts.  
 In 2011, Corporal Berube was 30 years old. His best friend, Corporal Dyer, was 
killed in an Afghanistan blast in 2002. He was diagnosed with PTSD in 2007. Despite 
undergoing treatment in Comox, a theft of his military medals in May 2010 caused him to 
regress. He began uttering threats and possessed a firearm that he intended to use to kill 
himself. Corporal Berube initially pled guilty to weapons charges in Provincial Court and 
was facing a possible lengthy prison term. Fortunately, British Columbia Provincial 
Court Judge Peter Doherty stayed the proceedings stating that incarcerating Berube, 
"might strike thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust."267 Ironically, despite his having 
received a stay and getting better treatment, the bank commenced foreclosure on his 
home shortly after.268
Conversely, Craig Turcotte, aged 39, a Canadian Forces combat officer, was 
incarcerated for 30 days and further sentenced to 18 months on probation by a civilian 
court for twice failing to comply with bail release terms to not communicate with his 
wife. The prosecution and the court were aware that the soldier had severe PTSD from 
high stress deployments in Rwanda and Afghanistan. He also had a comorbid diagnosis 
that created a drinking problem. Other similar charges, from separate incidences, were 
put through mental health diversion, but Turcotte’s defence counsel agreed with a period 
267 Jason Proctor, “B.C. judge saves Afghan war vet from prison”, cbcnews (11 February 




of incarceration. Additional charges were outstanding that included uttering threats.269
While this case took place only four years ago, it is clear that court officials were of the 
view that punishment was required in addition to treatment. This differs from Corporal 
Berube, who received a complete stay. It is acknowledged that domestic violence is a 
legislated aggravating factor;270 however, should an untreated veteran suffering from 
mental combat wounds be held to the same standard as other non-traumatized offenders? 
In the words of British Columbia Provincial Court Judge Peter Doherty, such a position 
"might strike thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust”. It is acknowledged that spousal 
abuse is a horrendous unacceptable crime and many may feel that this example does not 
advance an argument for diversion which would be broadly accepted. Still, if NCR 
verdicts and subsequent treatment based approaches for combat related PTSD are 
possible for murder; one has to look at all crimes in a careful manner and determine if 
treatment is the best option. While a visceral reaction to punish may be automatic due to 
the nature of the offence, reflection as to eliminating the root cause is best for everyone in 
the long run. Education is paramount in fostering acceptance to this premise.   
In another example, Jonathan Woolvett was a combat soldier who did two tours in 
Afghanistan totaling 13 months between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, he began experiencing 
“chronic night terrors, profuse sweating and recurring nightmares. In one, he is drowning 
269 “Troubled soldier gets 30 days in jail: Judge tells man she hopes he comes to terms 
with counselling” The Sun Times (2008), online: Owen Sound Sun Times 
<http://www.owensoundsuntimes.com/PrintArticle.aspx?e=904985>. 
270 Supra, note 42, s 718.2(1)(a)(ii): “A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into 
consideration the following principles: […] a sentence should be increased or reduced to 
account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence 
or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, […] evidence that 
the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s spouse or common-law 
partner.
79
in sand. In another, he is forced to stand helpless as people around him are being 
killed”.271 His sleeplessness was attributed to the deaths of friends and colleagues he 
deployed with, being ambushed by sustained heavy enemy fire, killing enemy insurgents, 
and continued exposure to atrocities. He used drugs and alcohol to deal with the 
symptoms of PTSD. Shortly after returning home, he was divorced. He was then later 
charged for threatening a woman he had been dating. The court gave him a conditional 
discharge. It should be noted that reports suggest that approximately “60 Petawawa 
soldiers are currently on probation for offences related to PTSD”272 from civilian courts. 
The few examples of civilian initiated prosecutions demonstrate that serving 
military members and veterans suffering from OSIs are being charged and convicted of 
criminal offences in civilian courts. Their sentences range from probation to conditional 
discharge to incarceration. The inconsistent approaches demonstrate that diversion is not 
always used. When a punishment based ethos is used to deal with mentally ill offenders, 
the results do not necessarily result in reduced recidivism rates. To understand the impact 
of this judicial approach, it is helpful to examine the veteran experience in civilian 
prisons.
2.2.4 Civilian Prisons 
Civilian incarceration rates of Canadian veterans are not currently tracked by 
Corrections Canada. However, in a recent study it was suggested that approximately 
271 C. Cobb, “Military Father Kidnaps Afghan Veteran Son From CFB Petawawa To Get 





2.8% of total inmates may be veterans. This “suggests that there may be 626 offenders 
who served in the Canadian military (383 in institutions and another 243 supervised in 
the community). Moreover, there may another 633 sentenced or remanded veterans in 
provincial or territorial corrections”.273 The implications for corrections based on a 
comparative analysis with other states and existing data suggests that “as the number of 
veterans in the general population grows, their presence in correctional facilities is also 
likely to increase—and […] those who have been deployed overseas in recent years are at 
comparatively higher risk of involvement with the justice system”.274 It should be noted 
that studies suggest that deployments alone do not increase the risk of criminogenic 
behaviour, but rather the presence of an OSI.275
 There is a significant gap in the collection of data regarding veterans who are 
incarcerated. Canada’s allies currently track with substantial detail veteran offenders who 
are in prisons, their crimes and illnesses.276 This kind of information would be of great 
assistance to Canada in helping medical personnel address criminogenic factors in order 
to reduce criminal misconduct. Further, it would assist the JAG in formulating 
273 Philippe Bensimon & Rick Ruddell, “Veterans in Canadian Correctional Systems” (4 
May 2011), online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b46/b46-eng.shtml>.
274 Ibid.
275 Supra, note 249.
276 See e.g. “Responding to the Needs of Justice-Involved Combat Veterans with Service-
Related Trauma and Mental Health Conditions” CMHS  National Gains Center (August 
2008), online: <http://www.gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/veterans/CVTJS_Report.pdf>.
See also, “Report of the Inquiry into Former Armed Service Personnel in Prison” The
Howard League for Penal Reform, online: veteransinprison.org 
<http://www.veteransinprison.org.uk/Docs/Military%20inquiry%20final%20report.pdf>: 
“There are at present over 85,000 people in prison in England and Wales and estimates of 
the proportion of those who have previously served in the Armed Forces range between 
3.5 per cent and 16.75 per cent. This means that at any one time, between some 3,000 and 
14,000 prisoners may be ex-service personnel.”
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appropriate military justice policy. This thesis suggests that a concerted strategy for data 
collection on traumatized veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails and 
prisons is required. This should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections 
Canada and the Department of National Defence.
 Generally speaking, incarcerating offenders with mental illness has become more 
and more common.277 Unfortunately, veterans with PTSD in prison are placed at 
significant risk. They need to remain constantly hyper-vigilant for violence and personal 
harm, thereby impeding treatment. Further, veterans can become re-traumatized, causing 
their symptoms to be exacerbated and increasing their aggression and the risk of violence. 
In addition, longer periods of imprisonment can cause a veteran’s functioning to 
deteriorate.278 All of this increases the risk of longer periods of imprisonment, 
interference with treatment and a higher likelihood of recidivism. 
 More significantly, veterans who require immediate treatment may not get it. 
According to the most recent Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator, “a significant portion of the inmate population that suffers from mental 
illness is ‘falling through the cracks’, as they do not have access to intermediate care in 
their penitentiary nor meet the admission criteria of […] psychiatric treatment 
facilities.”279 Further, when dealing with veteran screening for OSI, “federal corrections 
has limited capacity to systematically assess […] neurological dysfunctions upon 
277 Gary Chaimowitz, “The Criminalization of People With Mental Illness”, online: 
(2011) 57:2 The Canadian J Psychiatry 1 
<http://intraspec.ca/CPA_CriminalizationOfPeopleWithMentalIllness_5.12.11.pdf>.
278 Supra, note 38. 
279 The Office of the Correctional Investigator of Canada, Annual Report of The Office of 
the Correctional Investigator: 2010-2011, (Ottawa, OCI, 2011), online: Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Canada <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20102011-
eng.pdf>.
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admission to a federal penitentiary”.280 This may include TBI, OSI, PTSD, addictions 
and increased suicidal ideations. While much of the above would apply to all offenders 
with mental illness, “[i]f the experiences of Canadian veterans are similar to those 




281 If Corrections Canada cannot meet offender basic mental
health requirements, incarcerated veterans and those who are concerned about their well-
being should be troubled. Failure to treat veterans for their hidden wounds an
corresponding increased recidivism rates are costly to society. 
2.2.5 The Cost of Veteran OSIs 
 While there are no specific recent Canadian studies that have tabulated and 
projected the costs of dealing with veteran OSI, it is conceivable that the costs will be 
significant. An American study by the “RAND Corporation estimates the costs of the 
psychological and neurological injuries suffered by Iraq and Afghanistan veterans at 
between $4 and $6.2 billion, just in the first two years after combat”.282
 If we use this forecast and compare the American forecasted amount to the 30,000 
Canadian troops deployed to Afghanistan, the cost in the first two years post combat is 
between 51.4 and 80 million dollars (30,000 Canadian troops283 x $4 and $6.2 billion / 
280 Ibid, at 10.
281 Supra, note 273.
282 Vanessa Williamson & Erin Mulhall, “Invisible Wounds: Psychological and 
Neurological Injuries Confront a New Generation of Veterans” Iraq and Afghanistan 
Veterans of America (January 2009), online: 
<http://iava.org/files/IAVA_invisible_wounds_0.pdf>.
283 Supra, note 177: “A total of approximately 30,000 Canadian service personnel were 
deployed to Afghanistan.”
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2,333,972 US Troops284). Clearly, there are other factors (such as currency differences 
between Canada and the United States) that would impact the actual figure. Similarly, 
these numbers strictly cover 2 years post-combat Afghanistan. They do not incorporate 
veterans suffering from OSIs from other deployments such as Rwanda or Bosnia. Still, 
these numbers provide a simplistic approximation of some of the economic costs of 
veteran OSIs for Canada – until a more detailed economic analysis is undertaken.285
 Fortunately, these costs can be mitigated with early treatment. “When the impacts 
of an operational stress injury are treated in a timely and appropriate manner, full 
remission may result in 30% to 50% of cases”.286 Using the figures suggested above, this 
could result in savings to the government of approximately 15.4-40 million dollars over a 
two year period. A small investment in programs like diversion for veterans would 
facilitate faster treatment and perhaps mitigate long term costs associated with treatment, 
pensions, incarceration, court costs, unemployment, and dependant health and social 
welfare. Further, if Canada can retain experienced soldiers, there is a training savings 
associated with not having to medically release injured members. 
This thesis suggests that the Government of Canada truly understand and attempt 
to quantify the actual costs of this problem. This may help foster broader acceptance of a 
treatment based approach by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial benefits 
284Luis Martinez & Amy Bingham, “U.S. Veterans: By The Numbers” ABC News (11 
November 2011), online: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-veterans-
numbers/story?id=14928136#1>. 
285 This author is wary of forecasting costs in Canada based on health care costs in the 
United States - which has the most expensive health care system in the world. Until more 
research is done by countries with socialized medical systems, and which had a combat 
role in Afghanistan, this simplistic comparator can be used to demonstrate, if nothing 
else, that more Canadian economic research and analysis is required. Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
286 Supra, note 177. 
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of mitigating it. Further, better focused treatment options within jails and prisons tailored 
to veterans who need to be incarcerated may better treat the root illness and reduce 
overall costs to the taxpayer. This is notwithstanding the human and ethical component of 
facilitating treatment for injured veterans and their families.  
2.3  SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 RECOMMENDATIONS
 Throughout Chapter 2, the scope of the problem was discussed in order to 
substantiate a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures System in Chapter 4. In 
addition, a number of specific recommendations were made in order to improve the 
current situation for traumatized veterans. These recommendations, which will form part 
of the overall “campaign plan” also discussed in Chapter 4, can be summarized as 
follows:   
1. There should be better data collection, tracking and analysis as it relates to 
mentally injured veterans or those suffering from TBIs. This information should 
be provided and reviewed in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) annual report as 
it relates to military justice. The Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance 
from Attorney Generals, should analyze the information related to civilian justice. 
Also, there should be a concerted strategy for data collection on traumatized 
veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails and prisons. This 
should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections Canada and the 
Department of National Defence. Understanding how and why veterans end up 
before justice processes may help identify criminogenic factors and improve 
prevention and treatment strategies; 
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2.  There should be better systematic processes to track, monitor and assist released 
veterans to ensure a safer transition to civil society;
3. There should be more stringent policies that address mental health discrimination 
to assist in expediting change and defeating stigma among the veteran and 
military community. Some improvements may include: better safeguards on 
employment through accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI 
harassment and increased privacy safeguards;   
4. There should be more extensive training on OSIs for military personnel from the 
moment of recruitment. This includes attacking the stigma and culture of 
repressing mental health problems during basic training. This education process 
must be directed to all rank levels;
5. All military justice participants should be trained to detect mental illness and to 
identify when there is a relevant correlation to the offence(s) charged. In 
particular, justice officials need more training on the symptoms of mental illness, 
mental health problems and addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and 
referral. Within the unique summary trial process, specific training on detection 
needs to be incorporated into accreditation processes for presiding and assisting 
officers;  
6. There is a need to provide mentally injured members with the option to elect court 
martial, regardless of the charge;  
7. There should be specific policy direction from military justice leaders on how 
subordinates are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected, 
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alleged or proven. These policies would enhance consistency in veteran treatment
by justice officials, increase awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection;
8. The Government of Canada should quantify the actual costs of mentally injured 
veterans. This may help foster broader acceptance of a treatment based approach 
by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial benefits of mitigating it; 
and
9. There is a need for better focused treatment options within Canadian jails and 
prisons tailored to veterans who need to be incarcerated. This may better treat the 
root illness and reduce overall costs to the taxpayer.  
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CHAPTER 3 THE AMERICAN PHENOMENA: A COMPARISON 
The United States continues to make substantial advancements for veterans 
caught up in the criminal justice system, including treatment during civilian incarceration 
and specialized VTCs.287 Examining the solutions of our American allies may be of 
assistance in deciding the best way for Canadians to address this serious issue.
In order to understand whether American solutions to the legal problems of 
traumatized veterans would be of assistance to Canada, a brief comparison of the relevant 
veteran OSI issues and justice processes of both countries is appropriate. The United 
States is used as a comparator because it is Canada’s closest ally. In addition, its military 
and civilian justice system has similar origins, operates within a concurrent jurisdiction 
framework and remains somewhat analogous. Further, the most recent deployment was to 
the same location, Afghanistan, where troops often fought side by side with each other. 
Finally, as will be seen, the magnitude of the problem the U.S. faces is comparable on a 
per capita basis. 
This chapter will examine the processes currently in place for American mentally 
injured veterans. In particular, it will compare those systems with Canadian ones. This 
comparison will be used build on existing processes in order to substantiate a proposed 
Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures System in Chapter 4. It will also provide 
287 See e.g. Robert Johnson, “So Many Military Veterans Are Going To Jail This Georgia 
Town Built A Vets Only Wing” Business Insider: Military & Defence (26 April 2012), 
online: Business Insider, Inc. <http://www.businessinsider.com/there-are-so-many-
veterans-going-to-jail-this-georgia-town-built-them-their-own-wing-2012-
4?utm_source=alerts&nr_email_referer=1>. See also Ed Pilkington, “First jail for US 
veterans will offer helping hand to a growing problem” The Guardian (6 May 2012), 
online: Guardian News and Media Limited, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/06/georgia-jail-for-us-veterans>.
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some specific recommendations on improving the current Canadian justice systems for 
veterans.
In particular, the first section will compare the magnitude of the traumatized 
veteran problem with our American counterparts. This section will demonstrate that the 
scope of the problem is comparable and similar for both countries. This similarity is 
relative to population differences and the number of military members found in the 
general population.
The second section will compare the existing military justice processes between 
Canada and the United States. This will highlight that while there are similarities between 
the Canadian and American military justice processes; there remains important 
differences that may require different solutions and tactics to deal with mentally injured 
military offenders caught up in Canadian military justice. 
The third section will compare the American civilian justice processes for 
veterans with Canadian systems. In particular, it will review some caselaw for veterans 
before civilian justice processes. It will demonstrate that American courts are prepared to 
recognize that veterans with OSIs require treatment based sentences. Further, courts at 
the highest level have determined that OSIs are relevant to sentencing. Some American 
states have recognized the importance of treatment based options to justice processes and 
OSI based mitigation in their legislation.  
The fourth section will examine specifically Veterans Treatment Courts. These 
are problem solving courts specifically designed for veterans that are currently being used 
in many American states.  
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Finally, a brief summary of relevant recommendations for Canadian justice that 
have been generated by comparing our justice processes with those of the United States 
will be summarized at the conclusion of Chapter 3. These proposals are collateral to the 
overarching argument for a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process 
detailed in Chapter 4.  These collateral recommendations include: the creation of 
Canadian legislation which expressly considers the impact of military trauma and injuries 
as it relates to criminal and disciplinary processes; options for veterans to self-identify 
OSIs on their provincial driver’s license; and options for specialized housing and 
treatment for veteran inmates in Canadian civilian institutions. 
3.1  THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
In order to substantiate that existing American justice models for veterans are 
appropriate for Canadians, it is important to compare whether the scope of the problem is 
comparable.  
As of 2009, there were 21.9 million American veterans living in the United 
States.288 After more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has 
more than 2.3 million veterans who have deployed in the “War on Terror”.289 “Nearly 20 
percent of military service members who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan -- 
300,000 in all -- report symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression 




289 Supra, note 284. 
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[….]”290 This percentage is consistent with Canadian figures, which suggest rates 
between 14.5 and 23.1% depending on where in Afghanistan service members were 
posted and their role.291
“On any given day, veterans account for nine of every hundred individuals in U.S. 
jails and prisons [….O]n any given day approximately 9.4 percent, or 223,000, of the 
inmates in the country’s prisons and jails are veterans”.292 It should be noted that this 
figure also corresponds to the percentage of veterans in the general American population. 
While Canadian data suggests that approximately 3% of Canadian inmates are veterans, 
this also mirrors the percentage of veterans in the general Canadian population.293 In 
other words, the magnitude of the problem regarding veterans who are incarcerated in 
civilian institutions is the same relative to the military members found in the general 
population.
Americans studies have noted factors at play among that state’s forces that 
aggravate the problem, including: long and multiple deployments, younger service 
members, increased exposure to combat, access to care and monitoring of reservists, the 
militia or National Guard.294 Similarly, Canadian reports have suggested that veteran OSI 
problems tend to increase when there are multiple close deployments.295 Also, increased 
290 “One In Five Iraq And Afghanistan Veterans Suffer From PTSD Or Major 
Depression” Science Daily (17 April 2008), online: 
<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080417112102.htm>.
291 Supra, note 30. See also, supra, note 171.
292 Supra, note 276.
293 Supra, note 273. 
294See e.g. supra, note 282.
295 See. e.g. supra, note 177: “Repeated exposure to combat operations will cause this 
percentage to increase.”
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exposure to actual combat is a factor that exacerbates conditions.296 In addition, Canadian 
reservists may “fall through the cracks” and have difficulty accessing specialized 
treatment.297 While similar factors make the problem worse, the impact on individual 
soldiers is equally comparable.  
United States officials have also concluded that the impact of untreated OSIs on 
members includes: misconduct and poor discipline, unethical behavior, substance abuse, 
marital conflict, family violence, homelessness and suicide.298 Canadian officials have 
made similar findings.299
 Having demonstrated that the nature and relative scope of the Canadian problem 
is very similar to that of the United States, it is helpful to examine how veteran offenders 
are treated in the American military justice system. 
3.2  THE MILITARY JUSTICE PROCESS
 A military member who is charged with an offence in the United States may face 
administrative measures from a Commander. Alternatively, they may be required to face 
a non-judicial punishment if the offense is minor. Such hearings conducted by the 
Commander are non-adversarial and the standard of reasonable doubt applies. “The 
service member may request an open or closed hearing, speak with an attorney about his 
296 Ibid: “This risk increases for soldiers deployed in combat zones.” 
297 See e.g. supra, note 245: “A career soldier and lieutenant-colonel in the reserves, 
Willaert said it's ‘harder to pick up on the warning signs’ among those outside the regular 
forces, and he adds it's ‘disappointing to hear’ that some are not finding the help they 
need.”
298 Supra, note 282.
299 See. e.g. supra, note 177: “When the symptoms become chronic, there is a significant 
increase in the risk of a spiral in the severity of symptoms: absenteeism, unemployment, 
interpersonal and family problems, alcoholism and drug addiction, trouble with the law, 
homelessness and suicide.” 
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case, have someone speak on his behalf, and present witnesses who are reasonably 
available. The rules of evidence do not apply”.300
The Canadian military has administrative measures that can be imposed; however, 
these are not considered part of the disciplinary or criminal process. Still, the prior or 
likely imposition of administrative measures on an offender may be considered on 
sentencing by a service tribunal. 
The American Commander may also choose to dispose of the offenses by court-
martial. This requires “preferring” or forwarding charges to a higher authority. Once 
preferred, they are referred to court martial. The court martial must be convened by a 
convening authority, who is ordinarily “the commander of the unit to which the accused 
is assigned”.301 Conversely, in Canada, the convening authority functions are performed 
by the Court Martial Administrator, a civilian bureaucrat.302 Otherwise, the process is 
relatively similar to the Canadian military justice system.303
In the United States there are currently three types of courts martial with varying 
levels of punishments and procedures. The Canadian military had a similar structure until 
2008, when legislative changes were prompted by a Court Martial Appeal Court decision 
ruling that the scheme was unconstitutional.304 Currently, there is only a Standing or 
300 “Military Justice Overview” U.S. Department of Defense, online:
<http://vwac.defense.gov/military.aspx>. 
301 R. Chuck Mason, “Military Justice: Courts-Martial, An Overview” Congressional
Research Service (14 March 2012), online: CRS Report for Congress 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41739.pdf>. 
302 Supra, note 42, s 165.19-165.191. 
303 See e.g. supra, note 46, ch 109. 
304 Joseph Simon Kevin Trépanier v The Queen, 2008 CMAC 3, at para 137: “For these 
reasons, we will allow the appellant’s appeal in part and, as requested, declare that 
section 165.14, subsection 165.19(1) of the NDA and article 111.02(1) of the QR&Os 
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General Courts Martial.305 The Standing Court Martial (SCM) is presided over by 
military judge alone and the General Court Martial (GCM) has five panel members and a 
military judge.306 The choice of mode of trial ordinarily lies with the accused as opposed 
to the chain of command.307 Regardless of the mode of court martial in either country, the 
process is adversarial with counsel appearing for both the prosecution and defence.308
While there are semblances of a civilian criminal trial, there are procedural differences 
and unique rules of evidence.309
The appeal or review process in the United States differs somewhat from Canada. 
In America, the appellate process begins with a review by the convening authority. In 
serious cases there is an automatic review by the Department of Defence's Court of 
Criminal Appeals, composed of military judges. Both the convening authority and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals may alter the decision or sentence as long as the jeopardy to 
the offender does not increase. The next court in the appellate process is the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces. It is composed of five civilian judges appointed by the 
President for fifteen years. This Court may only review questions of law.310 Finally, 
either party “may petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari 
from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The review by the Supreme Court is 
violate section 7 and the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 11d) of the Charter 
and are of no force and effect.” 
305 Supra, note 42, s 166 and 173.
306 Ibid, s 167 and 174. 
307 Ibid, s 165.193. 
308 See e.g. supra, note 300. See also, supra, note 46, ch 112. 
309 See ibid. See also, Military Rules of Evidence, C.R.C., c. 1049, online: Department of 
Justice <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C.R.C.,_c._1049.pdf>. 
310 Supra, note 300.
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entirely discretionary and extremely rare”.311 Conversely, the appeal process in Canada 
from a court martial does not involve any decision making by the accused’s chain of 
command. Instead, the accused or government may appeal directly to the Court Martial 
Appeal Court,312 then the Supreme Court of Canada – both composed of civilian 
judges.313 In addition, there have been occasions where counsel has tried to use the 
Federal Court of Canada to deal with court martial matters, though these are unusual.314
 When dealing with mentally injured veterans who are still serving, the United 
States military justice system has additional early detection processes for mental illness 
not available in Canada. While Canadian military judges may order an assessment of 
fitness for trial, the Canadian chain of command or convening authority does not have 
this ability. In the United States, both military judges and convening authorities may 
request a mental health assessment. The examination is often called an RCM 706 
board.315 The board is called upon to determine: whether at the time of the alleged 
offence, the accused had a severe mental disease or defect; the accused’s clinical 
psychiatric diagnosis; whether she was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of 
her conduct; and whether the accused is fit for trial. This report may “lead to the case 
311 Ibid.
312Supra, note 42, s 230-231. See also, supra, note 46, 115.02-115.04.
313 Ibid, s 245. See also, ibid, 115.27.
314 See e.g. Corporal M.A. Wilcox v Attorney General of Canada and Commander P.J. 
Lamont, in his capacity as a military Judge, (14 July 2009), Halifax T-1028-09 (FC): 
“AND UPON assuming and not deciding that there is a serious issue to be tried, the 
Court is not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable 
harm if a stay is not granted. The Applicant, if convicted, will be able to file an appeal to 
the Court Martial Appeal Court (subsection 230(b) of the NDA) and raise the same 
arguments as he is raising here. The harm to the Applicant can be cured by a decision on 
the merits by the Court Martial Appeal Court [….] THIS COURT ORDERS that the 
motion for an interim stay of proceedings be dismissed.”    
315 This term comes from the rule that creates the Board, namely Rule for Court Martial 
706 as contained in the Manual for Courts Martial United States. 
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being suspended, charges being dismissed by the convening authority, administrative 
separation of the accused from military service, or the charges being tried by court-
martial”.316 Regardless of the results, additional examinations may be ordered as the 
matter progresses through the military justice process.317 In essence, the American 
convening authority, usually, the accused’s Commanding Officer, has the powers of a 
Canadian military judge to order an assessment of fitness and criminal responsibility.318
  The United States military justice system currently does not have a diversion 
process, such as a VTC. The lack of problem-solving diversion is currently receiving 
substantial criticism, including from within the ranks of the American Judge Advocate 
General’s office.319 According to Seamone, the military justice system “undermines the 
stated sentencing philosophy of rehabilitation of the offender, the way it erodes the 
professional ethic by denying core values, and the way it defies the moral obligation to 
advance the interests of both the veteran and the society he will rejoin.”320 He advocates 
for convening authorities to implement “treatment-based suspended punitive discharges 
for combat traumatized offenders,”321 and to divert offenders to civilian PSCs through 
pre-trial agreement.322 Further, he advocates for treatment-based sentences.323
316 Supra, note 301.
317 Ibid.
318 See e.g. supra, note 42 s 198 and 202.13.
319 Supra, note 2, at 2-3: “While one would expect courts-martial to foster the problem-
solving approach based on the active duty origin of these mental conditions, the initial 
legal approach resides exclusively in the domain of civilian Veterans Treatment Courts 
(VTCs).”





Similarly, the Canadian military justice system does not have diversion or 
treatment based sentences beyond remanding to a psychiatric facility after a successful 
defence of mental disorder.324 Further, the Canadian convening authority does not have 
the ability to grant clemency pre or post-conviction. The referral authority, who refers 
from the unit to the DMP, may provide comments on disposition during referral; however 
they must refer for trial or direct a summary trial be held.325 Arguably, the Commanding 
Officer could decide not to proceed with charges,326 but he/she is not authorized to get a 
mental health assessment in relation to a disciplinary matter, nor impose treatment as part 
of a sentence.327 The CDS and Officers commanding a Command may suspend 
incarceration imposed by a court martial and lower ranking officials may also do so for 
summary trials.328 While military judges may also suspend their own sentences of 
incarceration,329 their ability to oversee future treatment is often perceived as limited due 
to the ad hoc nature of the military justice system.330
324 See e.g. supra, note 42, 202.16: “(2) No order made under subsection (1) shall direct 
that any psychiatric or other treatment of the accused person be carried out or direct that 
the accused person submit to such treatment, except that the order may include a 
condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment where the accused person has 
consented to the condition and the court martial considers the condition to be reasonable 
and necessary in the interests of the accused person.” 
325 Supra, note 46, 109.05.
326 Ibid, 107.09 (3)(b).
327 Her Majesty The Queen and Sergeant (Retired) Michael Kipling, 2002 CMAC 1, para 
28: “I think the parties would agree that forcible vaccination of an individual would per 
se be an infringement of the right to security [….] It is well established that a court must 
balance individual interests versus the public interest in deciding whether in the final 
analysis there is a denial of a right contrary to the principles of fundamental justice so as 
to invoke the protection of section 7.”
328 Supra, note 46, 114.02.
329 See e.g. R v Master Corporal D.A. Bryson, 2008 CM 1002.
330 Supra, note 74.
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A recent case involving a massacre in Afghanistan has raised serious questions 
about the impact of PTSD on soldiers serving in operations. Army Staff Sergeant Bales 
has been charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder of Afghan civilians. He had 
reportedly sustained a brain injury in Iraq and was on his fourth tour of combat duty at 
the time of the alleged offence. His defence team is expected to raise undiagnosed PTSD 
as a related cause of the incident.331 Initial reports from his lawyer suggest that Bales was 
“suffering from severe nightmares, flashbacks of war scenes and persistent headaches 
after his multiple combat tours”.332  The handling of this case by the American military 
justice system is anticipated to come under intense media scrutiny. Canada has not had to 
deal with such a massacre in recent memory and certainly not during the War on Terror – 
although it is possible to conceive as there are Canadian soldiers who have done four or 
more tours during a short period of time, with mental health issues arising.333
 A brief comparison demonstrates many similarities between the Canadian and 
American military justice processes. However, there remain important differences that 
331 Kari Huus, “Afghan massacre: Sgt Bales case echoes loudly for ex-soldiers on hotline 
for vets” msnbc.com (30 March 2012), online: 
<http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/03/30/10927433-afghan-massacre-sgt-bales-
case-echoes-loudly-for-ex-soldiers-on-hotline-for-vets?lite>.
332 Carol D. Leonnig, “Staff Sgt. Robert Bales describes PTSD-like symptoms, lawyer 
says” The Washington Post (28 March 2012), online: washingtonpost.com 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/staff-sgt-robert-bales-showed-
ptsd-like-symptoms-lawyer-says/2012/03/28/gIQAV3TGhS_story.html>.
333 See e.g. Allan Woods, “Battle rages for soldiers returning home from war” 
thestar.com (7 October 2011), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/politics/article/1066696--battle-rages-for-soldiers-
returning-home-from-war>: “But sources have told the Toronto Star that at least three 
Canadian soldiers have taken their lives in the last six weeks. At least two coincided with 
the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. One of those was the Sept. 12 death of 
a Kingston-based warrant officer with 23 years of service. He completed four tours of 
duty since 2002, including a 2009 deployment detecting and dismantling improvised 
explosive devices in Afghanistan with the military’s bomb squad.”
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may require different solutions and tactics to deal with mentally injured military 
offenders caught up in Canadian military justice. Seamone’s idea to use existing civilian 
PSCs within the civilian justice system334 is worth exploring.
3.3  THE CIVILIAN JUSTICE PROCESS
American civilian justice officials are often faced with veteran offenders who 
have OSIs. How they are dealt with varies from state to state and judge to judge. While 
many states have set up specialized VTCs, it is likely that many are diverted to other 
PSCs, such as DTCs, DVCs or MHCs. “The rapid expansion of specialized treatment 
courts is noteworthy. As of 2012, there are over 3648 problem-solving courts in the 
United States […] including at least 2459 [DTCs and] 250 MHCs”.335 Unfortunately, 
there are no statistics available to determine just how many veterans are being put 
through these types of civilian diversion processes. There is a similar lack of data on the 
Canadian experience with diversion to non-veteran PSCs.
Although diversion may be available, it is not always used when it could be due to 
a multitude of factors, including the experience level of the justice officials involved 
regarding mental illness detection and the lack of consent of the accused due to stigma or 
employment consequences. In those cases, and in those states without PSCs, judges and 
officials are often forced to craft decisions that they deem just. A review of the caselaw 
334 Supra, note 2 at 3: “Carefully drafted pretrial agreement terms indicate how offenders 
can enroll in existing VTCs within the convening authority’s jurisdiction.” 
335 Ibid, p 34-35. 
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demonstrates that unfortunately, the results are uncertain and do not always foster 
treatment. This is also consistent with the Canadian experience as demonstrated above.336
A brief review of some recent high profile cases highlights some similarities with 
Canadian justice and a similar evolution with respect to understanding the impact of OSIs 
on a criminal prosecution with respect to fitness, criminal responsibility and sentencing.
In October 2009, an Oregon jury found Jessie Bratcher, a former member of the 
National Guard that had served in Iraq, guilty of murder except for insanity related to a 
PTSD flashback from the war in Iraq337 (the process is akin to the Canadian “not 
criminally responsible” process).338  Bratcher was diagnosed with PTSD after serving 11 
months in a forward operating base in Kirkuk, Iraq in 2005. “His unit patrolled villages 
around Kirkuk under constant threat of insurgent attacks and roadside bombs. In 2005, 
Bratcher watched as one of his closest friends was crushed by a Humvee during an 
336 See ch 2.2.3 Civilian Courts.
337 Julie Sullivan, “Iraq veteran sentenced to state hospital in PTSD murder case” 
OregonLive.com (7 December 2009), online: 
<http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/12/post_34.html>. 
338 See 2011 Oregon Revised Statutes § 161.328, online: 
<http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/161.328>: “(1) Following the entry of a judgment 
pursuant to ORS 161.319 (Form of verdict on guilty except for insanity), the court shall 
order a person committed to a state mental hospital or other facility designated by the 
Oregon Health Authority if: (a) Each offense for which the person is found guilty except 
for insanity is a misdemeanor; and (b) The court finds that the person is affected by 
mental disease or defect and presents a substantial danger to others that requires 
commitment. (2) The total period of commitment under this section may not exceed the 
maximum sentence provided by statute for the crime for which the person was found 
guilty except for insanity. (3) If the superintendent of the state mental hospital or the 
director of the facility to which the person is committed determines that a person 
committed under this section is no longer affected by mental disease or defect or, if so 
affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others that requires commitment, the 
superintendent or director shall file notice of that determination with the committing 
court. Upon filing of the notice, the superintendent or director shall discharge the person 
from custody.”
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accident while out on patrol”.339 Shortly after, “a roadside bomb exploded near 
Bratcher’s Humvee at the same intersection where his friend had been killed”.340
The jury had heard how in the summer of 2008, Bratcher’s pregnant fiancée, 
Celena Davis, told him that Ceja Medina had raped her and that the baby might not have 
been Bratcher’s. Bratcher proceeded to put the barrel of an AK-47 in his mouth. He later 
cut Davis’s hair off. Two days later, Bratcher purchased a gun. After discussing what to 
do, the two decided to go to the police. Because it was the weekend, the police station’s 
door was locked. As a result, they proceeded to Ceja Medina's home. The evidence 
showed that Bratcher called Ceja Medina into his front yard and shot him six times. At 
the time of the murder, he stated that he experienced a flashback to Iraq. 341
A forensic psychologist for the defence argued that “Bratcher's flashback was 
triggered by the stress around the rape allegation”.342 He had experienced other 
flashbacks while incarcerated and was previously diagnosed with PTSD. In sentencing 
the offender, the judge found Bratcher to be a danger to the community and ordered that 
he be placed under the lifelong supervision of the Oregon Psychiatric Security Review 
Board.343 “Under Oregon law, jurors could have convicted Bratcher on a reduced charge 
of first-degree manslaughter, if they determined that he was a sane person acting in the 
passion of the moment”.344 The "guilty except insane" decision allowed Bratcher “to 
339 Melody Finnemore, “Firestorm the Horizon” Oregon State Bar Bulletin (April 2010), 
online: Oregon State Bar 
<http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/10apr/firestorm.html>.
340 Ibid.
341 Kim Murphy, “Did the war make him do it?” Los Angeles Times (28 November 2009), 
online: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/28/nation/la-na-soldier28-2009nov28>.
342 Supra, note 337. 
343 Ibid.
344 Supra, note 341.
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receive psychological treatment instead of prison”.345 This is akin to the 2007 decision of 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Borsch346 which affirmed that PTSD can be used 
to support an NCR defence.
The Oregon Bratcher decision was on the heels of a Supreme Court of the United 
States unanimous decision to overturn a combat veteran’s death sentence because the 
defence had failed to introduce mitigating evidence of PTSD.347 In that case, Porter, a 
decorated veteran of the Korean War who was wounded and traumatized during heavy 
combat, was convicted of the murders of his former girlfriend and her lover. The highest 
American court stated: 
[o]ur Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to 
veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those 
who fought on the front lines as Porter did. Moreover, the 
relevance of Porter's extensive combat experience is not 
only that he served honorably under extreme hardship and 
gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find 
mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll 
that combat took on Porter.348 [Emphasis mine] 
 The sentiments of the United States Supreme Court seem similar to the rationale 
used by Judge Peter British Columbia Provincial Court Judge Peter Doherty when he 
stated that incarcerating Corporal Berube, a mentally injured veteran, "might strike 
thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust".349 Still, the American decision binds lower 
courts and clearly articulates the fundamental problem for veterans and the requisite 
impact combat stress should have on mitigation when an OSI does not completely 
345 Ibid.
346 Supra, note 102.
347 Supra, note 39.
348 Ibid, at 455. 
349 Supra, note 267.
102
absolve criminal responsibility, but nonetheless has some bearing on the transaction that 
attracted the justice system’s attention.  
This spirit of leniency for traumatized combat veterans has been reduced to 
legislation in California350 and Minnesota.351 In addition, in 2010, the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines were revised to indicate that military related trauma can be 
considered relevant in sentencing. This allows judges to depart from usual sentencing 
guidelines “if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical 
350 California Penal Code, § 1170.9, online: <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=01001-02000&file=1170-1170.9>: “(a) In the case 
of any person convicted of a criminal offense who could otherwise be sentenced to 
county jail or state prison and who alleges that he or she committed the offense as a result 
of sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, 
or mental health problems stemming from service in the United States military, the court 
shall, prior to sentencing, make a determination as to whether the defendant was, or 
currently is, a member of the United States military and whether the defendant may be 
suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of that service. The court may 
request, through existing resources, an assessment to aid in that determination”. 
[Emphasis mine] 
351 Minnesota Statutes, § 609.115, Subd 10 (2008), online: 
<https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?id=609.115&year=2008>: “(a) When a 
defendant appears in court and is convicted of a crime, the court shall inquire whether the 
defendant is currently serving in or is a veteran of the armed forces of the United States. 
(b) If the defendant is currently serving in the military or is a veteran and has been 
diagnosed as having a mental illness by a qualified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist or 
physician, the court may: (1) order that the officer preparing the report under subdivision 
1 consult with the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Minnesota Department 
of Veterans Affairs, or another agency or person with suitable knowledge or experience, 
for the purpose of providing the court with information regarding treatment options 
available to the defendant, including federal, state, and local programming; and (2) 
consider the treatment recommendations of any diagnosing or treating mental health 
professionals together with the treatment options available to the defendant in imposing 
sentence”. [Emphasis mine] 
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cases covered by the guidelines”.352 No such legislation expressly considers the impact of 
military trauma in Canada as it relates to a criminal process. In my view, it should. 
In addition to judges, other American justice officials are also taking steps either 
to assist traumatized veterans that come in contact with the civilian criminal justice 
system, or to prevent them from doing so. For example, numerous states have provided 
veterans with an option to self-identify that they are veterans with PTSD on their driver’s 
licence.353 The overall purpose is to “provide valuable information to first responders and 
will help the Department of Veterans’ Services notify veterans of benefits they are 
eligible to receive”.354 As a result, it is hoped that many veterans who would otherwise 
have been arrested and confined following ordinary traffic stops due to aggressive 
reactions relating to OSIs will be diverted by police to mental health centers.355 While 
other U.S. states have followed or are currently examining this initiative,356 no Canadian 
provinces have openly discussed this issue. They should. 
352 “2011 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual” United States Sentencing Commission
(1 November 2011) at § 5h1.11, online: 
<http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/5h1_11.htm>.  
353 See e.g. Kevin Spak, “Georgia Passes Bill to Note PTSD on License“ newser (12 May 
2010), online: <http://www.newser.com/story/88531/georgia-passes-bill-to-note-ptsd-on-
license.html>.
354 Glen Johnson, “Mass. Registry to offer special ‘Veteran’ designation on driver’s 
licenses” Political Intelligence (11 August 2011), online: boston.com 
<http://www.boston.com/Boston/politicalintelligence/2011/11/mass-registry-offer-
special-veteran-designation-driver-licenses/hCS9Ze4cwu6CakphtL6POP/story.html>.
355 Supra, note 2 at 26: “Awareness of untreated veteran mental health conditions and de-
escalation of their symptoms can save not only the veteran in crisis, but the lives of police officers 
and innocent bystanders as well. […] The state of Georgia has gone even further, giving veterans 
the option of indicating diagnosed PTSD on their drivers’ licenses to avoid potential 
confrontations with officers during traffic stops. And, many veterans who would otherwise have 
been arrested and confined are being diverted by police to mental health centers in lieu of arrest.” 
356 See e.g. “RI House to vote on veteran driver’s licenses” boston.com (13 January
2012), online: NY Times Co. <http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-
13/news/30624646_1_specialty-license-plates-veteran-service-members>. See also, 
Lindsay Wise, “Texas driver’s licenses to list veteran status”, chron.com (30 August
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American corrections officials are also attempting to better deal with the influx of 
mentally ill veterans that are being incarcerated. Several states have begun providing 
specific dorms or facilities for veterans within jails. For example, Georgia has opened a 
16-inmate corrections facility near Fort Bening, a large military base. The programs are 
geared towards veteran treatment in order to reduce recidivism. They also partner with 
the multi-disciplinary team of the local VTC in order to better access reintegration 
services for the veteran.357  Similarly, the Florida Department of Corrections has also 
created specialized housing for veterans.358 According to Florida Corrections officials 
“[g]rouping veterans allows prisons to tailor pre-release services to their special needs, 
such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder counselling, and to familiarize inmates with 
military benefits and supports available to them on the outside”.359 Florida has created 
five dormitories with a capacity of approximately 400 which are located throughout the 
state. One facility is for female veterans.360 Conversely, there are currently no known 
similar initiatives for veterans within Corrections Canada, although Corrections officials 
acknowledge that more research and study is required on this issue.361 While there are 
more veterans in American jails and prisons, the most recent numbers from Correction 
Canada officials suggest that as many as 626 inmates may be veterans. The differences in 
the size of the two militaries do not justify Canada’s failure to provide specialized 
2011) (blog), online: <http://blog.chron.com/armedsources/2011/08/texas-drivers-
licenses-to-list-veteran-status/>.  
357 Supra, note 287.
358 Barbara Liston, “Florida Debuts New Prison Dorms for U.S. Veterans” Reuters (9




361 Supra, note 273.
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housing for veteran inmates with OSIs. It is far better that they be nationally based in one 
prison or in separate smaller dorms within regional facilities. It is acknowledged that 
these dorms may be smaller in size when compared to their American counterparts. 
Regardless, Corrections Canada and their provincial counterparts should provide this 
option for incarcerated veterans in civilian institutions.  
A review of civilian justice processes that American veterans may face suggest 
that many states have made substantial advancements in promoting treatment for 
mentally injured vets, including police identification and diversion, government 
synchronized veteran tracking through licensing, specialized veteran housing for inmates 
that focuses on treatment, courts diverting veterans to mental hospitals or treatment 
programs instead of jails or prisons, and legislated mitigation and treatment options for 
trauma related to military service. Still, there is more to be done. Canadians seems to be 
needlessly lagging behind in many of these areas, particularly with respect to specialized 
veteran criminal justice diversion and the use of VTCs. 
3.4  VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS
At last count, there were 88 VTCs in 27 states in the United States.362 VTCs are 
specialized alternative measures mechanisms for minor offences committed by former 
members of the military. The purpose of the courts is to “keep those with mental health 
362 Supra, note 2 at 5. See also Captain Evan R. Seamone, “Attorney as First-Responders: 
Recognizing the Destructive Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat 
Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making Process” (2009) 202 Mil L Rev 144 at 160: “In January 
2008, the first Veterans’ Treatment Court was established in Buffalo, New York [….] In 
a span of months, similar veterans’ courts began in eight other jurisdictions, including 
Wisconsin, Oklahoma, California and Alaska, with the prospect of thirty states planning 
future initiatives and federal legislation to fund such programs.”
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issues out of the traditional justice system”.363 More specially, it is designed to reduce 
recidivism by dealing with the core criminogenic factors such as homelessness, 
aggression, and substance abuse.
A VTC is a problem-solving diversionary court, which is a hybrid of mental 
health, drug treatment, sex offender and DVC. It deals exclusively with veterans 
suffering from serious mental conditions, including OSIs and addictions.364 Like 
Canadian MHCs, the focus is on rehabilitation. These diversionary courts demonstrate a 
societal willingness and inclination to focus on treatment and rehabilitation for mentally 
ill offenders faced with criminal justice processes. 
While there are differences between the respective State processes, the Alaskan 
model exemplifies contemporary American VTC programs. 365 Essentially, the VTC 
receives referrals post arraignment, regardless of whether the member is in custody. In 
order to participate in the VTC, the accused must file a motion to determine eligibility. 
The VTC sits one afternoon per week. Once the VTC judge assumes carriage of the file, 
the accused and Veterans Services Representatives develop a treatment plan to be carried 
out by Veterans Services. Both the Prosecution and Defence enter into plea discussions, 
which can result in a modified incarceration sentence, the reduction of counts, or the 
dismissal of all charges. Because the program is consent-based, the offender may opt out 
of the process. Further, they may be removed or punished for non-compliance and placed 
363 “Keeping Veterans with PTSD out of the Justice System” National Center for PTSD
(17 August 2010), online: United States Department of Veteran Affairs 
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/keeping-PTSD-vets-out-JS.asp>.
364 “Veterans Courts” California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California (2012),
online: Judicial Council of California < http://www.courts.ca.gov/11181.htm>.
365 Hon. Michael Daly Hawkins, “Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of 
Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice System” (2010) 7 Ohio St J Crim L 563 at 573, 
as quoted in Seamone, supra, note 1 at 188.
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back in the regular justice stream. Should they remain in the system, veteran offenders 
plead to the offences agreed and then a court-ordered treatment plan is implemented as a 
condition of bail pending sentencing. During the treatment phase, the Judge acts as a 
mentor or coach in assisting and monitoring the progress of treatment. Once the treatment 
plan is completed, the veteran graduates. The case is either dismissed or the offender is 
sentenced to a completion sentence. The file is then closed. The Alaskan Veterans Court 
process closely resembles the MHC models in Canada, such as the Nova Scotia Mental 
Health Court.366 The difference is that the provincial models do not currently have 
specialized veteran treatment professionals or social workers with knowledge of veterans’ 
benefits on their multi-disciplinary teams.  
The use of VTCs has been endorsed by the American Bar Association and the 
National District Attorney’s Association.367 Further, PSCs generally have been 
encouraged by the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court 
Administrators.368 No such public endorsements regarding veterans have been put 
forward by Canadian counterparts, although PSCs generally are receiving support from 
justice officials.369 The support is backed by statistics indicating that reduced recidivism 
366 Supra, note 121.
367 Supra, note 2 at 35.
368 Ibid.
369 See e.g. “Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Presented at the 
Empire Club of Canada Toronto, March 8, 2007” Supreme Court of Canada, online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bm07-03-08-eng.asp>: “Mental health 
courts have opened in Ontario, New Brunswick and Newfoundland. Many other 
jurisdictions, including British Columbia, Manitoba, Nunavut and Yukon, are in various 
stages of developing these courts. These courts can do much to alleviate the problems.
Other problem-solving courts within the Ontario Court of Justice include drug treatment 
courts and Gladue courts, the latter dealing with aboriginal offenders. Such courts are 
also being used in other Canadian jurisdictions. This is just the beginning. I could go on. 
The point is this. In a variety of ways, throughout Canada we are adapting our criminal 
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can be achieved through VTCs, along with substantial overall savings to the taxpayer.370
These positive results would be beneficial for Canada.  
3.5  SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS
 Throughout Chapter 3, Canadian and American justice processes were compared 
in order to substantiate and design an effective Canadian Military Justice Alternative 
Measures System as set out in Chapter 4. In addition, a number of specific collateral 
recommendations were made in order to improve the current situation for traumatized 
veterans. These recommendations, which will form part of the overall “campaign plan” 
also discussed in Chapter 4, can be summarized as follows (numbering continued from 
Section 2.3): 
10. There should be legislation which expressly considers the impact of military 
trauma and injuries in Canada as it relates to a criminal process. This could 
include options for treatment based diversion or sentence mitigation when 
appropriate.
11. There should be options for veterans to self-identify mental illness where it may 
reduce the likelihood of aggravating the condition. This would include allowing 
the option to self-identify an OSI on their provincial driver’s license.  This should 
be linked to Veteran’s Affairs, providing that department with an opportunity to 
offer services to injured veterans who self-identify. 
law court procedures to better meet the realities of endemic social problems and better
serve the public.” [Emphasis mine]
370 Supra, note 131: “The programs have not only significantly lowered recidivism rates 
for defendants who complete them, they also save taxpayers hundreds of thousands of 
dollars each year -- money that would have been spent locking up offenders, county 
officials said. The community as a whole also benefits because it is safer [….]”
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12. There should be an option for specialized housing and treatment for veteran 
inmates with OSIs in Canadian civilian institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 REHABILITATING JUSTICE FOR VETERANS 
 Having suggested that a treatment based approach for veterans reduces recidivism 
rates, saves public funds and treats veterans with the respect that the public thinks they 
deserve,371 this thesis will, in this chapter, examine how these approaches could be 
implemented in Canada.372 As the law and research in this area is developing, any 
proposed model must be flexible, adaptable and able to evolve. The approach here will be 
to examine a mechanism to incorporate a veteran focused PSC into the military justice 
system and civilian justice systems. It will also canvas other potential interventions by 
police, corrections personnel and counsel. This will include building partnerships in order 
to maximize resources, collecting data and research and increasing overall support to 
traumatized veterans. The “whole of governments approach” will culminate in a 
concerted effort to reduce recidivism among veterans primarily through treatment, which 
is to be supported by legislative, policy and educational initiatives. The purpose is to 
371 See e.g. “Major Canadian poll - Who'll Stop the Rain? Ode to Canada's War Veterans, 
Environment, and Same Sex Couples”, Robbins Sce Research, (26 May 2012), online:
Robbins SCE Research Inc.,  <http://www.robbinssceresearch.com/polls/poll_905.html> 
“Question #3, Is it your “Impression” – “Perception” that the Harper Government is 
treating Canadian War Veterans well? Yes    31 %, No    52.5 % [….]” [Emphasis mine]. 
See also James Struthers, “Comfort, Security, Dignity: The Veterans Independence 
Program, A Policy History” (December 2004), online: Veterans Affairs Canada 
<http://veterans.gc.ca/pdf/pro_research/comfort-security-dignity-vip.pdf>: “Opinion polls 
showed that sympathy for their clients far outranked support for refugees or people on 
welfare. ‘It is veterans who most Canadians would like to receive more assistance.’”  
372 I reiterate that I am not suggesting that veterans suffering from mental disorders or 
trauma should get preferential treatment over their civilian counterparts, rather that they 
should at least receive equal treatment, except where there is an insurmountable valid 
military reason for preventing it. 
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ensure that the Canadian military justice system parallels the civilian justice system 
except where there is clear justification for it to deviate.373
4.1  CREATING A SERVICE TRIBUNAL
In order to substantiate the point that military justice should change by focusing 
on treatment for disabled veterans, it will be argued that a shift in military culture is 
required. Several opposing arguments to VTCs within the Canadian military justice 
process will need to be addressed. In my view, these counter-arguments need to be 
addressed prior to discussing the mechanics of any military diversion proposal, because 
they deal with the strategic level questions of whether any treatment based PSC is even 
consistent with the unique nature and purpose of military justice. In particular, any 
solution must be cognizant of the unique military justice requirement for expediency, the 
ad hoc nature of military tribunals and the underlying purpose of military justice to 
impose discipline, efficiency and morale.374 This section will demonstrate that military 
PSCs will not hurt expediency, discipline, efficiency or morale. Conversely, they will 
foster or enhance these military requirements. 
4.1.1 Expediency
A possible argument against VTCs in military justice is that they will be 
inconsistent with the need for expediency. I will argue that while there is a need for 
expediency, VTCs are as expedient as other methods. 
373 Supra, note 111.
374 R v Généreux, [1992] 1 SCR 259, at para 60 [Généreux].
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The chain of command requires that discipline be maintained through swift 
justice.375 Parliament specifically created a statutory duty to deal with military charges 
“as expeditiously as the circumstances permit”.376 Similarly, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has stated that “[b]reaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily 
[….]”377 It is noteworthy that Prime Minister Harper has stated that civilian justice must 
also be “effective, swift and true”378 and that the Charter requires that all justice matters 
be “tried in a reasonable period of time”.379 Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
stated regarding civilian justice that “[t]he failure of the justice system to deal fairly, 
quickly and efficiently with criminal trials inevitably leads to the community's frustration 
with the judicial system and eventually to a feeling of contempt for court procedures”.380
[Emphasis mine] 
In the civilian realm, the highest court has articulated that criminal matters must 
proceed quickly for a number of reasons, including: community support through positive 
375 See e.g. House of Common Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 44 (4 November 2011) at 
1025 (Chris Alexander): “Therefore, it is vital that our armed forces take with them a 
reliable justice system that is consistent with our values. When they are deployed, they 
are governed by the military rather than the civilian justice system. Military justice in 
Afghanistan, Libya and other countries where our forces are deployed must be swift and 
fair and reflect the values of Canada's civilian justice system and its most recent 
developments.” [Emphasis mine] 
376 Supra, note 42, s 162: “Charges laid under the Code of Service Discipline shall be 
dealt with as expeditiously as the circumstances permit.” 
377 Supra, note 374.
378 Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Speech from the Throne” Here for All Canadians (3
March 2010), online: Government of Canada 
<http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1388>.
379The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11, s 11(b). See also, Askov v R, [1990] 2 SCR 1199: “[A]ll accused persons, each one of 
whom is presumed to be innocent, should be given the opportunity to defend themselves 
against the charges they face and to have their name cleared and reputation re-established 
at the earliest possible time.”
380 Ibid.
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perceptions of fairness; the reliability and availability of witnesses; the rapid reintegration 
of innocent accused parties into society; and the fostering of trust in the justice system by 
the community.381
The reason for the perceived increased expediency requirement for military 
justice relates to the unique (and self-evident) requirements of the profession of arms. In 
particular, war cannot stop for an extended trial. Further, units cannot afford to lose 
healthy trained members to repatriation from a war zone for minor offences in order for 
them to prepare for the defence of a court martial. For example, the work-ups or pre-
deployment training exercises for the Afghanistan combat mission lasted approximately 
nine months. If accused parties’ positions have to be backfilled at the last minute, the 
forces either have to draw upon previously deployed trained members382 or place soldiers 
into operational combat roles with little or no mission specific training. Either option 
places soldiers and the mission at increased risk. 
381 Ibid: “First, there is a collective interest in ensuring that those who transgress the law 
are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law. Second, those individuals on trial 
must be treated fairly and justly. Speedy trials strengthen both those aspects of the 
community interest. […] From the point of view of the community interest, in those cases 
where the accused is detained in custody awaiting trial, society will benefit by the quick 
resolution of the case either by reintegrating into society the accused found to be innocent 
or if found guilty by dealing with the accused according to the law. If the accused is 
released on bail and subsequently found guilty, the frustration felt by the community on 
seeing an unpunished wrongdoer in their midst for an extended period of time will be 
relieved. There are as well important practical benefits which flow from a quick 
resolution of the charges. There can be no doubt that memories fade with time. Witnesses 
are likely to be more reliable testifying to events in the immediate past as opposed to 
events that transpired many months or even years before the trial. Not only is there an 
erosion of the witnesses' memory with the passage of time, but there is bound to be an 
erosion of the witnesses themselves. Witnesses are people; they are moved out of the 
country by their employer; or for reasons related to family or work they move from the 
east coast to the west coast; they become sick and unable to testify in court; they are 
involved in debilitating accidents; they die and their testimony is forever lost. Witnesses 
too are concerned that their evidence be taken as quickly as possible [….]”
382 This contributes to increased deployment cycles and the potential for OSIs. 
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Also, members in combat cannot have their minds on anything but combat.383 If a 
criminal or disciplinary trial is on their minds for any extended period, people are at 
increased risk because they are not completely focused on their roles in combat.384 If 
people fail in combat for any reason, the result is not only that people can die or be 
injured; but that the entire mission can fail.385
In addition, war zones often become crime scenes with witnesses from various 
states who speak different languages. It is absolutely imperative that evidence be 
collected quickly and that matters proceed expeditiously in military justice processes to 
ensure that litigators can test the evidence, track down witnesses and examine crime 
scenes in their original form. For example, in the case of R. v. Wilcox, an application was 
brought by the Defence to move the location of the trial to have the homicide crime scene 
examined by the panel members. Unfortunately, the location of the shooting, a tent in 
Kandahar, had been dismantled and relocated by the time the court martial got underway. 
As a result, the panel relied on pictures and testimony to reconstruct the scene.386 It is the 
383 Travis L. Martin, ed, “Narrating the Past, Envisioning the Future” The Journal of 
Military Experience, online: <http://militaryexperience.org/volume1/>: “While you fight 
and suffer and struggle, you are also changing, becoming someone totally different. The 
harsh and violent realities of war force you to change. Emotions are an inconvenience—
they distract you—making you feel and think instead of react. A distracted soldier is a 
dead soldier.” [Emphasis mine] 
384 See e.g. “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps” GlobalSecurity.org,
online: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-indicators.htm>: “Booby traps 
rely on an unwary or distracted soldier touching or pulling a physical object [….]” 
385 See e.g. Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of 
War (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999) at 64: “Unjustified disobedience to a 
superior can be catastrophic for the safety of fellow soldiers in combat. It can also cause 
mission failure.” 
386 R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2024, at paras 15 and 19: “[15] The applicant 
now seeks an order to take a view of the Entry Control Point 3; clearing bays, which on 
the evidence at trial to this point were located on the camp and were used to verify that 
weapons were clear of ammunition; tent A-1 and the adjacent tent porch and bunker; the 
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nature of a war zone that people and objects generally change more quickly than in 
civilian society. 
Further, justice is perceived to be more effective if it is quick. If fellow soldiers 
see that committing an offence will result in an immediate correction or punishment, then 
it is believed to act as a deterrent to others contemplating similar behaviour. The possible 
offence can be as simple and disobeying a lawful command to “go over a hill” while 
under real threat of death due to enemy gunfire. The failure to obey by one without real 
immediate repercussion may cause others to weigh the risk of criminal prosecution with 
the risk of death. Without a “habit of obedience”, the entire unit can be destroyed. This 
can jeopardize the mission, which in turn may have national or international implications. 
The so called “habit of obedience” has been historically fostered through immediate 
correction, which for the most part is effective.387 Unfortunately, it does not contemplate 
mentally injured soldiers, because they should not be in combat. Maintaining an 
operationally-ready military force for combat was the real reason that military justice was 
25-metre range; and the Tim Hortons boardwalk, all, in order that the panel may, ‘fully 
understand the testimony of the defence witnesses.’ […][19] As I have already noted, the 
evidence on the application establishes that since the date alleged in the charge sheet, the
tent in question has been moved from its location in March of 2007. There is no evidence 
before me as to whether the adjacent porch and bunker remain in the place or condition 
that they were in at that time. There is a wealth of evidence before the panel of this court 
of photographs taken both inside and outside the tent in question and showing the area 
around the tent at or around the time of the alleged offences. This evidence is 
supplemented by diagrams drawn by some of the witnesses who lived in the tent at the 
time as well as by the investigator from the National Investigation Service. As well, there 
are many photographs of the gate area known as Entry Control Point 3.” [Emphasis mine]
387 See e.g. Colonel Michael Gibson, “Canada’s Military Justice System”, online: (2012) 
12:2 CMJ 61 at 62 <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol12/no2/61-gibson-eng.asp>: “In
the development of discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in correction, 
fairness or justice is indispensable.” [Emphasis mine] 
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designed. As a result, there is an “ableist” culture388 that presupposes offenders are fit 
and ready to fight, and that disciplinary or criminal behaviour can be corrected throu
punishment. Regrettably, this may be creating a disadvantage to disabled veterans by not 
having systematic diversion options that would facilitate treatment. 
gh
Expediency can be maintained with treatment based approaches, such as PSCs. 
Most PSCs will have 6-24 months of ongoing treatment before graduation.389 A minor 
summary trial is often completed within a month of two of the offence and cannot 
statutorily commence more than 12 months post-offence.390 There are legislative 
proposals underway to reduce that window to 6 months, although the accused could 
waive the limitation period in order to avoid a court martial in certain circumstances.391 It 
should be noted that as long as the summary trial is commenced before the time period, 
the requirements of the regulations are met. Often, summary trials are commenced and 
adjourned until after the limitation period in order to preserve the ability to proceed in 
that fashion. Despite assertions by Commanders that military trials must be resolved 
within 6 months to enforce discipline, a recent study of courts martial delay indicated that 
the average litigation period of a court martial in 2007 was 19.45 months. “The average 
388 Supra, note 150. 
389 See e.g. “Problem Solving Courts” Washington Courts (21 May 2012), online: 
<http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_dir/?fa=court_dir.psc&tab=9>.
390 Supra, note 42, s 163(1.1): “A commanding officer may not try an accused person by 
summary trial unless the summary trial commences within one year after the day on 
which the service office is alleged to have been committed.” See also supra, note 46, 
108.06.
391Supra, note 143, cl 35: (1.1) A commanding officer may not try an accused person by 
summary trial unless the charge is laid within six months after the day on which the 
service offence is alleged to have been committed and the summary trial commences 
within one year after that day. (1.2) The accused person may, in accordance with 
regulations made by the Governor in Council, waive the application of subsection (1.1). 
[Emphasis mine] 
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from April 1 2006 to March 31, 2007 was 21 months [….] The situation has not changed 
over the last eight years. […] The Court Martial system is, in fact, slower in disposing of 
cases than the civilian system”.392 While the JAG has adopted many of the 
recommendations in that report,393 there are still cases litigated that involve offences that 
are in excess of 24 months.394  In that respect, if diversion to a military justice PSC 
happened quickly, the period from actual sentencing to VTC graduation would not likely 
be very different in practice. In fact, graduation periods could be faster and more 
expedient, as would be the public finding of responsibility at the commencement of a 
treatment program. 
The use of PSC mechanisms would be beneficial to the military justice system 
because they may identify injured soldiers early, thereby reducing recidivism and 
increasing the overall likelihood of a full recovery.395 A guilty plea or admissions are 
entered early in PSC models, eliminating issues of trial preparation, witness attendance 
and other administrative resources that could be put to other military operational use. In 
addition, the community, including the military community, will perceive the military 
392 Judge Advocate General, External Review of the Canadian Military Prosecution 
Service: Final Report by Andrejs Berzins & Malcolm Lindsay (Ottawa, National 
Defence, 2008) at 10.
393 Judge Advocate General, JAG Annual Report 2009-10, Annex C: Annual Report of the 
Director of Military Prosecutions (Ottawa, National Defence, 2012) online: 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/office-cabinet/annrep-rappann-09-10/annex-c-
annexe-c-eng.asp>: “In the previous fiscal year, in response to the Bronson Report, DMP 
completed a comprehensive review of all CMPS policies and procedures. […] DMP was 
still working to adopt some additional recommendations from the Bronson Report that 
had yet to be implemented by the end of the reporting period.”
394 See e.g. R v Collins, 2012 CM 4006: “Sergeant Collins forged the signature of 
Corporal Pelletier on the 3 October 2008 form […] Sergeant Collins again forged the 
signature of Corporal Pelletier on the 28 October 2008 form […]. A charge was laid in 
November 2010 and the first charge sheet was initially preferred in June 2011. The 
second charge sheet was preferred in January 2012.”
395 See e.g. supra, note 131.
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justice process as fair by demonstrating, in a more tangible way, a balancing of the 
requisite sentencing objectives, including rehabilitation.396 Further, the community would 
feel safer because the root issue is being resolved as opposed to simply being put off 
through incarceration. This enhances the public perception of the administration of 
military justice to reasonably informed members of the community. 
While it can be demonstrated that PSCs can be just as expedient (if not more so) 
as actual trials, the underlying purpose of military justice needs to be examined in order 
to assess their compatibility.  
4.1.2 The Purpose of Military Justice and VTCs 
As highlighted by the Supreme Court of Canada, “[t]he purpose of a separate 
system of military tribunals is to allow the Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain 
directly to the discipline, efficiency and morale of the military”. 397 Modern military 
doctrine for the Canadian Forces reiterates this finding.398 I will demonstrate how VTCs 
can be implemented into military justice without the degradation of its underlying 
396 Supra, note 42, s 718: “The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along 
with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, 
peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the 
following objectives: […] (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; […and] (f) to promote 
a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims 
and to the community”. 
397 Supra, note 374.
398 Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Ottawa, Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Canada, 2009) at 16, online: National Defence 
<http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfpds-sppfc/english/documents/Duty-with-Honour-The-
Profession-of-Arms-in-Canada-2009-e.pdf>: “[T]he Queen’s Regulations and Orders 
assign NCMs specific responsibilities to ‘promote the welfare, efficiency and good 
discipline of all who are subordinate to the member’ and the authority to execute these 
responsibilities. In effect, they have been delegated the day-to-day responsibility for 
ensuring that subordinates are individually and collectively trained, prepared and capable 
of accomplishing all missions assigned to them.”
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purposes of discipline, efficiency and morale. Further, in addition to actually addressing 
possible counter-arguments against VTCs, this section demonstrates how they are 
consistent with the underlying purpose of military justice. 
4.1.2.1  Discipline 
Throughout history discipline has been the cornerstone of military efficacy. For 
example, Sun Tzu indicated that “[s]oldiers must be […] kept under control by means of 
iron discipline”.399 Canadian military doctrine states that “it is a professional 
responsibility to ensure that the highest standard of discipline, especially self-discipline, 
is maintained. […]. Discipline and teamwork remain vital [….]”400 Discipline assists in: 
building cohesion, achieving objectives not possible by military skills alone, allowing 
compliance with the interests and goals of the military institution, facilitating immediate 
and willing obedience to lawful orders and strengthening individuals to cope with the 
demands and stresses of operations.401 The Code of Service Discipline contained within 
the NDA sets out the military offences and the legal system required to administer 
discipline. 
VTCs with a military justice scheme would not impair discipline. To the contrary, 
they are designed to treat a member’s problems so that they do not commit further 
offences. Eliminating aggression, addictions and hyperarousal symptoms among veterans 
with OSIs will foster discipline. There is a deterrent component to VTCs because 
offenders must be accountable for their actions in open court. They must continue to 
399 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles (Virginia: Wilder Publications, 
2008) at 88. 
400 Supra, note 398 at 14 and 75.
401 Ibid, at 28.
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appear week after week before a judge to report their progress. Arguably, multiple 
appearances are more of a deterrent than simply showing up one day for sentencing.402
Further, there is a constant threat of being removed from the program and placed back 
into the ordinary criminal justice system. Also, reasonably informed peers would 
understand that the member was ill and was being cared for by the military. In addition, 
they will know that her criminal behavior is equally unacceptable requiring judicially 
supervised treatment. Resolving the root problem publicly will foster discipline, thereby 
increasing efficiency.  
4.1.2.2 Efficiency
The concept of military efficiency is fluid and depends on the perspective 
underpinning the discussion. Generally, it is understood to be the efficient use of military 
resources in the course of military operations. Financial statements alone cannot be used 
to measure military efficiency, as there are other intangibles that are engaged, such as 
human courage or morale. 
It should be noted that under the direction of General Rick Hillier, the previous 
CDS, the focus was on operational effectiveness as opposed to efficiency.403 Military 
402 See e.g. R v Babineau, 2011 CM 3009: “There is also the fact that you had to face this 
Court Martial, which has a dissuasive effect, not only on you but also on your peers and 
on the persons in attendance at this Court Martial, which is made public and will surely 
be known at least in this region or within your unit.” 
403 Daniel Gosselin, “Navigating the Perfect Wave: The Canadian Military Facing its 
Most Significant Change in 50 Years”, online: (2008) 8:4 CMJ 83 at 85 
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no4/gosselin-eng.asp>: “This is where the 
reorganization of the 1960s differs from the transformation launched by General Hillier, 
who is not focused upon efficiencies, but upon operational effectiveness.” [Emphasis 
mine] 
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effectiveness and military efficiency may differ conceptually,404 but military justice is 
required to deliver both to Commanders.405 The mode of delivery must adapt to changing 
conditions on the ground, which currently have large numbers of veterans with OSIs and 
TBIs. As the medical science in this area advances and general stigma decreases, higher 
rates of diagnosis are likely.
VTCs in military justice would promote military efficiency, providing both 
tangible and intangible results. From a financial perspective, they reduce recidivism 
thereby reducing the costs of incarceration. Studies have shown that offenders with 
mental health problems actually serve more time because of the difficulty of adapting to 
the prison environment, and they are at increased risk to exhibit inappropriate or violent 
behaviours, often reducing parole eligibility.406 In addition, early treatment for PTSD and 
other OSIs results in fuller recovery, thereby reducing medical costs on the military and 
society post release. Further, reducing homelessness, substance abuse and unemployment 
also reduces social welfare costs. If the veteran can return to employment, the result is 
reduced pension or military benefits combined with the economic value of a member of 
society generating personal wealth. Further, if the veteran can be retained, the experience 
and training is not lost, resulting in reduced training costs for the Canadian Forces. 
404 Milan Vego, “Is the Conduct of War a Business?”, online: (2010) 59:4 JFQ 57 at 61-
62 <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_57-65_Vego.pdf>: “Efficiency is 
the ratio of the output to the input into any system. It deals with one's skillfulness in 
avoiding the wasting of time and effort. […] In a military context, effectiveness pertains 
to one's ability to accomplish the assigned objective—the starting point and a single most 
important element of both planning and execution in the employment of one's combat 
forces.”
405 See e.g. C.F. Blair, “Military Efficiency and Military Justice: Peaceful Co-
existence?”, (1993) 42 UNBLJ 237 at 237: “There is a myth that military efficiency and 
military justice are mutually contradictory. […] History shows that in the field the 
effective fighting force is a disciplined one.” 
406 Supra, note 116 at 24. 
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Studies on actual rates of return for investment in treatment courts suggest that 
“for every dollar invested in drug court, you will get $2.21 back from your investment. 
[…] Drug courts that are treating high-risk and more serious offenders are returning 
$3.36 for every dollar invested, and the best drug courts are returning $27 for every dollar 
invested”.407 VTCs are hybrid PSCs, which include DTCs. These figures suggest 
significant savings to the overall public budget can be realized through relatively small 
investments. Few other investments available have demonstrated such efficiency. 
In addition to the financial benefits, veterans who are diverted to VTCs are more 
likely to feel as though they are being looked after as opposed to being cast aside. This 
improves morale, not only for the affected veteran, but for those peers who see how the 
injured veteran is being treated. Knowing that veterans are being treated fairly and with 
respect will foster a willingness to obey orders despite personal risk. This allows courage 
to flourish. Numerous studies have found that “report[s] of low personal and unit morale 
and lower unit cohesion were linked to increased reports of PTSD symptoms”.408 Efforts 
to eliminate symptoms should result in improved unit cohesion and improved morale. 
Improved morale increases operational effectiveness. As a result, a move to incorporate 
VTCs in the Canadian military justice system would be both efficient and effective for 
the Canadian Forces. 
407 Senate Hearings, 112th Congress, 1st Sess, No. J–112–34 (19 July 2011) “Drug and 
Veterans’ Treatment Courts: Seeking Cost-Effective Solutions for Protecting Public 
Safety and Reducing Recidivism” (Douglas B. Marlowe) at 19, online: 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg71696/pdf/CHRG-112shrg71696.pdf>.
408 Terri L. Tanielian & Lisa J. Jaycox, eds, Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and 
Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences and Services to Assist Recovery (Santa Monica 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2008) at 52.
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4.1.2.3 Morale
Carl von Clausewitz, a military strategist, stated “we should observe that 
everything depends on the skill of our subordinate officers and still more on the morale of 
our soldiers”.409 [Emphasis mine] Canadian military doctrine suggests that “[m]embers of 
the profession must ensure the care and well-being of subordinates. All leaders must 
understand, both professionally and personally, that this vital responsibility is the basis 
for fostering and maintaining an effective and cohesive force with high morale”.410
[Emphasis mine] 
VTCs foster morale by allowing leaders to “ensure the care and well-being of 
subordinates”.411 Their primary goal is to resolve the root problem, which is related to 
OSIs. By treating this problem, unit cohesion and morale improves, so as to allow the 
maintenance of “an effective and cohesive force with high morale” – a vital responsibility 
of leadership.412 Conversely, incarcerating operationally traumatized veterans destroys 
morale and works against military goals. 
The implications of not treating veterans with mental health injuries include: 
lower morale, less discipline, decreased efficiency, and possible mission failures among 
the Canadian Forces community. Using rigid processes to deal with mentally injured 
veterans may make their illness worse, and in the process reduce the public’s confidence 
in the administration of military justice. Further, if Canadian society believes that 
veterans can be injured mentally and not adequately cared for on return from operations, 
409 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke 
(Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003) at 57. 




it will be more and more difficult to get effective volunteers to put themselves at great 
risk only to face further perils from their wounds when they return home. The absence of 
a “motivated” quality volunteer force will degrade operational efficiency. Reduced 
operational efficiency and potential for mission failures puts Canada and its foreign 
policy agenda at risk.
Having demonstrated that VTCs are consistent with the inherent purpose of 
military justice, three additional potential counter arguments need to be addressed, 
namely: portability, war and peace and the ad hoc nature of military justice. 
4.1.3 Other Possible Counter-Arguments
4.1.3.1 Portability
A possible argument against VTCs within military justice is that they will be 
inconsistent with the need for portability. I will argue that while there is a need for 
portability in military justice, VTCs would not likely have to enter into a theatre of 
operations, though they could do so where necessary. 
 Canadian military justice is portable and is designed to function in war zones. 
During combat operations in Afghanistan, numerous summary trials were held in theatre. 
Conversely, there were very few courts martial held overseas.413 The reason for this is the 
practical difficulty of bringing personnel who have not received mission-specific training 
into a theatre of operations, the increased logistical burdens and the overall safety issues 
for the court martial entourage. Further, by the time a matter reaches court martial, most 
413 See e.g. R v Semrau, 2010 CM 1002. See also, The Canadian Press, “Semrau court 
martial adjourned” cbcnews (7 July 2010), online: CBC Radio-Canada 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/07/07/semrau-court-martial.html>: 
“Semrau's trial travelled to Afghanistan in June to hear testimony from witnesses”. 
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of the military witnesses and the unit have left theatre, which makes a Canadian location 
more optimal to achieve the aims of discipline since the trial will unfold at the unit. In a 
recent court martial, Lt-Col D’Auteuil, military judge, indicated that generally Courts 
martial will be held at the unit of the member to ensure the proceedings are available to 
the community affected and to ensure the deterrent effect of any sentence imposed is 
communicated effectively.414 Also, “it has never been the practice at courts martial to 
hold the trial at the scene of the alleged offence. Even a cursory acquaintance with the 
exigencies of military operations discloses the impracticality of such a rule”.415 In 
addition to a deterrent component of holding the trial at the unit, there is an underlying 
efficiency element that is also considered, in terms of having the trial take place in a 
location that already has infrastructure to accommodate it.416
   A VTC would not have to enter into a theatre of operations and does not need to 
be operationally portable. If a member qualifies for a VTC, it is acknowledged that they 
require long term medical services that would make them unfit for operational duty. As a 
result, the VTC would take place in Canada, preferably at or near the unit so as to provide 
the requisite deterrent component.417 Further, there would need to be multi-disciplinary 
teams in place. Currently IPSC/JPSU has set up regional centers for OSI treatment. This 
is likely where the convening of ongoing hearings should take place. From an efficiency 
perspective, video conferencing could be used to reduce travel costs for brief 
appearances. The propriety of using this technology can be assessed on a case by case 
414 R v Petty Officer 1st Class J.R.G. Pelletier, 2008 CM 3002, Application M-1.
415 Supra, note 386, paras 9-10. 
416 Ibid, para 10: “Indeed, the American author Winthrop, in his Military Law and 
Precedents, refers to a directive of the War Department in 1895 that courts martial be 
held wherever the expense will be reduced to a minimum”. 
417 Supra, note 414.
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basis. Currently video conferencing is in place in most permanent courts martial 
locations, including: Halifax, Ottawa/Quebec and Victoria. This technology is already 
frequently used for applications and show cause hearings.418
In addition, there are new provisions for the appointment of part-time reservist 
judges currently before Parliament.419 Should it be necessary to have regionally located 
judges for these types of hearings to reduce costs, then reservist judges could be used if 
required. Based on the current caseload of the four military judges, it should be possible 
to incorporate a VTC into their current functions.420 Further, having fewer trials, which 
can last weeks or months, will free up judicial resources in order to supervise offenders 
before a military justice-type VTC. 
 In summary, VTCs can be domestically portable to the extent required and cost-
effective,421 which is consistent with military justice requirements. It is unlikely that it 
would be required in a theatre of operations; however it could be done if needed, as 
418 See supra, note 46, 112.64: “Where the prosecutor and the accused agree, and the 
judge so orders, the accused, the prosecutor or the judge may appear at preliminary 
proceedings (see article 112.03 – Preliminary Proceedings) by any means that allow the 
judge, the prosecutor and the accused to engage in simultaneous visual and oral 
communication.” See also supra, note 46, 112.65: “Where the prosecutor and the accused 
agree and the judge so orders, the evidence of a witness may be taken at any time during 
court martial proceedings by any means that allow the witness to testify in a location 
other than the courtroom and to engage in simultaneous visual and oral communication 
with the court, the prosecutor and the accused”. 
419 Supra, note 143, cl 2(3): “‘military judge’ includes a reserve force military judge.”
420 See “2012 Decisions”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/dec/2012-eng.asp>. Note that as of 27 May 2012, 14 
cases were reported for the calendar year with many being guilty pleas. See also 
“Biographies”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces <http://www.jmc-
cmj.forces.gc.ca/bio/index-eng.asp>. Note that there are currently four full-time military 
judges.
421 Supra, note 407, (Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse) at 1: “Many jurisdictions, including my 
home State of Rhode Island, also are developing veterans’ treatment courts. Today’s 
hearing will closely examine these intervention and treatment courts and the role they can 
play as cost-effective solutions for protecting public safety and reducing recidivism”. 
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would any other matter requiring a military judge. Current available technologies and 
reservist judges could be used to reduce travel costs associated with potential increased 
appearances. This would be offset by the diversion of trials. These diversionary processes 
are beneficial, both in times of war and peace. 
4.1.3.2 War and Peace
Another possible argument against VTCs is that military tribunals are not required 
in times of peace regardless their focus. I will argue that there is nonetheless a need for 
military treatment courts during times of war and peace. 
Obiter comments in a recent Court Martial Appeal Court decision appear to 
question the logic of the landmark Généreux decision and the purpose of a separate 
system of military justice in a modern context. In R. v. Joseph Simon Kevin Trépanier422,
the Chief Judge remarked how the French military justice system does not function 
during peacetime. Conversely, he points out that the Canadian military justice system has 
expanded even when not at war. “[N]otwithstanding its derogatory nature and the right of 
every individual to equality before and under the law pursuant to section 15 of the 
Charter, its constitutional legitimacy and validity have been affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Généreux [….]”423
The reality is that in order to instill a habit of obedience, it must be constant 
through war and peacetime. If military personnel do not live, prepare and train for combat 
conditions, they will not maintain the high-readiness and discipline that is optimal for an 
422 Supra, note 304. 
423 Ibid, at paras 22-23: “[T]he French authorities have abolished the military courts in 
time of peace. They have kept them in time of war and for crimes committed abroad.”
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effective fighting force. Inattention to discipline in garrison led to the disciplinary 
problems among Canadian Forces troops in Somalia.424 Further, the military justice 
system allows Canada to exert jurisdiction over members that commit offences on foreign 
soil deployed during non-combat or peace-keeping operations.425 Canada has an 
operational interest in ensuring that its military members who engage in misconduct on 
foreign soil are dealt with by Canadian military justice. This interest includes the 
maintenance of morale.426
424 The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol 10 (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 1997), online: 
<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol0/v0s12e.htm>: “ A number of factors contributed to the 
disciplinary problems in the CAR, specifically in 2 Commando, prior to deployment,
including […] a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary infractions or to 
cover them up entirely; and the continuing ability of CAR members to evade 
responsibility for disciplinary infractions.  As we explore in greater detail in Chapter 19, 
the CAR was simply unfit to undertake a mission in the autumn of 1992, let alone a 
deployment to Somalia. The three incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, indicated a 
significant breakdown of discipline in 2 Commando during the critical period of training 
and preparation for operations in Somalia. Military pyrotechnics were discharged 
illegally at a party in the junior ranks' mess; a car belonging to the duty NCO was set on 
fire; and various 2 Commando members expended illegally held pyrotechnics and 
ammunition during a party in Algonquin Park. The illegal possession of these 
pyrotechnics was the result of theft from DND and the making of false statements. A 
search conducted on the soldiers' premises uncovered ammunition stolen from DND, as 
well as 34 Confederate flags.” [Emphasis mine]  
425 The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol 11 (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 1997), online: 
<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c7e.htm>: “Under the Code of Service Discipline all 
service offences committed outside Canada and most committed in Canada can be tried 
by service tribunals.” See also supra, note 42, s. 60.
426 Michael R. Gibson, “International Human Rights Law and the Administration of 
Justice through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility while Precluding Impunity”, 
online: (2008) 4:1 J Int’l L & Int’l Relations 1 at 25 
<http://www.law.yale.edu/JILIR_International_Tribunals.pdf>: “It is readily apparent 
why the sending state should wish to have such jurisdiction over its own nationals. This 
permits it to exercise control over persons who have the potential to engage its state 
responsibility through their misconduct. It also allows it to be satisfied that its own 
nationals are being treated fairly. […I] t allows them to be subject to the domestic law of 
their national state and tried in accordance with its national procedures, rather than the 
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The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry acknowledged France’s 
decision, but reiterated the fundamental importance of maintaining a military justice 
system during peacetime.427 Still, the recommendations specifically pointed out that in 
justifying its existence, the “Canadian military justice system should […] parallel the 
civilian justice system unless there is clear justification for it to differ from the civilian 
system”.428 The Canadian civilian justice system is using PSCs to enhance treatment 
where appropriate. There is no military justification to deviate from this practice. 
 In fact, VTCs promote the notion that military justice should continue to operate 
during times of peace and war to ensure soldiers are properly diverted to treatment and 
returned to their units for operations when possible. Because VTCs promote and foster 
discipline and morale, they will efficiently enhance peacetime readiness for deployment. 
Further, by providing for alternative measures that parallel the civilian justice system, 
leaders can maintain the underlying philosophy of the restructured military justice system 
post-Somalia: because CF members are Canadian citizens, “[a]s a basic rule, laws and 
procedures governing their conduct should be the same as those for other citizens”.429
VTCs can be implemented to meet this underlying philosophy, despite the ad hoc nature 
of military tribunals. 
possibly unfamiliar law and procedures of the receiving state, as well as being subject to 
its punishments. […] Second, it allows them to be tried in a court which uses their own 
language for its proceedings. Third, the provision of legal aid will allow them to choose 
to be defended by a lawyer who speaks their language and is well versed in their national 
law. As an ancillary benefit, the morale of the military member concerned will likely be 
better if he or she […] are being tried in their own national legal system rather than that 
of another state.” 




4.1.3.3 The Ad Hoc Nature of Military Justice
Another possible argument against VTCs is the ad hoc nature of military justice. I 
will argue that while the military justice system is ad hoc without a permanent court, 
VTCs or a similar PSC can be used within the existing structure, if appropriate legislative 
changes are made. 
 The Canadian military justice system is often referred to as an ad hoc system. The 
Supreme Court of Canada compared military tribunals with ordinary criminal courts and 
remarked that the judge advocate, military judge or panel is temporarily appointed to sit 
on an ad hoc basis – when a breach of the Code of Service Discipline occurs.430
 The reality is that since 1992 there have been various decisions, reports and 
studies calling for a permanent court.431 Judges, prosecutors and defence counsel have 
increased their respective independence based on decisions and legislative initiatives.432
430 Supra, note 374: “At the conclusion of this type of court martial, the judge advocate 
and members return to their usual roles within the military. For the members of the 
General Court Martial, this means a return to their regular duties as officers. For the 
judge advocate, it means a return to legal duties within the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General.”
431 See e.g. Antonio Lamer, “The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable 
Antonio Lamer P.C., C.C., C.D. of the provisions and operation of Bill C-25, An Act to 
amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 
as required under section 96 of Statutes of Canada 1998, c.35” National Defence, online: 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/antonio-lamer/en/report_e.pdf>: “I am 
recommending the creation of a permanent trial level military court, with judges 
appointed until retirement.” See also supra, note 74 at 238. 
432 See e.g. Leblanc v R 2011 CMAC 2 at para 64: “Given the fact that the issue of 
security of tenure for military judges has been the subject of contradictory decisions that 
have generated concern and uncertainty since 2005, that the Government has continued to 
reappoint military judges as if the declarations of unconstitutionality of five-year terms 
had never existed (see: the reappointment of judges Dutil and Lamont), and that no 
legislation has been enacted to correct this situation, I have no other choice but to declare 
invalid and of no force and effect subsections 165.21(2), (2.1), (3) and (4) of the Act as 
well as articles 101.15, 101.16 and 101.17 of the QR&O as amended by Order in Council 
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While the system remains ad hoc, it has moved towards permanency.433 Further, 
“[a]lthough a General Court Martial is convened on an ad hoc basis, it is not a ‘specific 
adjudicative task’. The General Court Martial is a recurring affair”.434 Courts martial 
convene to deal with a specific matter, then they conclude. Still, the matter can be 
adjourned multiple times and can take close to a year or longer to be completed.435 This 
is similar to what would be required for a military justice PSC or VTC.
Despite the ad hoc nature of military courts, a convening order could conceivably 
be used to deal with an injured member who needs to appear repeatedly before a military 
judge. The judge could simply adjourn and reconvene as required until the matter is 
concluded. While the mechanics of creating VTCs for military justice may be subject to 
debate, the “institutional hardware” exists to facilitate their creation at minimal cost. It is 
acknowledged that amendments to the NDA would be required; however, this is not 
insurmountable. Determining the appropriate mechanics for a Canadian style VTC should 
build on existing models found in both the Canadian and American civilian justice 
system. 
P.C. 2008 0548 dated March 11, 2008. However, I would suspend the declaration of 
invalidity and its coming into force for a period of six months from the date of this 
judgment.” See also supra, note 143, cl 134. See also, Security of 
Tenure of Military Judges Act, S.C. 2011, c 22, s 2(3): “A military judge ceases to hold 
office on being released at his or her request from the Canadian Forces or on attaining the 
age of 60 years.” 
433 Supra, note 74 at 217: “In more practical terms, the court martial system is already set 
up like a permanent court.” 
434 Supra, note 374. 
435 See e.g. R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2005. 
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4.1.4 Building on Existing Models: A Canadian Military Justice 
Alternative Measures System 
 As previously mentioned, the NDA is silent on alternative measures. Despite often 
citing the Criminal Code in their decisions,436 military judges may be reluctant to 
actively incorporate the Criminal Code scheme for diversion.437 Nevertheless, in ligh
the Somalia Commission of Inquiry’s recommendation that the “Canadian military justice 
system should […] parallel the civilian justice system unless there is clear justification 
for it to differ from the civilian system,”
t of 
438 it is helpful to understand the civilian 
diversionary regulatory scheme. 
In order to use alternative measures in Canada, the Criminal Code requires that 
doing so not be inconsistent with the protection of society. PSCs balance treatment with 
the public interest, normally providing the prosecutor with a veto for diversion 
participation.439 In addition, Canadian alternative measures programs need to be 
authorized by the “Attorney General or the Attorney General’s delegate or authorized by 
a person, or a person within a class of persons, designated by the lieutenant governor in 
436 See e.g. R v Campion-Wright, 2010 CM 1015, paras 30-31.
437 See e.g. R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2025, para 5: “In my view, the force of 
this particular Military Rule of Evidence is not sufficient to simply incorporate a scheme 
such as that found in s. 722 of the Criminal Code for the admission of victim impact 
statements into proceedings at court martial.” See also supra, note , s 179: “(1) A court 
martial has the same powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of 
criminal jurisdiction with respect to (a) the attendance, swearing and examination of 
witnesses; (b) the production and inspection of documents; (c) the enforcement of its 
orders; and (d) all other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its 
jurisdiction, including the power to punish for contempt.” Counsel at courts martial have 
argued that s. 179 can be used to expand military justice processes or adopt civilian ones. 
I do not think it is appropriate for a diversion process.
438 Supra, note 111. 
439 See e.g. supra, note 121: “That the Crown Attorney for the Nova Scotia Mental Health 
Court consents to the accused’s participation.” 
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council of a province”.440 Currently, the federal and provincial governments have 
authorized the use of various PSCs. American VTCs are hybrids of these courts.  
It is unlikely that Canadian government officials would discriminate against 
veterans by barring access to specialized diversion. Further, the current Minister of 
National Defence (MND) has stated that he is “committed to ensure that we provide the 
best possible support for members with mental or physical illness or injuries […] Our
government is building on our record of caring for our ill and injured personnel”.441
[Emphasis mine] Based on the statements of government officials, the political will 
seems to exist for a military justice PSC or VTC.  
Further, all PSCs are consent based, with accused parties having been advised of 
the right to counsel.442 Any proposed VTCs would need to be consent based and provide 
the same protections. Also, in civilian PSCs, the accused “accepts responsibility for the 
act or omission that forms the basis of the offence that [she] is alleged to have 
committed”.443 In addition, there needs to be a reasonable prospect of conviction.444
Should an inculpatory admission, confession or statement be made during an alternative 
440 Supra, note 97, s 717(1)(a). 
441 Hon. Peter MacKay, “Statement by the Minister of National Defence on care for ill 
and injured military personnel” (4 May, 2012), online: National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-
eng.asp?id=4180>. See also House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 127 (18 
May 2012) (Hon. Peter MacKay), online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Mode=1&Pub=hansard&La
nguage=E>": “We are moving forward to hire more mental health professionals. We, in 
fact, have a goal of doubling the number. We are moving rapidly in that direction and 
will continue to support those soldiers, their families and our veterans when they need 
those services.” 
442 Supra, note 97, s 717(1)(c) and (d). 
443 Ibid, s 717(1)(e).
444 Ibid, s 717(1)(f) and (g).
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measures program, it must not be used in any subsequent court proceedings.445 Where the 
court is satisfied that there has been total compliance with the alternative measures terms 
and conditions, it shall dismiss the charges.446 Also, there is discretion given to judges to 
dismiss charges for partial compliance.447 There are also Criminal Code provisions with 
respect to records associated with alternative measures programs.448 These processes 
should be followed by any military justice PSC or VTC. 
In proposing the incorporation of VTCs into the United States military justice 
system, Seamone suggests using civilian VTCs and pre-trial agreements or chain of 
command clemency post-conviction as a solution without legislative amendment.449
There are currently no VTCs in Canada, so that option is not currently available. Further, 
existing PSCs are only developing, with many parts of Canada not having any. None 
have specialized military/veteran support members on their multi-disciplinary teams.   
Conversely, the Canadian military justice system does have a provision for 
clemency similar to that suggested by Seamone.450 However, the dynamic of a multi-
disciplinary team of treatment coordinated by a judge is lacking from the American 
proposal as it relates to convening authority clemency. The CDS and/or Officers 
commanding a Command do not generally have the specialized skill or time to lead ad
hoc multi-disciplinary teams of medical, legal and social work professionals in the 
treatment and rehabilitation of injured members, while balancing public safety risks. 
While it is arguably their responsibility, it would be better to have a trained military judge 
445 Ibid, s 717(3).
446 Ibid, s 717(4)(a).
447 Ibid, s 717(4)(b).
448 Ibid, s 717.1-717.4. 
449 Supra, note 2 at 3,
450 Supra, note 46, 114.02.
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who leads the regional multi-disciplinary teams in treatment, while constantly assessing 
the protection of society. Also, this should be constantly balanced by an independent 
military prosecutor. Suggesting the CDS should preside over these matters would be akin 
to having the Department of Justice Assistant Deputy Minister preside over individual 
DTCs. It is simply not feasible, effective, nor efficient for Canadian military justice to 
use the existing so called “clemency” regime as a substitute for formalized diversion.  
Further, the deterrent component of a military tribunal overseeing treatment in an 
open public forum, with the threat to the offender of being prosecuted for failing to 
comply, better assists in the success of VTCs in reducing recidivism.451 In addition, it is 
more efficient to have specialized multi-disciplinary units deal with all regional 
offenders, one of the enunciated purposes of military justice.452 It is equally more 
efficient that military judges may simply sentence offenders who do not consent or who 
do not qualify for diversion once referred.
This thesis does not purport to provide the perfect solution to incorporating VTCs 
into military justice or Canadian civilian justice. It does attempt to provide some options 
to facilitate discussion in order to move in the direction of implementing processes that 
will foster a treatment based approach for psychologically traumatized veterans. While a 
permanent court would reduce the amount of legislation and regulatory framework 
required to create alternative measures, the absence of such a court does not inhibit an 
effective diversion scheme from being created.   
The best way to incorporate a VTC into the military justice system is through 
legislative amendments. Until recently, this has proven difficult for military justice 
451 Supra, note 414. See also supra, note 131. 
452 Supra, note 374.
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initiatives. Despite almost a decade of proposals by successive vigilant JAGs and their 
Deputies, attempts to improve the military justice system have often failed in the hands of 
the Parliamentarians.453 The current majority government has begun to address these 
issues.454
Attempting to incorporate VTCs in the absence of legislative amendments is not 
advisable. While Seamone’s research and ideas are important, they are not applicable to 
the Canadian military justice system context due to some systemic procedural differences 
and societal conditions.
This thesis proposes a “Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures” scheme 
that would incorporate diversion options for members suffering from OSIs. This would 
be provided for most charges,455 including the so called “Baby Five”.456 This request for 
diversion would be following a reasonable period of time, where the accused has access 
453 See e.g. Michel Rossignol, “National Defence Act: Reform of the Military Justice 
System” (22 January 1997), online: Public Works and Government Services <http://dsp-
psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/961-e.htm> at 5: “The Government’s 
legislative response to the recommendations made in the Lamer Report was first 
introduced in the House of Commons on April 27, 2006 as Bill C-7. Bill C-7 
subsequently died on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued on September 14, 
2007. A successor bill, Bill C-45, was introduced in March 2008. Bill C-45 also died on
the Order Paper as the 39th Parliament was dissolved for a federal election. Bill C-41 was 
introduced in the House of Commons on June 16, 2010. The changes between Bill C-41 
and Bill C-45 were reflective of the amendments made to the National Defence Act 
following the coming into force of Bill C-60 on July 18, 2008. They further respond to a 
number of recommendations made by the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs following their study of the court martial system. Bill C- 41 died 
on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved on March 26, 2011.” [Emphasis 
mine] 
454 See e.g. supra, note 143. See also supra, note 432.
455 In my view, this should include most offences except those that are serious in nature 
such as homicide, aggravated sexual assault, etc. Determining the appropriate exclusions 
should involve consultations with key players and canvassing current Canadian PSC 
structures. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.    
456 Supra, note 46, 108.17(1).
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to legal advice.457 Normally, this would occur at the same time of the election to mode of 
trial, where permitted. The RDP should be amended to incorporate an annotation of this 
option along with some indication of consequences. Some potential consequences include 
an immediate repatriation if the accused is in theatre. In addition, an accused will be 
obliged to provide written consents to allow assessment, treatment, and information 
sharing with the military VTC multi-disciplinary team and the military judge.  
At the time of the election where diversion is requested, the accused will be 
immediately referred to a multi-disciplinary team, which includes a military psychiatrist, 
military social worker and military mental health nurse to determine if the member has an 
OSI. The military psychiatrist must always agree on the report’s findings, although a 
majority of the quorum is required. Within 14 days, the OSI Diversion Assessment Board 
(OSI DAB)458 will provide a psychiatric report of assessment. This can be extended to a 
maximum of 60 days if required. This will be similar to the American RCM 706 board 
report, but more limited in scope. In particular, the report will determine only the current 
clinical psychiatric diagnosis and whether it is related to an OSI. If an OSI exists, the OSI 
DAB should assess whether the medical condition is related to the behaviour that led to 
the offence.  If so, the member would be considered eligible for diversion. 
457 See e.g. supra, note 97, s 717(1)(d). 
458 It may be that the Chain of Command would see fit to use these matters for other 
mental health disorders not related to combat, such as schizophrenia. Although rare, 
military justice has dealt with these types of issues. See e.g. R. v. Brown, 2010 CM 2004 
at para 9: “I accept the evidence of the psychiatrists that the offender suffers from chronic 
paranoid schizophrenia, and, on the basis of the evidence of Dr Joshi, I find that he was 
suffering the symptoms of this condition to some degree at the time of the offences.” 
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The RDP and all relevant evidence are immediately referred through the chain of 
command to a Regional Military Prosecutor assigned for the VTC459 within 14 days. The 
OSI DAB report is sent confidentially to the prosecutor in order for her to assess whether 
she should exercise a veto or block entry into the alternative measures scheme. She will 
also assess the reasonable prospect of conviction. The Prosecutor shall allow diversion if 
the member is eligible, unless doing so would be inconsistent with the protection of 
society, including the military community. A DMP policy would be developed to 
articulate appropriate factors to guide the Prosecutor in determining the appropriate 
balance. This would include the position of the Chain of Command articulated during the 
referral process. Any veto would need to be articulated in writing and the file sent back to 
the unit for re-election into the ordinary military justice stream.  
If the Prosecutor does not veto, she will draft a charge sheet and request the 
convening of a “Treatment Standing Court Martial” (TSCM). The TSCM will then 
convene with the accused present. The first hearing will involve reviewing the consent 
forms endorsed for the OSI DAB and ensuring the requisite consent exists. The military 
judge will then adjourn for 14-30 days in order for the multi-disciplinary team to confirm 
eligibility and an appropriate treatment plan that addresses criminogenic factors. The 
multi-disciplinary team will individually meet with the accused person prior to the next 
appearance. Prior to the second appearance, the military judge will hold an informal 
meeting with the multi-disciplinary team to discuss their findings and proposals in a 
459 See supra, note 130. Within the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court, there are specific 
lawyers assigned by the Nova Scotia Prosecution Service and Legal Aid. In my view, this 
reduces the potential for conflict of interest should files need to be transferred back to the 
usual criminal process. It also allows for increased specialized expertise which improves 
efficiency. Further, it fosters the team cohesion of the multi-disciplinary team.    
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collaborative way. They will determine an appropriate treatment plan to be implemented 
over a period of 6-24 months. Should the member be released in the interim, the TSCM 
would continue to have jurisdiction similar to existing prosecutions by virtue of the 
NDA.460
At the second appearance, the charge sheet will be read and the accused will 
admit the particulars. The military judge will then make a finding of “responsibility”. The 
summary of the OSI DAB will also be read. The accused will then consent and agree to 
the diversion treatment plan. I would note that the rapid finding of “responsibility” is 
consistent with the requirement that military justice be expedient. The process will 
demonstrate to fellow members of the Canadian Forces that offenders are held 
accountable, but also that truly injured soldiers get the treatment they need.
In the conduct of a regular court martial, a military judge should also be able to 
formally order diversion screening with the accused member’s consent on his own or 
either party’s motion. A military judge should be able to do so by “Order of Referral” to 
the Court Martial Administrator to convene a TSCM. In a regular trial, this would allow 
the first judge to simply adjourn proceedings until the diversion process is completed or 
redirected back. The referring military judge would ensure the appropriate consents are 
endorsed and the member is referred to the appropriate OSI DAB. The prosecutor will be 
the recipient of the OSI DAB report and determine whether it will veto the diversion.  
460 Supra, note 42, s 60(2): “Every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline under 
subsection (1) at the time of the alleged commission by the person of a service offence 
continues to be liable to be charged, dealt with and tried in respect of that offence under 
the Code of Service Discipline notwithstanding that the person may have, since the 
commission of that offence, ceased to be a person described in subsection (1).” 
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In the proposed scheme, a defence counsel can make the request of the Prosecutor 
at any time before a finding of guilt is entered before a military tribunal. If the matter is 
convened, the Defence will make application to the military judge for an “Order of 
Referral” to a TSCM. If not yet convened but with the Prosecution or unit during the 
referral process, the member shall sign the appropriate consents and be referred to the 
OSI DAB. The Prosecutor will proceed as she would through requested diversion.      
Once the treatment program is fully completed, the veteran will “graduate”. As a 
result, the charges against the member will be dismissed by the military judge. If the 
program is partially completed, the military judge will have the discretion to dismiss the 
charges, create a new treatment program or refer the matter for normal prosecution. It 
should be legislated that delay associated with diversion attempts do not work against the 
parties in any subsequent prosecutions. Failure to comply with conditions could result in 
ineligibility for the diversion program and the offender could be sent back into the usual 
prosecution track. Any charges dismissed by a military judge for completion or partial 
completion of a TSCM program cannot be retried by a subsequent court.461
461 See contra supra, note 97 ss 717(4): “The use of alternative measures in respect of a 
person alleged to have committed an offence is not a bar to proceedings against the 
person under this Act, but, if a charge is laid against that person in respect of that offence, 
(a) where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the person has totally 
complied with the terms and conditions of the alternative measures, the court shall 
dismiss the charge; and (b) where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that 
the person has partially complied with the terms and conditions of the alternative 
measures, the court may dismiss the charge if, in the opinion of the court, the prosecution 
of the charge would be unfair, having regard to the circumstances and that person’s 
performance with respect to the alternative measures”. [Emphasis mine] It seems 
disingenuous to allow the prosecution of an offender who has complied successfully with 
an alternative measures agreement over a protracted period under significant supervision. 
In my view, this was meant to capture those offenders who begin but do not complete an 
agreed alternative measures program. 
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Further, the offender can consent to being found guilty and sentenced by the 
TSCM judge for the sake of efficiency. This would occur by the judge ordering the Court 
Martial Administrator to convene an SCM with himself as judge for the matter. Without 
consent, the matter is to be convened with a different judge with the usual election on 
mode of trial as appropriate.
In order to prevent abuse of the option of a diversion process, accused parties 
would be immediately repatriated from theatre in the event that they self-identify as 
having an OSI and seek diversion to a treatment court. Should it be determined that the 
member was faking an injury, malingering and/or made a false entry on an official 
document, such as the RDP, the accused would be subject to prosecution for these 
offences. It is hoped that the prosecution of offenders who lie about an OSI in order to be 
repatriated or to obtain diversion improperly would prevent abuse. Such behaviour could 
also become a legislated aggravating factor for sentencing in order to ensure ample 
deterrence for those who are not truly mentally injured and have other motives. 
Military training instills the “keep it simple” principle. Further, officer training 
encourages the use of visual aids in order to amplify the message. The following diagram 
sets out the proposed TSCM process and attempts to follow both of these ideas of 
officership.
Figure 1 The Proposed Treatment Standing Court Martial Process  
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The eligibility requirements for a TSCM would parallel those of civilian courts. In 
particular, in order to qualify a member must consent and have an OSI or other mental 
disorder; and there must be a significant connection between the disorder and the offence. 
Further, the offender must voluntarily undergo a clinical psychiatric assessment and 
accept responsibility for the offence. Further, the Prosecutor must consent to the 
offender’s access to this program.462 Similarly, the so-called phases could be referred to 
as the: election/referral, screening, appearance, assessment, program and graduation.  
The RDP will indicate that charges were diverted to the TSCM and the member 
graduated. This will not be a criminal record or an entry on a military conduct sheet. 
Further, should an inculpatory admission, confession or statement be made during the 
TSCM process, it may not be used in any subsequent court proceedings.463
It is essential that the military TSCM multi-disciplinary team be regionally based 
to allow for the ongoing treatment of veterans in the program. Existing personnel at 
major bases could be used for this purpose.  
4.1.5 The Multi-disciplinary Team 
 There are currently OSI clinics that are funded by Veteran’s Affairs. They are 
located in: Fredericton, New Brunswick; Loretteville, Quebec; Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue, 
Quebec, Ottawa, Ontario; London, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Edmonton, Alberta; 
Calgary, Alberta; and Vancouver, British Columbia. All of these facilities offer military 
personnel “clinical assessment and a variety of treatment options including individual 
therapies, group sessions, psycho-education sessions, [addictions services,] and other 
462 Supra, note 121.
463 Supra, note 97, s 717(3). 
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resources” 464 tailored to each client’s needs. The services are delivered by clinical 
“teams […] made up of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurse
and other specialized clinicians who understand the experience and needs of 
Veterans”.
s,
ly members.  465 Services extend to partners and fami
 In addition, the Canadian Forces administers seven Operational and Trauma 
Stress Support Centres (OTSSC) located at “Halifax, Gagetown, Valcartier, Ottawa, 
Petawawa, Edmonton and Esquimalt”.466 These locations coincide with where most 
Canadian Forces members are stationed. In addition, “[e]lements of OTSSC programs are 
also available at smaller bases depending upon population size and local resource 
availability”.467 Clinical teams at OTSSC include “psychiatrists, psychologists, social 
workers, mental health nurses, addictions counselors and Health Services Chaplains.” 
They are responsible for providing both treatment and education to clients and their 
families.  
 The composition of multi-disciplinary teams at the OSI Clinics and the OTSSC 
closely resemble those found on civilian PSCs.  The difference is that PSCs also have 
representatives from probation services, a judge, a prosecutor and a defence counsel. 468
464 Supra, note 145. 
465 Ibid.




468 See e.g. “Frequently Asked Questions” Nova Scotia’s Mental Health Court Program,
online: The Province of Nova Scotia 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/global_docs/MHC_FAQ.pdf>: “The Court has a dedicated 
team comprised of a nurse, a social worker, a Probation Officer, a Crown Attorney, and a 
Legal Aid lawyer. There is also a Provincial Court Judge assigned to preside in the 
Mental Health Court.” 
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Some PSCs further incorporate police into their team model.469 Currently, the Canadian 
Forces has all this expertise at its disposal except those of a probation officer. A well 
trained social worker and military police officer could fill this void.  
 The proposed TSCM multi-disciplinary team would require, at a minimum, a 
military judge, a prosecutor, a defence counsel, a military psychiatrist, a military nurse, a 
military social worker and a military police officer. Ad hoc members could include 
military chaplains, psychologists, Veterans Affairs program managers and addiction 
counsellors as requested or required. It should be emphasized that the Canadian Forces 
and Veterans Affairs has these teams ready to treat veterans. TSCMs could use these 
existing resources. 
The legislation could convene these individual team members by name such as a 
panel on a GCM, although formally naming them on a convening order is not required 
and would be impracticable.470 Ideally, the legislation would confer broad powers on 
military judges similar to s. 179 of the NDA471 in order to administer the alternative 
measures scheme and allow flexibility for unforeseen developments. 
469 See. e.g. Heino Lilles, Tracy McPhee & Sandra Bryce, “The Domestic Violence 
Treatment Option: A Yukon Initiative”, at 10 and 22, online: Centre for Children and 
Families in the Justice System, London Family Court Clinic Inc. 
<http://www.lfcc.on.ca/Lillies_DVTOPaper.pdf>: “The TC process uses a collaborative 
effort among criminal justice system participants, who traditionally see each other as 
adversaries, in a process mediated by the judge. TCs shift the paradigm of the court 
system, meaning that everyone involved, including judges, prosecutors, defence counsel, 
the police, treatment personnel, victim services workers and probation officers, must 
change their outlook and conduct if TCs are to function effectively. In short, it requires a 
team approach. [Emphasis mine] 
470 Team members and counsel may change throughout the process as in civilian trials. 
Military processes must remain equally flexible; although changes can be noted on the 
record.
471 Supra, note 42, s 179: “A court martial has the same powers, rights and privileges as 
are vested in a superior court of criminal jurisdiction with respect to (a) the attendance, 
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Admittedly, the proposed solution may be imperfect, incomplete and subject to 
debate, revision, or improvement. Still, the absence of perfection should not prevent 
progress. The “ninety percent solution” is sufficient as we traverse the divide of veteran 
OSIs and disciplinary and criminal justice.   
4.1.6 The Ninety Percent Solution 
The Office of the Judge Advocate General’s (OJAG) mission is to deliver 
“independent, operationally focused, solution oriented legal advice and services across 
the full spectrum of military law, and superintends the administration of military 
justice”.472 [Emphasis mine] Legal solutions to deal with what is perceived to be a 
“crisis”473 for veterans and the Canadian Forces falls under the mandate of the JAG, 
particularly when dealing with military justice. The JAGs vision includes being 
“operationally focussed […] and networked legal professionals, proudly contributing to a 
disciplined force and mission success in a manner that reflects Canadian values and the 
rule of law”.474 [Emphasis mine] 
Being operationally focused necessarily means that perfection in legal advice may 
not be possible. The reality for the men and women in the JAG who serve as legal 
officers is that they sometimes have to give immediate operational advice to a 
Commander, with little or no time to research it. The information provided and legal 
swearing and examination of witnesses; (b) the production and inspection of documents; 
(c) the enforcement of its orders; and (d) all other matters necessary or proper for the due 
exercise of its jurisdiction, including the power to punish for contempt. [Emphasis mine] 
472 “Office of the Judge Advocate General”, online: National Defence and the Canadian 
Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/index-eng.asp>.
473 See e.g. supra, note 159. 
474 Supra, note 472.
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analysis, by the nature of the problem, are limited. For example, the decision to target a 
person or object along with an assessment of collateral damage may need to be given 
quickly.475 The OJAG continues to provide excellent support, despite significant 
pressures, because leadership understands that the ninety percent solution is 
acceptable.476 The ninety percent solution can be defined as implementing a solution 
despite concerns that planning or research has not been fully prepared or canvassed 
exhaustedly.
The JAG’s position on the ninety percent solution in the delivery of his mandate 
is consistent with modern business approaches. Academics suggest that “[p]erfectionism 
is a common psychological obstacle to productivity.  In the perfectionist’s mind, the 
product […] report, etc. she is trying to produce is not quite good enough just yet. […] 
The problem is that somewhere along the pursuit for 100% perfection, we face 
diminishing returns.”477 This is sometimes referred to as “analysis paralysis”478.
475 Michael N. Schmitt, “Precision attack and international humanitarian law”, (2005) 
87:859 Intl Rev of the Red Cross 445 at 450, online: icrc.org 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_859_schmitt.pdf>: “Targets […] may be 
‘time-sensitive’. They require immediate attack ‘because they pose (or will soon pose) a 
danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity’.”
476 Brigadier-General Blaise Cathcart, (Address delivered at the Office of the JAG 
Continuing Legal Education Conference, Ottawa, 4-6 October 2012), [unpublished]. 
477 See e.g., Sarah From, “Perfectionism and the 90% Solution” (9 December 2011) 
(blog), online: do your best work 
<http://www.doyourbestwork.net/2011/12/09/perfectionism-and-the-90-solution/>. See 
also Jon Acuff, “The Problem with Perfection” The Ziglar Weekly Newsletter (17 January 
2012), online: <http://www.ziglar.com/newsletter/?p=1419>: “Quit perfect. It’s an 
unnecessary obstacle. Chase the idea of your dream being better finished at ninety 
percent than perfect and not pursued.” [Emphasis mine] 
478 William A. Cohen, The Art of the Strategist: 10 Essential Principles for Leading Your 
Company to Victory (New York: AMACOM, 2004) at 53.
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Civilian justice officials that are piloting PSCs realize that they may not have the 
perfect model and are constantly reviewing, studying and adapting as required.479 The 
Military leaders should equally courageously implement PSCs into the military justice 
system with the knowledge that there will be legislative amendments, evolutions, 
problems and analysis required in the future. Still, a ninety percent solution to PSC 
implementation is consistent with the JAG’s mission-vision: to provide operationally 
focussed, agile, solution-oriented advice to a serious developing military problem, which 
impacts military justice.  
Additionally, it attempts to parallel civilian efforts where military requirements 
allow, further bolstering the purpose of a separate military justice system which reflects 
Canadian values while instilling confidence in the JAG’s leadership to superintend it.
4.2  BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES
Notwithstanding the JAG’s role in military justice, the development of an 
effective plan to address veteran OSI issues requires civilian partnerships. Ideally, 
civilian PSCs that can deal with the specific needs of veterans should be developed. 
Building bridges between these organizations and fostering knowledge of OSI issues for 
veterans and military personnel before civilian justice will require the assistance of 
focused military leadership, which carries accountability. The military’s lead expert on 
legal matters involving its members is the JAG. 
While it is understood that the government receives various forms of legal advice 
from different departments regarding defence issues, only the OJAG fully appreciates the 
479 See e.g. supra, note 128.
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dynamic of how incarceration or justice generally can impact military operations. The 
military justice system does not prosecute all military members who are offenders.480 The 
reasons for not doing so may involve existing legislation, victims’ services capacity, 
whether there are civilian co-accused, the investigating body, etc. Still, the impact on 
military operations is not lessened simply because civilian authorities prosecute. This was 
highlighted recently in a high profile civilian prosecution of a senior officer where morale 
was reportedly severely affected.481
The OJAG must continue to network and bridge gaps with civilian agencies in the 
prosecution of military members so that civilian officials fully understand the impact on 
operations and the particular needs of military members and their families. Further, the 
military justice system must exercise its concurrent jurisdiction where appropriate.  
The work required in creating an alternative measures scheme for serving military 
members equally assists released veterans. In addition, because the care of veterans, and 
the perception thereof, is thought to have a direct correlation to military effectiveness,482
480 See e.g. David Bright, Louis-Vincent D’Auteuil & Kathy Pentz, “Canada’s Military-
Citizens: The Intersection of Military and Civilian Laws: Concurrent Jurisdiction 
between Military and Civilian Justice Systems” (Address delivered at the Nova Scotia 
Military Law Section, Canadian Bar Association Conference, Halifax, 1 December 
2011), [unpublished].
481 See e.g. Don Martin, “'This can't be good for morale'” National Post (10 February 
2010), online: oped.ca <http://oped.ca/National-Post/don-martin-murder-charges-against-
cfb-trenton-base-commander-a-blow-to-military-morale/>: “It shouldn't be happening 
because the uniform isn't on trial, but morale is plummeting inside CFB Trenton after the 
base commander was charged with two murders and a pair of sexual assaults.” [Emphasis 
mine]. 
482 See e.g. Mike Haynie & Robert B. Murrett, “This Memorial Day, supporting veterans 
is a matter of national security” The Christian Science Monitor (25 May, 2012), online: 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0525/This-Memorial-Day-
supporting-veterans-is-a-matter-of-national-security>: “The care of veterans and their 
families is also a national security imperative if the US is to maintain an effective all-
volunteer force.[…] The National Security Strategy, which emphasizes all of the nation’s 
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military leadership should have a mandate to assist veterans. To that end, and in order to 
avoid duplication, one government official should lead a “whole of governments effort”.  
The primary effort now should be the creation of a military justice PSC, along 
with education and training. Encouragement to improve treatment within civilian prisons, 
data collection by Corrections Canada and prosecution agencies on veterans, and options 
to identify OSIs (such as on driver’s licences) are but a few other initiatives that military 
leaders can encourage in order to reduce criminogenic factors and behaviors related to 
OSIs. This networking with civilian counterparts and other justice officials is consistent 
with the JAG’s vision to be “networked legal professionals”.483 Similarly, the current 
mental health strategy for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs is consistent with this 
concept and advocates “[n]urturing collaborative partnerships with other organizations 
who share the goal of responding effectively to the needs of clients living with mental 
health conditions”.484
Partnerships, education and advocacy on behalf of veterans in tandem with 
civilian justice counterparts will foster the creation of mechanisms that ensure members 
and veterans are properly cared for when faced with civilian justice. Ideally, these 
mechanisms would include civilian PSCs adapted to veterans’ needs.  
resources as an element of security, says that rededicating ‘ourselves to providing support 
and care of wounded warriors, veterans, and military families’ is fundamental to
America's defense posture. [Emphasis mine] 
483 Supra, note 472.
484 “Veterans Affairs Canada Mental Health Strategy”, online: Veterans Affairs Canada 
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/mental-health/health-promotion/strategy>. 
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4.2.1  Civilian VTCs
 Because of the lack of available data regarding the number of veterans and 
military members processed through civilian justice, it is impossible to conclude that the 
American approach of having numerous VTCs in each jurisdiction is required in Canada. 
Still, any civilian PSC programming approach for veterans does need to be tailored 
specifically to their unique needs and circumstances to maximize effectiveness.485 As a 
hybrid PSC, the VTC model has components of DVC, DTC and MHC, all rolled into 
one. Further, there are unique medical and social services available through the Canadian 
Forces and Veterans Affairs that require additional knowledge, expertise and partnerships 
not currently available to civilian PSCs.   
 In keeping with efficiency and effectiveness, it would be beneficial to initially use 
existing PSCs in civilian justice systems, but to adapt them on a case by case basis. For 
example, the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court pilot model is located in Dartmouth, Nova 
Scotia, near CFB Halifax and its lodger units.486 If it were to be referred the file of a 
military member or veteran, the partnerships built by the networked OJAG (as proposed 
above) would prompt the collaborative team to contact their partners within the 
Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs. The civilian group could 
incorporate some military specialists on their multi-disciplinary team. On those cases, 
military psychologists, military social workers and Veterans Affairs personnel could 
work with civilians to develop more enriched programs that enable better treatment for 
veterans or military offenders. The partnership and collaboration in the civilian PSC 
485 Supra, note 131. 
486 Hon. Pamela S. Williams, “Problem-Solving in the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court” 
(2011) 30:1 Nova Voce 4 at 5. 
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would not only assist civilian justice for military members or veterans, but would foster 
knowledge and training by military professionals that can be used in a military justice 
TSCM process. 
 The civilian PSC would presumably have an interest in working with military 
officials, because doing so would open up additional community resources in order to 
further their aims. Many PSCs make significant efforts to identify, coordinate and 
facilitate “collaborative relationships with community partners in areas related to mental 
health, addictions, housing, vocational/educational training and other wellness-related 
initiatives”.487 By working with military officials on veterans’ files, these civilian PSCs 
would access more expertise, resources and save time and effort in doing so. This 
partnership is win-win and should be pursued with vigour. 
 Should data and research collected over time warrant specialized specific veterans 
courts, then these courts could be developed from this pilot initiative. Still, by working 
with existing PSCs and bolstering their collaborative teams with military and veteran 
expertise, in essence the same end can be achieved, even without the formal VTC name. 
Further, it maximizes efficiency. 
 The focus of advocacy by defence leadership should be on having these civilian-
military models in every province and territory, beginning at locations with major bases. 
These would complement TSCMs by providing diversion options for released veterans or 
those injured persons over whom military authorities do not wish to exercise their 
jurisdiction. The existing OTSSC structure would be the best place to start because of its 
487 Ibid.
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proximity to personnel and access to the requisite collaborative professionals.488 This is 
not to say that outlying areas, where reservists or other retired veterans live, are any less 
important. To the contrary, each member is equally worthy of VTC access. The reality is 
that the project has to start somewhere and, as is said, the perfect is the enemy of the 
good.
 The general public may not understand that combat or deployments can cause 
OSIs. They may not know that this type of injury can lead to criminogenic factors that 
cause veterans and military members to become involved with the law. Their knowledge 
may only come from television, movies or media reports, which may sensationalize risk. 
Both military and civilian justice leadership must address the truth “head on” and inform 
the public of the reality of these injuries as it relates to criminal justice. The United States 
has done a good job in building public support for this notion, through a wide variety of 
programs, services and educational efforts.489 The result has been to allow more 
acceptance of treatment based approaches for their nation’s veterans.490 Canada must do 
the same.    
Civilian VTCs or ad hoc military-modified civilian PSC models will further 
military goals of increasing morale, efficiency and discipline. Because of the stigma and 
cultural beliefs associated with mental health in the military, education and training are 
essential to fostering the treatment of OSIs. Military leadership has a role to play when 
488 Supra, note 466.
489 See e.g. United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on Drug and Veterans 
Treatment Courts: Seeking Cost-Effective Solutions for Protecting Public Safety and 
Reducing Recidivism (19 July 2011) (Douglas B. Marlowe) at 5: “The National Drug 
Court Institute (NDCI) is the preeminent source of cutting-edge training and technical 
assistance to the Drug Court field. […] This past year, they launched a training [program] 
for Veterans Treatment Courts and have trained over 22 teams.” 
490 See e.g. supra, note 2.
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the education relates to legal processes involving military members or veterans that 
potentially have operational impact. 
4.2.2 Education and Training
 Education and training are required in order to combat the stigma of mental 
illness in Canada and the Canadian Forces generally.491 As has been explored above, the 
rationale for such prioritization is self-evident. Stigma impedes OSI treatment.492
Impeded treatment has a correlation to increased criminogenic factors.493 Increased 
criminogenic factors can impact discipline and lead to misconduct.494 Poor discipline by 
military personnel undermines operation effectiveness and puts missions and public 
safety at risk.495
Recent efforts by the military to educate veterans and military members about 
OSIs have been significant.496 However, little has been done to educate the public on its 
correlation to military justice or civilian justice generally. Similarly, military 
commanders and personnel should be educated in treatment court options. Beneficially, 
this type of learning would break cultural biases toward correction and punishment as the 
only solution to recidivism. Further, it would foster acceptance for TSCMs as a military 
justice option. In addition, it would assist in the overall goal of reducing stigma to 
provide greater acceptance of OSI treatment. Knowledge of the existence of these civilian 
491 See e.g. supra, note 223. 
492 Supra, note 208.
493 Supra, note 37. 
494 Supra, note 2. 
495 Ibid. See also supra, note 398.
496 See e.g. supra, note 217.
155
diversionary processes may increase awareness and acceptance of their use and reduce 
military rates of incarceration while correspondingly increasing OSI treatment. 
The OJAG is in a good position to administer this education effort because of its 
knowledge, expertise and networked legal capacity. It already provides substantial 
training to various levels of leadership across the Canadian Forces. Incorporating these 
components of education into OJAG programs is not only efficient, but arguably is their 
duty.
The OJAG has already taken important timely steps to educate its personnel on 
OSIs and their relationship to military justice.497 Further steps would be beneficial, 
including the creation of specific policies for dealing with accused members who are 
suspected or confirmed to have an OSI. In addition, should TSCMs or some other 
diversionary process be incorporated into military justice, specific education for key 
players would be necessary. In particular, military judges, defence counsel, prosecutors, 
and members of the multi-disciplinary team would need to be specifically instructed in 
PSC techniques. Sources of this training could include American VTC training resources 
combined with shadowing counterparts in Canadian PSCs. This further enhances the 
OJAG’s vision to be networked legal professionals.
In addition, civilian counterparts in the Federal and Provincial justice systems 
need to understand the unique needs of veterans and how criminal processes impact their 
careers, families and operations. They require training in numerous OSI justice related 
issues, including: services available that would enhance their collaborative efforts at PSC 
program treatment; the impact of incarceration for veterans with OSIs; and the 
497 Supra, note 476. 
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appropriate available treatment options provided by the military or Veterans Affairs that 
can be incorporated into such sentencing tools as probation orders. 
As the JAG is the superintendent of military justice, he is the proper authority to 
ensure prisoners with OSIs sent to the CFSPDB by military service tribunals are provided 
with appropriate treatment. It may be that the existing programming for rehabilitation 
would need to be modified for severe OSI disabilities in order to meet domestic and 
international legal obligations.498 For example, it would not be considered lawful to 
punish injured offenders for not doing something they could not reasonably do. If it 
would be cruel to punish a prisoner for not standing at attention when their legs were lost 
in combat, why would it be any more acceptable to punish a veteran whose OSI injuries 
foster panic, violence, or “acting out”?499 It would not. The wounds not being visible 
does not make them any less real, but simply misunderstood. The OJAG may be able to 
sensitize officials in the military or civilian prisons as to the impact of OSIs on offenders 
that go through the military justice process. Clearly, the OJAG will need to work in 
concert with medical officials; however, the JAG is well-positioned to lead some of the 
effort, or at least advise the CDS on matters related to such an endeavour.    
The Military Police and their civilian counterparts also need to be trained in 
dealing with OSIs and mental illness generally. Normally, these actors are at the front-
line of the criminal process.500 They are also involved at various stages throughout the 
498 See e.g. “Human Rights and Corrections: A Strategic Model” (December 1997), 
online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rights/human/im4630-02-eng.shtml>.  
499 Supra, note 38.
500 Supra, note 140: “Finally, the police have a critical role to play in improving the 
response of the criminal justice system to mental health problems and illnesses. They are 
the gate-keepers of the criminal justice system and frequently the first on the scene when 
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military justice and civilian justice processes including: investigation, court testimony, 
diversion, enforcing orders or supervising custody. The CFPM is responsible for internal 
policing policy and training;501 however, they must work in concert with the OJAG in 
ensuring that appropriate front line diversion or handling is legal and meets the purpose 
and underlying philosophy of military justice. 
A concerted education effort and package on the issue of military and veteran 
mental health as it relates to criminal and disciplinary justice should be developed and 
implemented as soon as possible. Because the target audience involves various players 
someone is experiencing a mental health crisis. That makes it essential for the police (and 
other front-line criminal justice and corrections workers) to have the very best education 
and training in how to interact with people living with mental health problems and 
illnesses. Most police agencies in Canada recognize the need to improve education and 
training in this area and are working actively to address this need.” See also, James D. 
Livingston et al, “Criminal Justice Diversion for Persons with Mental Disorders: A 
Review of Best Practices” (31 March, 2008), online: CMHA BC Division’s Mental 
Health Diversion Project <http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/DiversionBestPractices.pdf>: 
“Police must stabilize the scene using deescalating techniques or trauma-informed 
responses appropriate for people with mental disorders. […] It is important for police to 
be able to recognize behaviours, actions, and speech that are indicative of mental 
disorder.”
501 “CF MP Gp HQ”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces 
<http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/apm-agp/index-eng.asp>: “The CFPM also is 
the Commander of the Canadian Forces Military Police Group. As the centralized MP 
HQ, the CF Military Police Group (CF MP Gp) HQ provides direction to all Military 
Police Branch members with regards to police policy and procedures, oversight on 
policing and security matters, professional standards, security, equipment and training 
[….]”
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within departments502, various departments within governments503, and various levels of 
governments,504 a “whole of governments approach” is required.
4.2.3 Whole of Governments Approach  
 The concept of “whole of governments approach” is one used by the military in 
operations and now understood by most commanders.505 In the operational peace-
building setting, it has also been referred to as the 3D approach, the integrated approach 
and the comprehensive approach; however the contemporary military term is the “whole 
of government approach”.506 It has been around for more than a decade. In 2005, the 
MND referred to it as “bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and 
coherent fashion”.507  It is widely viewed as coordinated and holistic, using a 
collaborative approach to achieve maximum effect.508
502 For e.g., the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, the Judge Advocate General, the 
Canadian Forces Surgeon General and Commanders in all elements within the 
Department of National Defence. 
503 For e.g. the Department of National Defence, the Department of Justice, Corrections 
Canada, the Department of Health and the Department of Public Safety.  
504 For e.g. the Government of Canada, provincial and territorial governments, and 
municipalities and First Nations Reserves with police forces.  
505 Colonel M.P. Jorgensen, “A Strategy for Effective Peace-Building: Canada’s Whole 
of Government Approach in Afghanistan”, (Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2008), 
online: <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/281/280/jorgensen.pdf>.
506 Ibid, at 3.
507 “Canada’s International Policy Statement: a Role of Pride and Influence in the World - 
Defence” (2005) at 26, online: Canadian Forces and National Defence 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/Canada_Defence_2005.pdf>. 
508 Lieutenant-General (Retired) Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski & Lieutenant-Colonel 
Michael Rostek, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces 
Operations”, online: (2008) 9:1 CMJ 11 at 11 
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no1/doc/04-leslie-eng.pdf>: “Canadian Forces […] 
acknowledgement of the need to practice a more coordinated and holistic approach to 
operations is ever more evident – and also pressing. Accordingly, DND leadership – both 
civilian and military – is increasingly calling for the adoption of a force that takes a 
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Associate Chief Judge Pamela Williams of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court, who 
presides over the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court, indicates that “a collaborative 
approach to decision making is essential. An integrated team of professionals from a 
variety of disciplines ensures that a holistic approach is followed”.509 [Emphasis mine] 
Similarly, VTCs use holistic and collaborative methods510 consistent with familiar 
military operational models.   
 The use of a “whole of government approach” model is suggested because it is 
used and understood by military Commanders. The use of “governments” was substituted 
because there are multiples levels of government that need to be involved due to their 
administrative responsibilities of various types of courts and police forces. A so-called 
“campaign plan” or strategy should be written to foster understanding, debate and 
accountability.
“comprehensive approach” to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic, 
defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other 
agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of 
operations as needed. As such, the approach would entail traditional and non-traditional 
military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the 
“Effects Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO). The result would be greater mission 
effectiveness”. [Emphasis mine] 
509 Supra, note 486. 
510 See e.g. “Veterans Court” The Philadelphia Courts (2012), online: First Judicial 
District of Pennsylvania <http://www.courts.phila.gov/veteranscourt/>: “The 
Philadelphia Veterans Court represents the latest problem solving court initiative, in 
Municipal Court, addressing a holistic Treatment Court approach to dealing with justice 
involved Veterans. […] This collaborative initiative between the Court, the District 
Attorney, the Public Defender, the Veterans Administration and numerous Veterans 
agencies [.…]” 
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4.2.4 The Campaign Plan
 This thesis does not purport to have the perfect blueprint or, in military 
terminology, “campaign plan”511 in order to resolve the OSI issues as they relate to 
disciplinary and criminal justice. Still, it will offer a starting point or framework from 
which justice officials can begin discussions in order to come up with a ninety percent 
solution512 and begin implementation. 
 The following diagram is a simple view of the initial focus that leaders should 
consider when attempting to deal with veterans suffering from OSIs. It is holistic and 
captures military and civilian required efforts. Responsible agencies were specifically not 
named as it is clear there will be debate regarding who should be responsible for various 
components. The OJAG should assist in a leadership capacity, but other Canadian Forces 
leaders must equally be accountable and assist in meeting the MND and the CDS’s higher 
intent “to create a command climate that allows those who need help to get it [and] foster 
a social climate of understanding, acceptance and support”.513 Regardless of the specific 
allocation of responsibility, Figure 2 provides an outline upon which leaders can build 
systematic processes that further foster the appropriate treatment of our injured veterans.  
Figure 2 The “OSI Justice Campaign Plan”  
OSI Operational Stress Injuries VTC Veterans Treatment Court 
PPSC Public Prosecution Service of 
Canada
DDCS Director of Defence Counsel 
Services
PSC Problem-Solving Court MJ Military Justice 
511 See e.g. Pierre Lessard, “Campaign Design for Winning the War…and the Peace”, 
Small Wars Journal, at 4, online: < http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/lessard.pdf> 
“A campaign may be defined as ‘a set of military operations planned and conducted to 
achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographic area […]’
512 Supra, note 477.
513 Supra, note 223.
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CF Canadian Forces TSCM Treatment Standing Court Martial 
PPS Provincial Prosecution Services CDS Chief of Defence Staff 
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The Campaign plan has a basic two pronged approach – military and civilian 
justice. Because Canadian Forces members are subject concurrently to both systems of 
justice domestically and because released veterans will be subject exclusively to civilian 
justice, both systems need to be addressed. Within each justice system, three basic areas 
need to be examined initially, namely: legislation, policy and education.
  Assuming there is an understanding and acceptance that OSIs can cause increased 
criminogenic risk, misconduct and increased recidivism, legislative responsibilities 
include a systematic review of existing legislative processes to determine what 
amendments should be made to create a social climate of support and treatment for 
veterans with OSIs. This may include specific amendments to the Criminal Code or the 
National Defence Act, which could suggest that OSIs incurred on behalf of the nation or 
honorable military service is a recognized mitigating factor in sentencing.514 It may also 
include modified regulatory correctional regimes at the military prison or satellite 
detention barracks for OSI inflicted veterans.515 The possibilities to improve are 
countless; still the initial and most important legislative focus to meet the Commanders’ 
higher intent for military justice should be the creation of a TSCM or similar type 
treatment court. While it is acknowledged that it may not be used very frequently, its very 
existence will foster trust and morale, thereby increasing operational efficiency and 
effectiveness. At a minimum, it enhances the perception that the Canadian Forces will 
514 While it is acknowledged that judges most often do determine that these factors are 
mitigating, formal recognition within legislation will foster acceptance which will assist 
in reducing stigma, a barrier to treatment. Some American states have formally 
recognized military service as relevant to sentencing in their legislative schemes. See e.g. 
supra, note 39. See also supra, note 352. 
515 See e.g. supra, note 94, which suggests that a boot camp style approach may not foster 
reducing criminogenic factors; thereby adversely impacting rehabilitation.
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look after its ill and injured appropriately. On the civilian front, federal and provincial 
governments should consider expanding existing PSC initiatives. 
Simultaneously, existing justice policies need to be reviewed and amended in 
order to combat OSI-related issues. In addition, new policies addressing these problems 
should to be created. On the military justice side, the creation of specific mental health or 
OSI justice policies should be created by the DMP, the DDCS, the Deputy Judge 
Advocate (Regional Services),516 the CFPM and the CDS generally. These policies 
should amplify the MND and CDS’s intent that the military fosters a climate of 
understanding, support and treatment for veterans with OSIs.
On the civilian side, both federal and provincial prosecution services should draft 
specific policies designed to get veterans suffering from OSIs into treatment as opposed 
to jails, where possible. Further, police should also have specific policies to deal with 
veterans inflicted with OSIs, with possible initial diversions available at the lowest 
levels.517 In addition, Corrections Canada and their provincial counterparts should also 
516 The Deputy Judge Advocate (Regional Services) provides legal advice to the military 
police and the chain of command administering the summary trial system. 
517 See e.g. Uppala Chandrasekera, “Police & Mental Health: A Critical Review of Joint 
Police/Mental Health Collaborations in Ontario Provincial” Provincial Human Services 
and Justice Coordinating Committee (January 2011) at 28, online: 
<http://www.hsjcc.on.ca/Uploads/PHSJCC_Police-
MH_Final_Report_January_31_2011.pdf>: “In terms of police involvement in diversion, 
[…] police officers have the discretion to informally divert persons from the criminal 
justice system when appropriate, and on a case by case basis, regardless of whether the 
individual has a mental illness. However, informants also noted that different methods of 
informal pre-charge diversion occur based on the police detachment and based on the 
mental health services available in the community. Informants highlighted the need to 
develop a standard provincial protocol for pre-charge diversion that can be used across 
the province.” [Emphasis mine] 
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have specific policies about the handling and treatment of prisoners with OSIs.518 Legal 
Aid organizations should have specific policies for dealing with OSI clients and bar 
societies could assist in providing support and guidelines for counsel involved with 
veterans in the civilian justice process. The underlying philosophy should be treatment-
based to resolve the root problem associated with the behavior attracting justice officials’ 
scrutiny.
Further, other government departments, such as the provincial Departments of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV), could determine programs or services that may assist veterans 
afflicted with OSIs in avoiding situations that could cause flare-ups.519 In particular, 
provinces may consider allowing OSI veterans to self-identify on their driver’s licence. 
As noted earlier, this can assist police in better understanding the person they are dealing 
with, avoiding unnecessary confrontation during routine traffic stops associated with the 
injury and facilitating early diversion to treatment at the lowest possible level. This 
option would also foster acceptance and reduce stigma, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of treatment by veterans. It would also allow government agencies to acquire current 
information on veterans in order to ensure the provision of available veteran benefits and 
services.
Currently, there is a significant deficit of data regarding veterans suffering from 
OSIs and their involvement in justice. The military currently does not collect data on how 
518 Supra, note 273 at ii: “High numbers of incarcerated veterans present a number of 
implications for correctional services. Veterans often have treatment needs for 
psychological injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Canadian medical 
researchers have recently reported that many veterans suffering from these injuries do not 
seek help for years and it is possible that the presence of PTSD or unresolved issues 
surrounding trauma may impact the offender’s safe transition to the community.”
519 See e.g. supra, note 353. See also, supra, note 354.
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many service personnel suffering from OSIs are tried and convicted by summary trial or 
courts martial. There is no information on how many are incarcerated at the CFSPDB and 
whether their remission success520 is lower than fellow prisoners. There are equally no 
statistics on recidivism rates for veterans with OSIs as compared with the rest of the 
Canadian Forces population. Similarly, there is a dearth of quantitative research on OSIs 
and criminogenic risk for Canadians. It is unclear whether there is a link between the type 
of OSI (PTSD, C-PTSD, major depression, addictions, etc.) and misconduct or criminal 
behavior. There is no database of mentally injured veterans prosecuted in civilian courts. 
As a result, the extent of the problem on civilian justice is unknown. Also, it remains 
unclear how often military police or units use pre-charge diversion for members or 
veterans with OSIs.
Similarly, civilian justice officials often do not collect data on veterans or military 
offenders caught up in their systems. Corrections Canada does not currently track the 
number of inmates that have military service, let alone those with OSIs, as does its 
American counterpart.521 Civilian police and prosecution services also do not collect 
information on the impact of OSIs on the civilian court process or related diversions. 
Further, Veterans Affairs and the Department of Justice do not systematically track 
veterans’ involvement with civilian justice processes.  
In summary, there is inadequate and insufficient data collection processes on the 
issue of OSIs and Canadian justice. More information would enhance efforts to address 
key issues of the problem, including: reducing criminogenic factors and recidivism, 
520 The remission scheme at the CFSPDB is based on a point system. It is focused on 
rehabilitation through a boot camp philosophy. See e.g. supra, note 46, Appendix 1.4, 
Regulations for Service Prisons and Detention Barracks at ch 5.
521 See e.g. supra note 273.
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fostering early treatment and recovery, and determining appropriate incarceration 
rehabilitation techniques. As part of the whole of governments approach, concerted 
policy should be implemented to require departments and governments to collect, analyze 
and share this information to further the common goal of assisting veterans in recovery.
  The final component listed in the “campaign plan” is education. As indicated in 
a Special Report from the Office of the Canadian Forces Ombudsman, “[e]ducation is the 
single most important catalyst to change attitudes about PTSD in the CF”.522 As 
explained at various points above, existing attitudes and culture foster stigma which is a 
barrier to treatment. The absence of treatment increases criminogenic factors for veterans 
with OSIs.
From a military perspective the focus should be three-fold. First, both Canadian 
Forces personnel and the general public need to be educated generally on the role OSIs 
play in relation to misconduct and criminogenic risk, along with how PSCs can reduce 
recidivism. Second, the general public needs to understand the importance of taking care 
of veterans in the maintenance of an effective volunteer military force and related 
implications on public safety. Third, the Canadian Forces also needs to commence 
educating military justice officials, including Military Police, Presiding Officers, 
Commanders, military prosecutors, military judges, and military defence counsel, on OSI 
identification and specific diversion options that can be implemented to foster treatment. 
The tools that can be used to educate include: CANFORGENS523, Defence 
522 Supra, note 231.
523 Canadian Forces General Orders. These orders are issued and provide direction on a 
wide variety of topics regarding military affairs, including: leave, administration, and 
policy.
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Administrative Orders and Directives, policy, press releases or direct instructional 
techniques.
Similarly, civilian agencies need to develop education strategies for the general 
public from a civilian justice perspective. They also need to educate their justice officials 
on OSIs and their correlation to civilian justice and public safety. This training may be 
obtained from military personnel who are likely the subject matter experts. In order to 
avoid duplication of effort, joint training between civilian and military organizations such 
as police, prosecution, and corrections services on veteran specific issues would promote 
collaboration and foster efficiency.524 Similarly, should TSCMs or a similar PSC model 
be implemented in the military, joint training and civilian shadowing of existing PSCs 
would be beneficial to improve knowledge and to build relationships to further the 
“whole of governments approach”. Further, existing working groups on mental health 
provide a forum for military leaders to articulate the importance of the OSI issue to their 
civilian counterparts.525
524 There are currently conferences that are jointly attended by military and civilian legal 
practioners, such as the Federation of Law Societies’ National Criminal Law Program, 
online: < http://www.flsc.ca/en/national-criminal-law-program/  >. More specific focused 
training on veteran related issues is what is contemplated here, and such conferences 
could be used as avenues to further these ends.
525 See e.g. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, News Release, 
“Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Discuss Key Justice and Public Safety Issues 
Facing Canadians” (27 January 2012), online: 
<http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2012/just/0127n09.htm>: “Ministers 
acknowledged that mental health issues present significant challenges for the justice 
system. Ministers highlighted the success of the May 2011 Mental Health and Justice 
Symposium in Alberta and discussed the Symposium’s recommendations. Ministers 
asked senior officials to further engage their health and social service counterparts in 
reviewing the recommendations and developing a work plan with the view of more 
effectively managing this at-risk population.” 
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There are obviously more legislative, policy and education initiatives that can be 
developed. The “campaign plan” needs to remain flexible, agile and adapt to new 
information as it becomes available. The most important component is that it be 
developed and that implementation begins.   
Aristotle is attributed with the statement that “we make war that we may live in 
peace”.526 Veterans returning from war seek a life of peace. Some find little and are 
forced to live with the demons of OSIs. It is inherently unreasonable and unfair to 
systematically respond to combat injuries by prosecuting and incarcerating veterans who 
“act out” due to their illnesses. The very notion “might strike thoughtful Canadians as 
manifestly unjust.”527 A leading academic in Canadian mental health law, Professor 
Archie Kaiser, succinctly and correctly summarized that “[t]o incarcerate people merely 
because we have failed to develop appropriate supports has always been shameful 
[….T]his is totally unacceptable.”528
The pith and substance of Kaiser’s comments were echoed in the Second 
Independent Review of Justice Patrick LeSage which was tabled last month in 
Parliament. Following extended consultations, review and analysis, his sixth 
recommendation was that “[t]he senior ranks of the Canadian military are encouraged to 
do their utmost to ensure that those suffering from mental health issues are not placed in 
the criminal justice system by default but receive the help they need from our health care 
526 See e.g. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, eds., Handbook of  Peace and Conflict 
Studies (New York: Routedge, 2007) at 347. See also Roberta Lynn Wodenscheck, The
Human Right to Peace: Why Such a Right Should be Recognized (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
ProQuest, 2004) at 31.
527 Supra, note 267.
528 Supra, note 5.
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system.”529 This thesis has attempted to address these concerns while balancing the 
military requirements of maintaining an effective fighting force.  
529 The Honourable Justice Patrick J. LeSage, C.M., O.Ont., Q.C., “The Second 
Independent Review Authority to The Honourable Peter G. MacKay Minister of National 
Defence” (December 2011) at 18.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION
This thesis has discussed the perceived “crisis” of OSIs and its impact on serving 
military members, veterans and their families.530 In particular, it has focused on its 
correlation with military justice and civilian justice processes. It has suggested that 
alternative measures need to be created or improved for military personnel and veterans 
suffering from OSIs. In order to substantiate this position, this examination has reviewed 
the history of mental health in combat and modern understandings of the injuries, 
including the concept of comorbidity. It has articulated the difficulty in detecting the 
illness, particularly for justice officials. Further, it has compared existing processes for 
dealing with mentally injured veterans in the civilian and military justice system. It has 
also compared treatment with both United States’ justice systems. It has articulated why 
this issue is relevant now by describing the scope of the problem for the Canadian Forces 
and the current challenges in detection and prevention of activities attracting military 
penal consequences. It has shown that there are significant numbers of veterans 
anticipated to be suffering from OSIs, and that there is a correlation to disciplinary or 
criminal behavior.  
In building upon existing civilian and foreign models and ideas, this thesis 
proposed a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process. It has justified its 
use by referring to the underlying philosophies of the military justice system, statements 
of key officials, and the stated purpose of military justice: discipline, morale and 
efficiency. It is hoped that innovative justice methods will better balance rehabilitation, 
530 See e.g. supra, note 159.
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public safety and the public interest by treating veterans with the respect and care that 
they deserve.
In addition, the proposal advocates building partnerships with civilian justice 
officials by using a “whole of governments” approach to deal with veterans who have or 
will reintegrate into civil society. It provides a blueprint or “campaign plan” upon which 
the Canadian Forces and others can build. It suggests three main areas of action, namely: 
legislative reform, policy reform, and an educational initiative for justice issues 
impacting veterans and military members with OSIs. 
 There were also specific collateral recommendations raised which form part of the 
overall proposed campaign plan. Some of these ideas included better data collection, 
tracking and analysis as it relates to mentally injured veterans or those suffering from 
TBIs. It was suggested that this information be provided and reviewed in the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) annual report as it relates to military justice. Further, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance from Attorney Generals, should analyze 
the information related to civilian justice. Also, there should be a concerted strategy for 
data collection on traumatized veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails 
and prisons. This should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections 
Canada and the Department of National Defence. It is hoped that understanding how and 
why veterans end up before justice processes may help identify criminogenic factors and 
improve prevention and treatment strategies. 
This thesis also recommended that there be better systematic processes to track, 
monitor and assist released veterans. This may help ensure a safer transition to civil 
society.  Part of this solution may be to provide options for veterans to self-identify OSIs 
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on their provincial driver’s license. This process should be linked to Veteran’s Affairs, 
providing that department with an opportunity to offer services to injured veterans who 
self-identify. 
It was also suggested that more stringent policies that address mental health 
discrimination are required to assist in expediting change and defeating stigma among the 
veteran and military community. Some improvements suggested included: better 
safeguards on employment through accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI 
harassment and increased privacy safeguards.   
As part of the education component, this thesis suggested that there is a need for 
all military justice participants to be trained to detect mental illness and to identify when 
there is a relevant correlation to the offence(s) charged. In particular, justice officials 
need more training on the symptoms of mental illness, mental health problems and 
addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and referral. Within the unique summary trial 
process, specific training on detection needs to be incorporated into accreditation 
processes for presiding and assisting officers. 
This thesis also recommended that elections to court martial be provided to 
mentally injured members regardless of the charge they are facing. Further, it was 
suggested that there is a need for specific policy direction from military justice leaders on 
how subordinates are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected, 
alleged or proven. These policies would enhance consistency in veteran treatment by 
justice officials, increase awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection.
This thesis also recommends that the Government of Canada attempt to quantify 
the actual costs of mentally injured veterans. This may help foster broader acceptance of 
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a treatment-based approach by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial 
benefits of mitigating it.  
Further, it was recommended that governments provide an option for specialized 
housing and treatment for veteran inmates in Canadian civilian institutions. This may 
better treat the root illness and reduce overall costs to the taxpayer.  
In addition, this thesis advocated the creation of legislation which expressly
considers the impact of military trauma and injuries in Canada as it relates to criminal 
and disciplinary processes. This could include options for treatment based diversion or 
sentence mitigation when appropriate.  
A reasonably informed person would know that the OJAG has been proactive and 
diligent in recognizing the issues identified herein, and have taken timely steps to educate 
its members of the arguments surrounding the problem.531 Further, this current 
government has been the most legislatively proactive government in advancing military 
justice for some time.532 In addition, the concept of PSCs is cutting edge and is only now 
taking hold in civilian justice.533 More importantly, the use of formalized diversion for 
military “correction” is only now being openly questioned534 and debated.535
531 Supra, note 476.
532 See e.g. supra, note 143 and 432.
533 See e.g. supra, note 109: “Beginning in the area of mental health, this approach has 
expanded to consider matters within criminal law such as drug abuse and domestic 
violence and has spread from the U.S. to many jurisdictions. Canada has not yet 
embraced problem solving courts to the same extent as has the U.S., although there are 
signs that both federal and provincial governments in Canada are keen to do so. There are 
currently Drug Treatment Courts (DTCs) in Toronto, Vancouver and St. John and the 
Canadian Department of Justice announced its plan to create three new DTCs in the next 
12 months. Problem solving court processes have also arisen in Canada in cases 
concerning mental health, aboriginal justice and domestic violence”. 
534 Ibid: “Problem solving courts have developed in response to the realization that a “one 
size fits all” approach to criminal justice does not work in some contexts. The adversarial 
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 Also, military leaders truly do care about their people, including those released. 
The idea that a member or veteran would “fall through the cracks” saddens anyone in 
uniform. If it occurs during a leader’s watch, it would be deemed by most as a personal 
leadership failure.536
While all players truly have the best interests of Canadian Forces veterans at 
heart, they must now consider new alternatives to improve conditions and existing justice 
processes for them. While a proposal has been provided, it is acknowledged that 
improvements or other options may ultimately be preferable. Still, it is imperative that 
decision makers do not become bogged down in the pursuit of perfection. Instead of 
over-analysis, immediate actions that are adapted over time will generate progress. Using 
nature of the traditional criminal justice model cannot effectively handle the complexity 
of certain human and social problems, where failing to deal with fundamental causes 
almost guarantees re-offending. As a result, initiatives have emerged which are designed 
to enable courts to respond more effectively to cases where complex, often overlapping, 
and sometimes intractable social and personal issues are involved. Specifically, courts 
attempt to deal holistically with cases involving these difficult socio-legal problems by 
implementing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence wherein judicial case processing 
is partnered with treatment providers and community groups to provide follow-up and 
support for victims and offenders alike in order to reduce recidivism.” [Emphasis mine]
535 See e.g. supra, note 2.
536 See e.g. National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine (Ottawa:
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005) at 6 and 25: “[E]ffective CF leaders at 
all levels […] demonstrate concern for the well-being of their subordinates, represent 
their interests, and ensure they are supported and taken care of by the organization [….] 
The whole purpose of leadership in the CF is to achieve essential outcomes. Essential 
outcomes for the CF fall into the four broad categories of mission success, internal 
integration, member well-being and commitment, and external adaptability. Although 
mission success will almost always take precedence over other considerations, failure to 
pay sufficient attention to other dimensions of effectiveness can seriously undermine 
overall performance and may have secondary adverse effects on the image and reputation 
of the CF or on public confidence and support. CF leaders have to understand that 
effectiveness means paying attention to all essential outcomes. At times, this may require 
leaders to make trade-offs, but part of the burden of leadership involves dealing with 
competing values and priorities and managing the risks inherent in making decisions.” 
[Emphasis mine]  
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the ninety-percent solution concept will ensure that leaders take appropriate risks to be 
effective in resolving the goal of reducing OSIs among its members and veterans. In the 
words of General Patton, “a good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect 
plan next week [….]”537
The goal expressed here is consistent with the new Canadian Mental Health 
Strategy538 and the CDS’s higher intent to foster a climate of understanding and support 
for OSI members.539 Canadian Forces leaders have a responsibility, not only to meet this 
intent, but to advocate for and protect their people in the pursuit of operational efficiency.
The idea of systematically treating mental illness with prosecution or 
incarceration seems inherently unreasonable and unfair in a developed, civilized and 
informed nation. To impose this type of treatment upon our nation’s veterans is not only 
outlandish, but should shock the conscience of any reasonably informed member of the 
community. Many of these military members became psychologically traumatized as 
they sat and waited in the dirt of a foreign country, with bullets or explosions surrounding 
them as they watched their friends be blown up, lose limbs or expire in their arms.   
In the words of the current MND, "[t]he men and women who serve and sacrifice 
in Canada's name need to know that their government will stand behind them and provide 
the benefits they need when their service is complete […]"540 Standing behind our 
nations’ service members and veterans requires a multi-pronged approach. Recently, the 
government has made significant advancements for veterans with OSIs in numerous areas 
537 Supra, note 478. 
538 Supra, note 140. 
539 Supra, note 223. 
540 Kris Sims, “Gov't won't appeal veterans' benefits ruling”, the observer.ca (29 May 
2012) online: Sarnia Observer <http://www.theobserver.ca/2012/05/29/govt-wont-appeal-
veterans-benefits-ruling>.
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including: education,541  employment,542 medical treatment,543 and financial 
compensation.544 It is now time to look at how Canada’s justice systems can help reduce 
injured veterans’ problems, rather than adding to them. It is time to rehabilitate existing 
legal processes to adapt to the new conditions on the ground, by using new tactics. These 
tactics will include ensuring that veterans receive equal access to justice processes that 
are available to civilian counterparts. By implementing a treatment-based option to 
justice processes, it is hoped that wounded veterans will find the peace and happiness 
they deserve when they come home.  
541 See e.g. Meaghan Whelan, “SIFE Memorial launches program for Canadian Forces” 
Memorial University, online: Memorial University of Newfoundland 
<http://today.mun.ca/news.php?news_id=4804>:  “A group of Canadian Forces members 
[…] participate in SIFE Memorial’s Based in Business program. The program, which is a 
partnership with the Department of National Defence, gives medically-discharged 
Canadian Forces members training and mentorship as they develop business plans and 
put them into action. It’s the first-ever program of its kind in Canada.” 
542 See e.g. The Canadian Press, “Helmets to hard hats: Harper launches job program for 
vets” CityNews Toronto (7 January 2012), online: Rogers Communications 
<http://www.citytv.com/toronto/citynews/news/national/article/179176--helmets-to-hard-
hats-harper-launches-job-program-for-vets>: “Helmets to Hardhats will […] provide 
exclusive access for veterans to jobs and training opportunities in the construction 
industry. That will include disabled veterans, reservists and transitioning members of the 
Canadian Armed Forces. It will also offer apprenticeships in various building trades. The 
Helmets to Hard Hats program […] builds on a program that has run for almost a decade 
in the United States [….]” 
543 See e.g. supra, note 466.
544 See e.g. “Improving Service to Veterans” Salute (2011), online: Veterans Affairs 
Canada <http://veterans.gc.ca/eng/salute/article/751>: “As the starting point for many 
major improvements, last fall the Government announced increased monthly benefits for 
Canadian Forces Veterans and more flexible financial options for those injured in the line 
of duty. The changes total two billion dollars and will bring the Department another step 
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